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My PhD thesis is an enquiry into the factors that influence the performance of community 
nutrition workers known as Anganwadi workers (AWWs) employed by the Integrated Child 
Development Services (ICDS) scheme in the Indian state of Bihar.  
My research question asks: what factors influence the performance of AWWs and how does the 
addition of a technology augmented intervention influence AWW performance in the context of a 
state with a high burden of child undernutrition. I use qualitative and quantitative methods to 
answer my research question. To explore the concept of performance in the AWW context, I 
developed a conceptual framework informed by a review of frameworks on the performance of 
community and facility-based health workers.  
In my research I utilise the context of a pilot programme – the Bihar Child Support Programme – 
that introduced mobile phone technology as a job aid for the AWW, combined with a monetary 
incentive.  
As part of the qualitative research, I conducted 30 semi-structured interviews with AWWs 
including 15 AWWs who received the mobile phone technology and monetary incentives 
intervention of the BCSP. I used a hybrid method of inductive and deductive thematic analysis to 
analyse the data.  
In the quantitative research, I employed a DifferenceinDifference estimation strategy to assess 
the influence of the mobile phone technology and monetary incentives intervention on the 
uptake of ICDS services linked to the intervention.  
I found a range of factors that impact on AWW performance. My research identified four new 
factors to add to the starting framework: family support, beneficiary and AWW service 
preferences, seasonal migration, and corruption.  
The technology augmented intervention examined in this thesis would have been expected to be 
successful based on the existing frameworks for community and facility-based health worker 
performance. However, it had no positive impact on household level service delivery outcomes. 





the primary explanatory for this. The intervention sought to strengthen information-oriented 
nutrition services (weighing and counselling) but this was not a preference for either the 
beneficiaries (who prefer product-oriented services) or AWWs (who prefer education related 
services due to their self-identification as pre-school teachers) and as such did not lead to impact. 
This has implications for the understanding of the motivation and performance of AWWs and 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
This thesis is an enquiry into the factors that influence the performance of community nutrition 
workers known as Anganwadi workers (hereafter, AWWs) employed by the Integrated Child 
Development Services (hereafter, ICDS) scheme in the Indian state of Bihar. The ICDS and AWWs 
have a significant role in the context of the high burden of child undernutrition in India. Child 
undernutrition levels in India remain among the worst in the world (Raykar et al., 2015). The ICDS 
is the main government of India programme to address undernutrition. At the village level, AWWs 
provide significant maternal and child health and nutrition services to young children and 
mothers whilst also working as pre-school teachers. Hence, they cover the whole range of early 
childhood developmental stages from conception to pre-schooling. In the battle against child 
undernutrition, what constitutes an AWW’s performance remains inadequately addressed. While 
existing branches of public health literature have examined in detail the factors that influence the 
performance of community and facility-based health workers, few studies have examined the 
performance of workers such as AWWs who perform health and nutrition activities along with 
broader early childhood developmental activities.  
The Indian state of Bihar offers a unique empirical setting to study AWW performance because, 
being one of the states with the highest levels of child undernutrition, it has been demonstrating 
a steady commitment through various state-led interventions to improve AWW and ICDS 
performance. Making use of this opportunity to learn more about AWW performance, I structure 
this research around three distinct analytical chapters, which explore this topic using qualitative 
and quantitative methods.  
The remainder of this introduction is organised as follows: section 1.1 describes the personal and 
academic motivation for this thesis; section 1.2 describes the geographic and programme 
contexts the thesis is situated in; section 1.3 outlines the overall analytical approach; and section 
1.4 provides an overview of the thesis by connecting the research questions and chapters.  
1.1 Personal and academic motivation  
In the year 2006, the National Family Health Survey (known as NFHS3) released its third round 
of findings on maternal and child health and nutrition levels in India. It revealed the persistent 
and deep crisis of undernutrition levels amongst under-five children in the country. Other than 
providing much-needed data, it also stirred discussions on the topic among central and state 





students like me. Although my interest in the topic of child undernutrition started with reading 
the NFHS3 fact sheets, it developed into an academic interest when I used the NFHS3 raw 
datasets to study the determinants of child undernutrition in India for my Masters’ dissertation.  
Almost a decade after the NFHS3, the fourth round (NFHS4, 2015-16) also underlines India’s 
high levels of child undernutrition. India is home to more than one-third of the world’s stunted1 
children (IFPRI, 2016). In India, 40 million children under five are stunted (low height for age) and 
17 million wasted (low weight for height) (Raykar et al., 2015). Figure 1 presents the trends in 
nutritional status from 1993 to 2016.  
Figure 1 Trends in nutritional status in India 1993-2016  
 
(Source: Author compiled from nutritional survey2 reports) 
                                                          
1 The majority of empirical work uses anthropometric indicators to understand the nutritional status of 
children.  Nutritional deficits are identified by the prevalence of stunting, underweight, or wasting (defined 
using anthropometric Z scores compared to an international reference population calculated by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO)). Stunting is linear growth retardation and it captures chronic undernutrition - 
a failure to receive adequate nutrition over a long period or the presence of chronic/recurrent diarrhoea. 
Underweight is a measure of both acute and chronic undernutrition and captures seasonal variations in 
food intake or recent phases of illness. Wasting captures the thinness of children and indicates acute 
undernutrition. A child would be considered stunted when height-for- age is below -2 standard deviations 
(SD), underweight when weight- for- age is below -2 SD and wasted when weight-for-height is below -2SD 
with respect to the median of the reference population (WHO, 2010).  
2 Nutritional survey reports used for this graph are—(NFHS-3, 2007; NFHS-4, 2015; Rapid Survey on 



































Although the under-five stunting and underweight (low weight for age) rates of Indian children 
declined since 2006, they are at higher levels than those reported in other countries in the region 
which are considerably poorer (e.g. Bangladesh3).  
Though evidence-based solutions to improve maternal and child nutrition are available, there is 
a lack of evidence on the best operational strategies to implement them (Menon et al., 2014).  
Community health programmes delivered through Community Health Workers (CHWs) have 
been shown to effectively deliver key maternal and child health and nutrition interventions at the 
community level in low and middle-income countries (Haines et al., 2007; Lewin et al., 2010). The 
performance of community health programmes delivered by CHWs is heavily influenced by 
individual CHW characteristics, programme, and contextual factors (Haines et al., 2007; Kok et 
al., 2014, 2015; Lehmann & Sanders, 2007; Rowe et al., 2005).  
India has invested in efforts to reduce childhood undernutrition and improve maternal and child 
health through its two flagship CHW programmes— the ICDS scheme and National Health Mission 
(NHM). Together, these two programmes deliver all fourteen essential nutrition interventions4 
proved to improve maternal and child nutrition using two types of CHWs (Avula et al., 2013). The 
ICDS worker is AWW and the NHM worker is Accredited Social Health Activist (ASHA). In the wider 
public health literature, these two workers are considered as CHWs. However, in the Indian 
context the AWW has health and nutrition responsibilities and ASHAs have only health 
responsibilities (GoI MWCD, 2010; MWCD, 2017). Unlike the NHM, which only delivers health 
interventions through Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs), the ICDS delivers both health 
and nutrition interventions through its cadre of 1.34 million AWWs (MWCD, 2017).  
In my career before this doctoral work, I conducted fieldwork on various social welfare policies in 
interior villages of Northern Indian states (Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, and Uttar 
Pradesh) which have the highest rates of child undernutrition. Even when my fieldwork was not 
                                                          
3 From 2006 to 2014, whilst the under 5 stunting prevalence in India declined from 48% to 39%, in 
Bangladesh it decreased from 43% to 36% (IFPRI, 2016).  
4 The 14 essential inputs for child nutrition are- Timely initiation of breast-feeding within one hour of birth; 
Exclusive breastfeeding during the first 6 months of life; Timely introduction of complementary foods at 6 
months; Age-appropriate complementary feeding, adequate in terms of quality, quantity and frequency, 
for children ages 6-24 months; Prevention of anaemia; Safe handling of complementary foods and hygienic 
complementary feeding practices; Full immunisation; Reducing Vit A deficiency; Reducing burden of 
intestinal parasites; Prevention and treatment of diarrhoea; Timely and quality therapeutic feeding and 
care for all children with severe acute malnutrition; Improved food and nutrition intake for adolescent girls, 
particularly to prevent anaemia; Improved food and nutrient intake for adult women, including during 
pregnancy and lactation; Prevention and treatment of Malaria. The ICDS scheme has interventions to cover 
12 out of 14 essential inputs listed above. Two essential inputs ICDS interventions don’t cover are- Reducing 
burden of intestinal parasites and Prevention and treatment of Malaria. [Source: (Avula et al., 2013), Lancet 
Series on Maternal and Child Undernutrition (Bhutta et al., 2008); (Coalition for Sustainable Nutrition 





directly related to maternal and child health, I interacted with AWWs in villages as they had a 
prominent presence in a village. It is a common practice for journalists, government and non-
governmental staff, social activists, and researchers like me to approach AWWs to inquire about 
the village population size, recent births and deaths, geographic boundaries, and to locate people 
in the villages. As a population data repository, a provider of integrated child development 
services, and a resident of the village, AWWs embodied the role of a representative of the welfare 
state and a fellow villager (Sreerekha, 2016). I was curious to see them deliver a programme 
mandate in a complex environment where the boundary between the personal and professional 
is often blurred.  
Throughout my experience, I encountered Anganwadi Centres5 (hereafter, AWCs) which varied 
in quality and AWWs who provided varied levels of support across villages, districts6, and states. 
The majority of the studies that have examined the implementation of the ICDS confirm this 
observation. These studies on the ICDS suggest that, overall, it is performing sub-optimally. 
Implementation of services is often poor leading to low coverage7 (Biswas & Verma, 2009; CBGA, 
2011; Dasgupta et al., 2012; Drèze, 2006; FOCUS, 2006; HUNGaMA, 2011; Maity, 2016; Nayak & 
Saxena, 2006; NIPCCD, 2009a, 2009b; Planning Commission, 2011; Saxena & Srivastava, 2009; 
Sinha, 2006). Even though the available evidence suggests that the ICDS is not performing 
optimally especially in high burden undernutrition states, the reach of the overall ICDS platform 
is high as it has been documented to exist even in remote villages. Considering AWWs are 
responsible for the delivery of the ICDS services, their performance is critical for the overall 
programme performance (Biswas & Verma, 2009). However, the evidence base on what shapes 
AWW performance is limited.  The evidence on the ICDS that is available primarily focuses on 
describing the shortfall in human resources management (especially workload, role clarity, 
supervision, and training) and resources and logistics (job aids, transport, supplies) but not the 
actual worker beyond her levels of skills and knowledge (Agarwal et al., 2015; Bhattacharji et al., 
1986; Gujral et al., 1991; Maity, 2016; Planning Commission, 2011).  
States in India have invested in initiatives to reduce the burden of child undernutrition. The 
Nutrition Mission led initiatives in Maharashtra has been reported as one such successful state-
                                                          
5 Buildings from which AWWs operate.  
6 A district is an administrative division of an Indian state.  
7 However, this performance is varied across India. For example, southern states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala 
have a history of well-equipped AWCs with educated AWWs, but states like Bihar have the least supported 
AWWs and most resource constrained AWCs (FOCUS, 2006; Maity, 2016; Nayak & Saxena, 2006; Planning 





led initiative (IFPRI, 2014). The government of Bihar, with the input of key development partners8, 
have initiated a series of projects to improve the implementation of the ICDS programme. 
Structural improvements to the AWC buildings, introducing an additional worker, providing cash 
transfers to beneficiaries, providing financial and non-financial incentives and building capacities 
of AWWs are some of the initiatives currently ongoing or recently completed. In 2013, I got the 
opportunity to be part of one these initiatives. As part of an organisation selected to design and 
evaluate a pilot maternal and child support programme utilising the ICDS platform, I interacted 
with several AWWs across Bihar.  
The Bihar Child Support Programme (BCSP) is one of a range of government of Bihar initiated 
experiments to improve maternal and child nutrition with technical and financial assistance from 
the Department for International Development (DFID) (OPM, 2014). The BCSP was introduced by 
the Social Welfare Department (SWD) of the government of Bihar, in three administrative blocks9 
of Gaya district in Bihar10. The BCSP aimed to improve ICDS service delivery through demand and 
supply-side interventions11. The programme piloted a monthly maternal and child cash transfer 
as the demand-side intervention.  As the supply-side intervention, it gave mobile phones to 
AWWs as a job aid to help them with real-time monitoring. It also provided monetary incentives 
to AWWs to encourage them to use the mobile phone technology. Although providing cash 
transfers to households is a widely studied social protection measure, programmes using the 
potential of mobile phone technology to improve health and nutrition service delivery is a 
relatively new area of research. A review of the evidence in the emerging fields of m-Health12 and 
                                                          
8 After the political change in 2005 Bihar started demonstrating more receptiveness to technical assistance 
and financial assistance from development partners. Since then, the nutrition landscape in Bihar has many 
players, but a few remain as key players. They are- United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF), Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), Save the Children, British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) Media Action, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF),and Department for 
International Development (DFID) etc. (Alive and Thrive, 2014). See Annexe B for a detailed description of 
donor engagement in Bihar.  
9 Administrative unit below district/sub-division covering 1,00,000 to 2,00,000 population. 
10 I worked for the programme as part of the organization Oxford Policy Management (OPM) that was hired 
to design, provide implementation support to, and evaluate the programme. I worked on the programme 
prior to its implementation as part of the inception and evaluation team leading the baseline data collection 
from January 2013 to August 2013.  
11 The terms demand and supply are commonly used in economic theory. In the BCSP context a demand-
side intervention is defined as an intervention that aimed at the beneficiary/household. Supply-side 
interventions are considered as those piloted to improve government systems, in this case especially the 
AWW and AWC.   
12 The terms m-Health and m-Nutrition are used to denote interventions that use mobile phones in health 






m-Nutrition confirms this observation (Agarwal et al. 2015, Barun et. al 2013, and Labrique et.al 
2013).  
Considering AWWs continue to work in low-resource settings with a high burden of child 
undernutrition, the current evidence on the ICDS does not shed light on how they negotiate 
existing limitations and emerging opportunities (e.g. use of monetarily incentivised mobile phone 
technology) in those settings. Understanding how AWWs negotiate with existing limitations and 
emerging opportunities offered by technology is a significant step towards understanding their 
performance. The question of what constitutes AWW performance and how various factors 
including new technology influence it needs to be adequately understood to intensify AWWs’ 
battle against child undernutrition, especially in the context of a state like Bihar. At this juncture, 
I found my motivation taking the shape of an academic quest asking a pertinent question 
inadequately answered in the literature what factors influence the performance of AWWs and 
how does the addition of a technology augmented intervention influence AWW performance in 
the context of a state with a high burden of child undernutrition?  
1.2  Understanding the context: Bihar and the ICDS 
This thesis is situated in the geographic context of a high burden child undernutrition state, Bihar, 
and the programme context of one of the world’s largest CHW programmes, the ICDS, to study 
the performance of AWWs. Within the BiharICDS context, it also utilises the context of a pilot 
programme, the BCSP as an empirical site to answer specific research questions. In this section, I 
introduce key features of the geographic (Bihar) and programme (the ICDS) contexts to lay a 
foundation to situate the overall significance and contributions of this thesis. I describe in detail 
my empirical site of the BCSP in Chapter 3.  
Geographical13 context: Bihar  
The state of Bihar14, situated in the fertile Gangetic plain, possesses a rich range of natural 
resources (e.g. coal, steel) (Ministry of Finance Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016). However, 
it has long been at the bottom of India’s poverty rankings and is a consistently poor 
performer in social development indicators (UNDP, 2011; World Bank, 2005). It has been 
characterised as embodying the interface of an old and new India  a feudal agrarian society 
and a fast-growing newly globalised economy (Singh & Stern, 2014). As a feudal society, it 
                                                          
13 Geographical maps of Bihar and Gaya are given in Annex A.  






historically preserved traditional social biases that lead to caste15 and class conflicts, 
especially caste conflicts between upper and lower caste Hindus (Bhatia, 2005; Gajrani, 
2004; Sharma et al., 2012). The social fabric of Bihar has long been governed by caste-based 
patronage politics, corruption, and bad governance. In the period 1990 to 2005, Bihar faced 
intensified deterioration in growth and development due to the excessive patronage 
political practices leading to state incapacity in planning and day-to-day governance 
(Mathew & Moore, 2011).  
The district of Gaya is a popular tourist destination due to its religious significance in 
Buddhism and Hinduism. Bodhgaya, a part of the Gaya district, houses the famous Maha 
Bodhi temple where it is believed by Buddhists that Buddha found enlightenment. It is a hub 
of Buddhist monasteries and occupies a significant space in religious tourism. In Hinduism, 
Gaya is a significant place for rituals related to the salvation of ancestors. Although Gaya is 
the second highest district contributor of the State Domestic Product (SDP) through small-
scale industries and religious tourism, a significant proportion of the population live with 
low standards of living, and pockets of it experience extreme poverty (Ministry of Finance 
Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016; NFHS-4, 2015).  
Since, 2005, with new political leadership16, the state of Bihar has been demonstrating 
efforts to change its reputation by investing in improving economic growth, infrastructure, 
social welfare programmes, law and order, and state governance (Singh & Stern, 2014). 
Although the state witnessed increased economic growth and infrastructure develop ment 
in the last decade, the returns to reforms in governance have been low, especially the 
improvement of social welfare programmes. The state did achieve commendable 
improvements in the performance of the Public Distribution System17 (PDS) and education 
initiatives, but reducing child undernutrition and improving maternal and child health 
remains a challenge (Drèze & Khera, 2013; NFHS-4, 2015).  
From 2006 to 2014, all states in India showed a decline in stunting of children below five years. 
However, Bihar is one of the three Indian states18 which had a high rate of under-five stunting in 
                                                          
15 A box on caste (Box 1) in Bihar is presented on page 15.  
16 After a period of rule by Rashtriya Janta Dal (RJD) leaders Lalu Prasad Yadav and Rabri Devi and a short 
period of the president of India’s rule, Nitish Kumar (Janta Dal United) came to power for a second term in 
2005. He remained as the chief minister until May 2014. Although he stepped down as the chief minister 
for less than a year, he got re-elected as the chief minister by the legislatives and later in the 2015 state 
elections.  
17 PDS is in India is a chain of government run ration shops that distributes subsidised food (wheat, rice, 
sugar etc.) to different beneficiary groups in the local catchment area. 
18 Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand are the other two states that showed slow declines in under five stunting 





2006 but which had only slow improvement (see Figure 2 ). Still half (48.3%) of the children below 
age five years are underweight and more than a quarter (27.1%) are wasted in Bihar (NFHS-4, 
2015).  
Figure 2 Stunting rates 2005-06 and 2013-14 in 29 Indian states  
 
(Source: (IFPRI, 2015) 
Therefore, despite the intensified efforts to improve maternal and child health by improving basic 
measures (e.g. filling up the vacant AWW posts, investing in the physical infrastructure of the 
AWCs, sanctioning more AWCs and converging the ICDS and NHM activities at the village level) 
and state-initiated interventions19 (e.g. innovative pilots using technology, additional workers, 
team based goals and incentives, cash transfers, women self-help groups, and food fortification) 
the state is yet to see a significant benefit of these efforts in the form of a substantial reduction 
in child undernutrition20. Although my doctoral study utilises the empirical context of one of these 
state-initiated maternal and child cash transfer interventions, it is primarily aimed at contributing 
towards a richer understanding of preferred human resource management strategies to improve 
the service delivery of national health and nutrition programmes using community health 
workers, and thus contribute to the government of Bihar’s goals to reduce malnutrition among 
young children. 
Programmatic context: the ICDS  
The ICDS was started in 1975 as a pilot in 33 administrative blocks. It began universalisation 
(i.e. scaled up across all districts in all states) following several Supreme Court orders since 
2001 (Kapil, 2002). Table 5 shows the ICDS expansion since its inception in 1975 regarding 
                                                          
19 A detailed list of recently completed and ongoing state-initiatives in health and nutrition service delivery 
is given in Annex B.  





the number of AWCs, AWWs, and beneficiaries (women and children). In the four decad es 
of the ICDS programme, the number of AWWs increased from 4,891 to 1.34 million.  
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*SNP: Supplementary Nutrition Programme  
 
Traditionally the ICDS comprised of six services  preschool education, supplementary 
nutrition, immunisation, health-check-ups, nutritional health education, and referral 
services (GoI MWCD, 2010). However, with the introduction of ASHAs as part of the NHM 
programme from 2006, the activities AWWs perform within the broad service category have 
evolved (Bhatia, 2014). In the current context, an AWW delivers the following services 
1. Preschool education for 3-6-year-old children 
2. SNP 
i. Hot Cooked Meal (HCM): daily lunch for 36-year-old children 
ii. Take Home Ration (THR): monthly dry rations to pregnant and lactating 
women and 6-36-month-old children  
3. Health and nutrition counselling (individual and group) 
4. Preparation for monthly Village Health Sanitation and Nutrition Day (VHSND) to 
facilitate immunisation and weight monitoring of children and pregnant women in 
coordination with ASHAs and Auxiliary Nurse Midwives (ANMs)  
5. Identification and referral of Severely and Acutely Malnourished (SAM) children  
                                                          






Therefore, in theory, an AWW provides a varied set of services. She provides food to children 
and mothers, provides non-formal pre-school teaching, counsels mothers individually and 
as a group, facilitates age-appropriate immunisation, and provides nutrition surveillance 
such as weighing and referral of SAM children. The monthly VHSND is a platform to deliver 
a set of health services primarily for women and children and an opportunity for the two 
village-level CHWs (AWW and ASHA) to coordinate under the leadership of the facility based 
health worker, ANM. An AWW provides the physical space at the AWC to hold a monthly 
VHNSD where the ANM provides immunisation, health check-ups, and Ante-Natal Care 
(ANC), which means that an AWW is not directly responsible for two out of  six of traditional 
ICDS services. However, she is still responsible for monitoring of age-appropriate 
immunisation for every child and weighing of pregnant women as part of the ANC check -ups 
within her catchment area (GoI MWCD, 2010, 2010, 2011).  
Each population segment of 1000 is entitled to have an AWC managed by an AWW who is 
assisted by an Anganwadi Helper (AWH) in cooking and cleaning. An AWW works from the 
AWC, which is usually a physical structure with one or two rooms. The AWC functions either 
in ICDS owned buildings or any other government buildings or rented premises. The AWCs 
are expected to have facilities for clean drinking water, sanitation, and cooking as well as 
medicines (such as oral rehydration salts, de-worming tablets, etc.). It is also expected that 
a well-functioning AWC will have teaching aids, health and nutrition counselling posters, 
seating facilities for children, weighing machines, and growth charts. Moreover, a clean 
environment fostering childcare should be provided (GoI MWCD, 2010, 2010, 2011). Apart 
from district-level Nutritional Rehabilitation Centre (NRC) attached to primary health care 
facilities to treat SAM children, the AWC is the only provider of public nutrition services. 
However, many studies have pointed out that a high proportion of AWCs across the country 
suffer from the absence of basic facilities like clean drinking water or sanitation (Dasgupta 
et al., 2012; FOCUS, 2006; HUNGaMA, 2011; Maity, 2016; Planning Commission, 2011) .  
The ICDS is a human resource intensive public programme, with 35-50% of its budget spent 
on AWWs (Biswas & Verma, 2009). The ICDS recognises AWWs as ‘honorary workers’ from 
the local community who have come forward to render their services, on a part-time basis, 
in child care and development (GoI MWCD, 2010). Thus, they are paid a fixed honorarium 
per month. In Bihar, an AWW and an AWH are paid up to Rs. 3000 ($45)22 and Rs. 1500 
                                                          






($22.5) respectively depending on their educational qualifications (SWD, 2015a). Different 
states provide a top-up to the minimum honorarium amount. For example, the South Indian 
state Kerala gives Rs. 5000 as the monthly honorarium (GoI MWCD, 2015). In most of the 
states, AWWs and AWHs are contractual labourers with temporary job status (i.e. they do 
not have the permanent employee status that entitles them to a minimum wage salary or 
pension or other government employee benefits). Only the state of  Tamil Nadu and Union 
Territory Puducherry have recognised AWWs as government employees (GoI MWCD, 2015).  
The minimum education qualification to become an AWW is ten years of education in Bihar. 
AWWs are expected to work four to six hours per day for six days a week. AWWs are 
supervised by Lady Supervisors (LS). Each LS supervises 20-30 centres. They are based at the 
administrative block headquarters and are supposed to visit AWCs on a regular basis. The 
LSs support AWWs by helping them solve their daily operational issues, reporting their 
difficulties to higher officials, making sure they have supplies for the month and monitoring 
their work. The Child Development Project Officers (CDPOs) posted at the block level 
(covering a population of 100,000- 250,000) provide the next line of management support 
(GoI MWCD, 2010, 2011).  
1.3 Overarching analytical approach  
This thesis is situated within the fields of public health and nutrition. Overall, I follow a mixed 
methodology combining qualitative and quantitative methods to answer my research question, 
simultaneously engaging with public health frameworks on worker performance and seeking to 
draw lessons for policy.  
My central research question asks: what factors influence the performance of AWWs and how 
does the addition of a technology augmented intervention influence AWW performance in the 
context of a state with a high burden of child undernutrition? 
To conceptually and empirically explore the concept of performance in the AWW context, I define 
AWW performance as ‘AWWs making services accessible with required quality (i.e. fidelity to 
guidelines)’. I derived the conceptual framework on AWW performance from reviewing the 
relevant public health literature. It envisages that individual, programmatic, community, and 
organisational factors act as determinants of AWW performance at the AWW level (discussed in 
Chapter 2). I define the monetarily incentivised mobile phone technology intervention as an 
augmentation in programme factors because the literature identifies monetary incentives within 
the broader category of incentives and mobile phones within the category of job aids and both 





Based on the development of the conceptual framework, I refined my central research question 
into two sub-questions RQ1 and RQ2. The primary aim of this thesis is to understand factors that 
influence AWW performance, especially after a technology augmented intervention has been 
implemented to improve AWW performance. Each of the research questions specifically focuses 
on filling identified research gaps in the public health literature (discussed in Chapter 2). 
Separating the questions allowed me to explore and examine specific areas of performance 
identified in the conceptual framework in depth. The nature of the research questions led me to 
choose suitable research methods to answer them. I use qualitative methods to answer RQ1 and 
combine qualitative and quantitative methods to answer RQ 2. Table 2 provides an overview of 
research questions, aims, methodology and chapter categorisation of this thesis.  
Table 2 Overall analytical approach  
Research question  Research aims Methodology Chapters  
Central 
question  
What factors influence the performance of AWWs and how 
does the addition of a technology augmented intervention 
influence AWW performance in the context of a state with a 
high burden of child undernutrition? 
Mixed  
4,5, 6, and 7  
Sub-question  
RQ 1 
What are the individual, 
programmatic, community, 
and organisational factors 
that influence AWW 
performance? 







RQ 2  
How and why does a change 
to the programmatic factors 
(mobile phone technology 
and monetary incentives 
bundle) influence AWW 
performance? 
Understanding how and why 
the monetarily incentivised 
mobile phone technology 
intervention influences the 
uptake of ICDS services linked 




Understanding how and why 
the monetarily incentivised 
mobile phone technology 
intervention influences AWW 
performance  
Qualitative  6 
 
I conducted qualitative fieldwork that informs two different chapters with separate objectives. 
The two objectives were1) understand what and how individual, programmatic, community and 
organisational factors influence AWW performance and 2) understand how and why the 
technology augmented intervention with a monetary incentive component influences AWW 
performance. I also conducted quantitative analysis to examine the influence of the technology 
augmented intervention’s influence on the household uptake of services. In Chapter 3, I provide 





1.4 Structure of the thesis  
Overall this thesis comprises of three background chapters and four analytical chapters. I now 
describe the overview of each of the constituent chapters of my thesis.  
Chapter Two: Conceptual review and conceptual framework  
The next chapter provides an analytical summary of the empirical and conceptual evidence 
available on the performance of AWWs, and of community and facility-based health workers 
across the world. In doing so, the chapter highlights the empirical and conceptual research gap in 
understanding AWW performance within the ICDS literature and lays out key lessons from the 
existing public health literature on conceptualising performance of workers such as AWWs. It also 
introduces the emerging fields of m-Health and m-Nutrition and the relevance of studying the 
influence of mobile phone technology and monetary incentives on the performance of workers 
such as AWWs. Finally, the chapter discusses how I used the lessons from the conceptual review 
as the point of departure in developing a conceptual framework on AWW performance.  
Chapter Three: Empirical context and methodology  
In Chapter 3, I describe the BCSP empirical context, discuss my motivation to conduct qualitative 
and quantitative research and my approach in combining them, outline the qualitative methods 
including selection of participants, data collection, and data analysis, and provides a brief 
overview of the quantitative data and estimation strategy.  
Chapter Four: Individual, programmatic, community, and organisational factors that influence 
Anganwadi Workers’ performance  
In Chapter 4, I present findings from my qualitative research that explored the individual, 
programmatic, community, and organisational factors influence AWW performance. The chapter 
aims to present a deeper understanding of an AWW’s lived experiences, feelings, and emotions 
as a village woman and as a programme worker. It briefly recaps the concepts and methods used 
in the research, presents the findings, discusses the implications of the findings, and concludes 
with a summary of conclusions.  
Chapter Five: Effect of the mobile phone technology and monetary incentives by Anganwadi 
Workers on the household uptake of ICDS services  
Chapter 5 presents the findings of my quantitative research. In the chapter, I present the 
quantitative analysis I undertook to examine the influence of the monetarily incentivised mobile 





intervention. The chapter also describes the quantitative data and the empirical strategy used in 
the analysis.  
Chapter Six: Anganwadi Workers’ perceptions and experiences in using the mobile phone technology 
and monetary incentives intervention  
In Chapter 6, I present the findings of my qualitative research that aims to understand the 
influence of the intervention on AWW performance by exploring AWWs’ perceptions and 
experiences. In the chapter, I also provide a recap of the concepts and methods, and discuss the 
analytical framework used in the analysis.  
Chapter Seven: Discussion and conclusion 
Chapter 7 brings together the findings from earlier analytical chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) to 
demonstrate how they present a coherent narrative on AWW performance. I discuss specifically 
how the overall findings make significant contributions towards the conceptual and empirical 
strands of knowledge on the performance of workers such as the AWWs. Moreover, I discuss the 
implications of the thesis findings for policy and practice at the national and state contexts. I also 







Caste (in Hindi Jati) denotes an endogamous kinship group of the individual 
Hindu. Jatis generally have distinctive traditional occupations (e.g. priest, 
administrator, barber, milkmen, porters etc.). In a village, there will be individual 
households belonging to different jatis. In typical Bihari villages, different jatis 
reside in different locations within a village. Broad differences of race, religion, 
culture and language tend to be geographical in nature; the different jatis coexist 
in the same locality (Blair, 1972). Over a region, for example in an entire linguistic 
area, there are often a number of jatis of the same name. These jatis form an 
analytical category that can be denoted as a ‘caste group’ or ‘caste cluster’ (Blair, 
1972) 
The caste groups are roughly categorised in terms on the varna system. This 
classifies Hindu society into four categories- Brahmans (Priests), Kshatriyas 
(Warriors), Vaishyas (Merchants) and Shudras (Workers). The first three classes 
are known as ‘twice born’ varnas, since they by tradition undergo the religious 
initiation ceremony of ‘rebirth’, and in strict orthodoxy they are allowed to hear 
the sacred texts of vedas (Blair, 1972). Actually, there are five categories rather 
than four. The fifth caste group- Dalits fall as the lowest rank in caste rankings. 
Even within the caste groups hierarchies exist. For example, Shudras can be 
further classified in to upper Shudras and lower Shudras. Dalits come even below 
the lower Shudras (Blair, 1972).   
For administrative purposes and for affirmative action policy targeting, the castes 
are grouped as General (or forward class), Other Backward Class (OBC), 
Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST). Forward classes or General mainly 
include all ‘twice born castes’; backward classes include all the Shudra sub-castes. 
Dalits belong to the SC and Adivasis (tribals) belong to Scheduled Tribes (ST). This 
categorisation reflects the traditional hierarchy. 
British Raj politics transformed caste in India. During the Raj, censuses were taken 
giving a great deal of detail of importance to caste groups. This immediately 
triggered the caste associations and mobilised caste groups. Caste associations 
played roles of pressure groups and interest groups. These caste associations 
came around as groups for reservations in educational institutions, the civil 
services and other institutions (Jaffrelot, 2010).  
In Bihar, the twice born castes are- Brahman, Bumihar, Rajput, Kayastha and 
Bania. Shudras can be further classified in to upper Shudras and lower Shudras. 
The main upper Shudra castes are Yadav, Kurmi and Koiri. The main lower Shudra 
castes are Barhi, Dhanuk, Kahar, Kandu, Kumhar, Lohar, Mallah, Nai, Tatwa, Teli 
and others. Caste-based conflicts and discrimination are still part of Bihar’s social 
fabric (Bhatia, 2005; Gajrani, 2004; Sharma et al., 2012). In Bihar, Gaya has the 
highest proportion of SC population (Census of India, 2001). 29.6% of the 
population in Gaya belongs to the SC, and they predominantly live in the rural 
areas (Census of India, 2001). The population of the Manjhi community is one of 
the common caste groups in the SC population. Although caste group wise 
literacy rates are not available at the district level, the state average SC literacy 
rate in 2001 was 28.5% just over half of the overall state average (54.07 %) 
(Census of India, 2001).  
  





Chapter Two: Conceptual review and conceptual framework  
2.1 Introduction  
As laid out in the previous chapter, my central research question asks: What factors influence the 
performance of AWWs and how does the addition of a technology-augmented intervention 
influence AWW performance in the context of a state with a high burden of child undernutrition? 
The specific sub-research questions outlined in the previous chapter were developed based on a 
conceptual review of the literature on the performance of workers like the AWWs. They were 
developed to comprehensively study AWW performance and inform the research gaps identified 
in the relevant literature streams. In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate these research gaps and 
how they are linked to my sub-research questions.  
This chapter has two aims. They are: i) present the lessons from the conceptual review (sections 
2.3 to 2.5) and ii) discuss the conceptual framework (section 2.6). Structurally, the lessons from 
the conceptual review are presented in three sections: section 2.3 summarises the empirical and 
conceptual research gap in understanding AWW performance within the ICDS literature; section 
2.4 lays out key lessons from the existing public health literature on conceptualising23 
performance of workers such as AWWs; and section 2.5 introduces the emerging fields of m-
Health and m-Nutrition and the relevance of studying the influence of mobile phone technology 
and monetary incentives on performance of workers like AWWs. In section 2.6, I discuss how I 
used the lessons from the conceptual review as the point of departure in developing a conceptual 
framework on AWW performance. Finally, a summary of this chapter and the focus of the 
following chapter is provided.  
2.2 Methodology  
The conceptual review drew on a literature search for peer-reviewed academic papers, 
conference papers, and grey literature such as research reports that studied performance, 
especially of workers such as AWWs. I used a comprehensive list of key search terms, specified 
time frames, geographic regions (or countries), and language to guide the search. To review the 
literature, I used the following databases and search engines: Google Scholar, Web of Science, 
Scopus, University e-library catalogues, and government ministry websites. I selected articles, 
                                                          
23 Conceptualisation here means the process of forming the concept of performance which includes gaining 
clarity on determinants of performance, the definition of performance, and how the determinants of 
performance lead up to the measurable outcome of performance. The conceptualisation of performance 
of AWWs also includes contextualizing the definition of performance, and factors influencing performance 





books, and published reports to use in the review after a two-stage screening process title and 
abstract screening.  
Table 3 Conceptual review search specifications  
Theme Key search terms Timeframe Regions/Countries Language(s) 



















2000- 2017  
India  English and Hindi  
Public health  
 
Performance and 
factors influencing it 




CHW/ Health worker+ 










monetary incentives  









performance+ Performance  




Inter-disciplinary   Worker+ Motivation+ 
Performance 
 
 Worker+ Motivation+ 
Performance+ Theory  
No 
specification  
No specification  English  
 
Table 3 summarises the search specifications I used in the conceptual review process. I used 
various combinations of the search terms to narrow down the relevant literature. I used specific 
timeframes for the review of the ICDS and public health literature as those were significant 
periods for the development of the literature streams. Although I did not specify any geographic 
specification for the inter-disciplinary search to review the broader literature on worker 
motivation and performance, I specifically searched for public health literature from Latin 
America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia to understand the performance of workers such as 





As part of the doctoral research, I continuously reviewed the relevant literature. I also used web 
alerts, and snowballing methods to be up-to-date with newly emerging evidence on the topic. 
Hence, this conceptual review was gradually developed and constantly reviewed.  
2.3 Conceptual and empirical evidence on AWW performance  
The studies that have been conducted on the ICDS and AWWs can be broadly classified into three 
categories. In reviewing these three categories of studies, I found empirical and conceptual 
research gaps in understanding AWW performance.  The studies of impact and implementation 
of the ICDS do not link to variations at the AWW level (so reveal limited understanding into the 
drivers of AWW performance), whereas studies that assessed the influence of AWW 
characteristics on health and nutrition service delivery have limited conceptual clarity on how 
they define performance. Table 4 provides a synthesis of these three categories of studies on the 
ICDS and AWWs and highlights the research gaps in understanding AWW performance. In the 
next sub-sections, I discuss each of these three categories of studies in detail.  
Table 4 Research gaps on AWW performance 
Categories and aim of 
studies 
Overall findings Definition of performance   Research gap 
Assessed the impact of 
the ICDS on child health 
and nutritional outcomes, 
infant survival, child food 
intake, and women’s 
labour force participation 
Overall the studies show the 
mixed impact of the ICDS.The 
more recent studies show 
positive influence of the 
presence of AWCs in the 
village or utilisation of the 
SNP on child health and 
nutritional outcomes, infant 
survival, child food intake, 
and mother’s labour force 
participation. 
ICDS performance as 
impact on populatiuon 
outcomes  
 
Due to data limitations, 
these studies cannot 
explain to what extent an 
AWW’s effort and 
characteristics leads to 
improvements in the ICDS 
impact 
Assessed the 
implementation status of 
the ICDS and analysed its 
achievements, potential, 
and limitations in 
reaching out to its 
intended beneficiaries  
The ICDS implementation has 
several gaps, but it varies 
across states. The reason for 
the gap is rooted in political 
and institutional context 
ICDS performance as the 
availability of physical 
infrastructure, uptake of 
services, etc. AWW 
performance as skills and 
knowledge  
Do not conceptually 
explore AWW 
performance beyond skills 
and knowledge  
 
Need more empirical 
evidence on how AWWs 
negotiate challenges and 
what factors help and 
hinder her performance 
beyond skills and 
knowledge 
Assessed the influence of 
AWW level factors on 
delivery of health and 
nutrition service delivery 
by the ICDS 
Empirical evidence on how a 
few AWW characteristics and 
programme factors influence 
AWW performance  
AWW performance as 
coverage of services 
Limited conceptual 




Lack of AWW 
perspectives on what 
factors influence her 





Studies on the impact of the ICDS  
The set of studies that focused on the impact of the ICDS examined its impact on child health and 
nutritional outcomes, child food intake, infant mortality, and caregiver’s labour force 
participation (Gragnolati et al., 2005; Jain, 2012, 2013, 2015; Kandpal, 2011; Mittal & Meenakshi, 
2016; Yatsu, 2012). These studies found mixed impact of the ICDS on child health and nutritional 
outcomes and a significant positive impact on child survival, child food intake, infant mortality, 
and caregiver’s labour force participation.  
The majority of the studies that assessed the impact of the ICDS on child health and nutritional 
outcomes used different rounds of the NFHS data (Deolalikar, 2005; Gragnolati et al., 2005; Jain, 
2015; Kandpal, 2011; Viswanathan, 2003). The studies that used the first two rounds of the NFHS 
data (NFHS1 (199293) and NFHS2 (199899)) found limited or no evidence of the impact of 
ICDS on child health and nutritional outcomes. For example, Deolalikar (2005) found that the 
presence of an ICDS centre in a village is associated with a 5% reduction in the probability of being 
underweight for boys but not for girls using the NFHS1 data.  
One of the first studies that used the NFHS2 found that the ICDS programme placement to be 
regressive across states (i.e. states with the highest prevalence of child undernutrition has the 
lowest coverage of the AWCs) and no significant effect of the programme on child nutritional 
outcomes24 (Gragnolati et al., 2005). The main limitations of these studies are that they used non-
experimental cross-sectional data. As Gragnolati et al. (2005) pointed out, panel data that tracks 
villages, households, and individuals are necessary to understand the ICDS impact fully. Non-
experimental cross-sectional data might induce selection bias in estimating the impact. 
Moreover, in the first two rounds of the NFHS, the data on household utilisation of the ICDS 
services were unavailable, and the child reference group was below three years. Due to this, the 
analysis focused on estimating the impact only through programme placement (i.e., the presence 
of the AWC in the village). Focusing on a younger reference group of children (below three years) 
could also be a limitation in estimating the impact of the ICDS on a long-term nutritional measure 
like stunting (i.e. height-for-age z scores below -<2 SD).  
In 2011, using the third round of the NFHS, Kandpal (2011) found that the ICDS programme 
placement (presence of an AWC in a village) had a significant positive impact on the most 
malnourished children25. The same study also reported that the ICDS effectively targeted poorer 
areas, but it failed to target areas with low levels of average education or those with unbalanced 
                                                          
24 Height-for-age z scores and weight-for age z scores of children below three years of age. 





female sex-ratios26. Using the same data, Jain (2015) reported a significant positive impact of ICDS 
service receipt on child nutritional outcomes. The study found 02-year-old girls who received 
supplementary feeding daily from the ICDS centres are around 1 cm taller than other girls in rural 
India. Two other studies by Jain (2012, 2013) using the NFHS3 suggest that the provision of day 
care through preschool service, immunisation, feeding, and health check-ups of children 
significantly increase mothers’ labour force participation and school attendance of elder siblings 
(girls 614 years). Although these studies used better econometric strategies and improved 
data27, they still have limitations arising from using non-experimental cross-sectional data to 
estimate the impact.  
Other than the above-discussed studies by Jain (2012, 2013, 2015), three other studies examined 
the impact of the receipt of ICDS services. All of them focused on the SNP component of the ICDS. 
The receipt of SNP from the AWCs is found to be positively associated with infant survival (Rao, 
2005; Yatsu, 2012). Another study by Mittal & Meenakshi (2016) suggested that children (36 
years) who received hot-cooked-meals as part of the SNP component demonstrated a significant 
positive effect on the net intake of food (calorie, protein, and iron). However, for children below 
three years of age, who received take-home rations, there are no improvements in the intake of 
calories or any nutrients (Mittal & Meenakshi, 2016).  
The set of impact studies on the ICDS implicitly or explicitly considered population impact as the 
performance of the ICDS programme. Due to data limitations, none of these quantitative studies 
used any AWC (e.g. infrastructure) or AWW (e.g. education, social background) characteristics as 
explanatory variables in the analysis. Hence, these studies are inconclusive about how variations 
of the AWC or AWW level characteristics influence the impact of ICDS.  
Overall the impact studies of the ICDS show mixed evidence. The more recent studies show a 
positive influence of the presence of AWCs in the village or receipt of SNP on child health and 
nutritional outcomes, infant survival, child food intake, and mother’s labour force participation. 
However, due to data limitations, these studies cannot explain to what extent an AWW’s effort 
                                                          
26 Sex ratio is the ratio of male to females. In India, states vary in terms of sex ratio. For example, the state 
Kerala has the highest female sex ratio (1058 females for 1000 males). However, the state Haryana has the 
lowest female sex ratio (861 females for 1000 males). The author (Kandpal, 2011) refers to states with 
lower female sex ratios as unbalanced.      
http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/India_at_glance/fsex.aspx 
27 NFHS1 and 2 did not have any ICDS service utilization data and the child reference group was below 
three years. But, NFHS3 included limited information on ICDS service utilization and the child reference 
group was below five years complying with the standard WHO child reference group for anthropometric 





leads to improvements in the ICDS impact. Hence, they are inconclusive about what factors 
influence an AWW’s performance and how that influences the impact of ICDS.  
Studies on the implementation of the ICDS  
The studies that examined the implementation of the ICDS include assessments of the ICDS by 
national agencies, surveys that report national and sub-national coverage of ICDS services, and 
explorative small-scale studies that looked at reasons for low coverage and quality of services  
(CBGA, 2011; Dasgupta et al., 2012; FOCUS, 2006; HUNGaMA, 2011; Nayak & Saxena, 2006; 
NIPCCD, 2009a, 2009b; Planning Commission, 2011; RSOC, 2014; Saxena & Srivastava, 2009). 
These studies identified several implementation gaps such as a lack of focus on under three 
children, poor AWC infrastructure, poor coverage of beneficiaries under the SNP, poor record 
maintenance, poor maintenance of growth charts for children, absence and ineffective utilization 
of weighing machines, socially exclusionary practices in service delivery, greater emphasis on the 
SNP component for children 3-6 years compared to other services, ineffective training and 
monitoring of AWWs, and lack of awareness among beneficiaries leading to poor coverage and 
quality of the ICDS services (Borooah et al., 2014; Dasgupta et al., 2012; Diwakar, 2014; Drèze, 
2006; Faker et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2013; Mander & Kumaran, 2006a; Sinha, 2006). However, 
a few studies also suggest that these implementation gaps vary across states (FOCUS, 2006; 
HUNGaMA, 2011; Maity, 2016; Planning Commission, 2011). The state of Bihar performs poorly 
interms of physical infrastructure and coverage of beneficiaries (Maity, 2016).  
The majority of these studies articulate the shortfalls between policy design and implementation. 
A few studies that explored the reasons for the implementation bottlenecks highlight how the 
political context – and the specific institutional structure of ICDS (such as incentives) - might 
create and sustain these shortfalls (Biswas & Verma, 2009; CBGA, 2011; Drèze, 2006). Although 
the implementation studies highlight the challenges AWWs face regarding financial and physical 
resources, no studies so far have explored the viewpoints of AWWs as to what factors help and 
hinder them in performing their job responsibilities.  
Two studies explore the availability of physical infrastructure, awareness of beneficiaries, AWW 
skills and knowledge, and utilisation of services by beneficiaries as components of ICDS 
performance (Maity, 2016; Planning Commission, 2011). The national evaluation of the ICDS by 
the Planning Commission (2011) defined the performance of the ICDS in terms of physical 
infrastructure availability (as a statewide facility infrastructure index) and skills and knowledge of 
the AWW (AWW performance index). A recent study by Maity (2016) too followed a similar 





indices using recent data from the RSOC (201314). In addition to the Planning Commission 
evaluation, this study provided a services index which ranked Indian states in terms of the receipt 
of services by households. The AWW performance index by Maity (2016) measured AWW 
performance as the skill level of the AWW in terms of her accuracy of knowledge about health 
and nutrition requirements of pregnant women and young children.  
These studies focus on the AWW’s skillsespecially accuracy in health and nutrition knowledge, 
ability in using growth charts, accuracy and completeness of recordsas the most common 
factors contributing towards the programme performance. However, an AWW’s skill level is only 
one aspect of her performance. Although the statewide indices are helpful to understand the 
status of the ICDS performance and AWW skills across states, these studies do not shed light on 
how the variation in AWW skill across states explain the variation in receipt of services by 
households (Maity, 2016; Planning Commission, 2011). 
In sum, the majority of the implementation studies suggest that the ICDS implementation has 
several gaps and that varies across states. These studies also shed light on the reasons for the 
implementation gaps and trace the root cause to the political and institutional context. Although 
these studies have discussed constraints AWWs face (resources, skills, knowledge), they have not 
explored what contributes to an AWW’s performance beyond these factors or looked at the 
effects of variation amongst individual AWWs. Moreover, these studies do not address how 
AWWs negotiate these challenges and what factors help or hinder them from continuing with 
their daily job responsibilities, which are crucial in understanding an AWW's performance.  
Studies on the influence of AWW level factors on health and nutrition service delivery  
Table 5 provides a summary of evidence from studies that researched the influence of AWW level 
factors on AWW performance. The majority of these studies defined AWW performance as 
coverage28 (uptake of services by households) of one or more health and nutrition services 
delivered through the ICDS. These studies show that AWW’s characteristics like knowledge, 
education, experience and programme factors like incentives (financial and non-financial), 
supervision, the size of the catchment area and supplies influence AWW performance. They used 
household level service utilisation data on one or more services delivered through the ICDS to 
define performance.  
  
                                                          
28 One study examined the coverage and quality of home visit services by the AWW. The quality was defined 





Table 5 Evidence on AWW performance and determinants of performance  







Coverage of antenatal home visits and newborn 
care practices (e.g. initiation of breastfeeding, 
clean cord care, and thermal care) were 
positively correlated with AWW knowledge29 
levels 
 
AWWs with a nutrition knowledge score of more 












(Gujral et al., 1991) 
Education  AWWs with at least high school education 
performed better (coverage of services)  
Less educated AWWs performed better 
(Gujral et al., 1991) 
 
(Bhattacharji et al., 
1986)   
Experience (years) More experienced AWWs (years of experience as 
an AWW) performed better (coverage of 
services)   
(Bhattacharji et al., 
1986)   
Programme factors   
Incentives Non-financial incentives like social recognition 
influence the AWW to volunteer (malaria curative 
activities)   
 
Team-based and target oriented non-financial 
incentives for AWWs (with ASHA and ANM) 
improved performance (coverage of services)  
Monetary Incentives for immunisation positively 
influenced the receipt of services  
Financial incentives for AWWs improved child 
health and nutritional outcomes  




(Borkum et al., 2014) 
 
 
(Kosec et al., 2015) 
 
(Singh & Masters, 
2016) 
Supervision  Intense supervision improves performance 
scores; poor supervision hampered performance 
(coverage and quality of home visits)  
 
More than one supervisor visits in three months 
improved AWW performance (coverage of 
services)  
Supervisor’s (ANM) activity score of more than 2 
out of 9 improved AWW performance (coverage 
of services)  
 








(Gujral et al., 1991) 
 
Catchment population size Performance (coverage of services) deteriorated 
with increasing population size   
(Bhattacharji et al., 
1986) 
Essential supplies  Inadequate essential supplies (e.g. medicines) 
hampered performance (coverage and quality of 
home visits)  
(Mohan et al., 2011) 
 
Although these studies provide evidence on a few factors that influence AWW performance, they 
pose limitations in conceptually understanding AWW performance. Firstly, although these studies 
shed light on factors influencing AWW performance, the definition of performance is limited as 
                                                          
29 Agrawal et al. (2012) computed a knowledge score for AWWs through Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based 





it only focuses on the coverage of services. Coverage is not fully within the control of AWWs 
because it is also dependent upon beneficiary demand and other mediating factors such as 
availability of supplies. Therefore, it is not an ideal proxy for the effort of the individual AWW.  
Secondly, older studies provide conflicting evidence on factors that influence AWW performance. 
For example, Gujral et al. (1991) found a positive association between AWW education and her 
performance, but Bhattacharji et al. (1986) found less educated AWWs performed better. 
Bhattacharji et al. (1986) explained this negative association by the fact that most of the AWWs 
with higher education came from the better-off sections of the community and experience more 
difficulty in visiting poorer areas. However, AWWs who received intensive supervision overcame 
this challenge. A caveat for these two studies is that they belong to the early phase of the ICDS 
and since then the ICDS has become a national programme with a broader range of services 
(Bhattacharji et al., 1986; Gujral et al., 1991).  
Thirdly, these studies do not engage with the AWW’s perspective about which factors influence 
her actions or effort towards the coverage of services.  
In summary, the studies that have examined the influence of AWW level factors on health and 
nutrition service delivery (especially coverage of services) provide useful empirical findings. 
However, they do not engage with the concept of AWW performance conceptually. They only 
focus on one dimension of performance (coverage of services) and do not consider her action or 
effort as an important dimension in understanding her performance. Moreover, none of these 
studies provide the perspective of the AWW on factors influencing her actions.  
2.4 Evidence and frameworks from the broader public health literature  
Due to the lack of engagement with the concept of performance in the existing evidence base, I 
looked to the broader public health literature to inform the conceptualisation of performance.  
Performance is a concept that crosses different disciplinary (economics, psychology, public 
management) and topical (e.g. education, health and nutrition, agriculture) boundaries. Even 
with non-health responsibilities, AWWs are a type of CHW (see Box 2). Hence, I primarily locate 
my inquiry within the public health literature. Moreover, being based at a facility (i.e. AWC) means 
that the work environment features of facility-level frontline health workers are also relevant for 
AWWs. The public health literature considers both CHWs and facility-based frontline health 
workers as necessary human resources for health. To conceptualise the performance of AWWs, 
I reviewed the public health literature to understand how the literature has dealt with the 






In the review, I found the conceptualisation of health worker performance by Dieleman & 
Harnmeijer (2006) as a useful starting point in defining the performance of AWWs and 
developing a conceptual framework on AWW performance. Considering the Dieleman & 
Harnmeijer (2006) conceptualisation of performance was primarily for professionally trained 
health staff at facilities, to contextualise it to AWWs who are predominantly a CHW, I 






Box 2  Locating AWWs within the public health literature 
  
AWWs: similarities and dissimilarities with CHWs and other health workers  
 
The cadre of AWWs existed even before the Alma-Ata conference (1978) declaration that recognised 
CHWs as the cornerstone of comprehensive primary health care and urged national governments to give 
importance to community-based care that would bring “health care as close as possible to where people 
live and work” (Lehmann & Sanders, 2007; Lewin et al., 2010; WHO, 1989). An evolved definition of 
CHWs widely used in studies and reviews is by Lewin et al. (2010) pg 2. They define the CHW as “any 
health worker carrying out functions related to health care delivery; trained in some way in the context 
of the intervention, and having no formal professional or paraprofessional certified or degreed tertiary 
education”. China’s Barefoot doctors, Pakistan’s Lady Health Worker programme, Bangladesh’s BRAC 
community health worker programme, Thailand’s Village Health Programme, Brazil’s Programa Saude 
da Familia, and  Ethiopia's Health Extension Programme are a few popular examples of CHW 
programmes in Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa (GHWA, 2010). A few common features of 
these global CHWs are: 
• Agents of health promotion and development 
• Provide a link between local communities and the health system by delivering local outreach 
services that might otherwise be unavailable to communities  
• Can be part of general health promotion programmes or specialist health programmes  
• Perform promotional, preventive, or curative tasks or a mix of all these  
• Operate in a government or non-governmental systems or a combination of both  
• Respond to single or multiple diseases and health issues  
• Show difference in their levels of knowledge and training, practice settings, remuneration, and 
relationship with the regulatory systems  
(Bloom & Standing, 2001; GHWA, 2010; Glenton et al., 2013; Lehmann & Sanders, 2007; Lehmann et al., 
2004; Lewin et al., 2010)  
 
AWWs were identified in the literature as CHWs especially before 2006. Since 2006, ASHAs were 
introduced. The majority of studies on CHWs in India since then treat ASHAs as the default CHW cadre 
(or combine both), as they only perform health responsibilities. Although AWWs still deliver significant 
health and nutrition services, unlike other global CHWs, they also deliver additional early childhood 
developmental responsibilities such as preschool teaching. They remain as a unique CHW model 
delivering a full cycle of ‘child development’ activities pre-pregnancy to pre-school education. The 
global CHWs are predominantly non-facility based but linked to a nearest health facility, but the cadre 
of AWWs primarily operate from a facility (i.e. AWC). Other than non-health responsibilities, this is one 
crucial distinction between CHWs and AWWs and a similarity between facility-based frontline health 
workers. A few AWW characteristics which make her different from CHWs and facility-based frontline 
health workers are 
AWW Characteristics  CHWs Facility-based health  
Workers  
Education requirement  × √ 
No professional health training  √ × 
Non-health responsibilities  × × 
Managed by a non-health regulatory system × × 
Facility-based × √ 
From the community  √ × 




Therefore, AWWs share characteristics with both CHWs and facility-based health workers and 





Performance conceptualised the public health literature  
In the public health literature, performance, especially staff performance (including CHWs) 
was considered as a function of skills and knowledge. Since the early 2000s, additional 
factors such as organisational and contextual factors have been increasingly recognised as 
influencing performance (Dieleman & Harnmeijer, 2006; Franco et al., 2002; Rowe et al., 
2005; WHO, 2006).  
In understanding the theoretical origins of performance, a variety of theories exist to explain 
why individuals behave in certain ways, and this, in turn, can facilitate the development of 
strategies to improve performance (Hughes et al., 2002). However, the studies that 
examined health worker motivation and performance are not based on one specific theory. 
In fact, they demonstrate some understanding of these theories in explaining the concepts 
of motivation, job satisfaction, self-esteem, etc. (Dieleman & Harnmeijer, 2006).  
The World Health Report 2006 and the World Health Organisation (WHO) report by 
Dieleman & Harnmeijer (2006) remain as key studies that recognised that health worker 
performance is influenced by factors at the macro (health systems), micro (health facility), 
and individual levels30. Dieleman & Harnmeijer (2006) draw on studies such as Franco et al. 
(2002) Rowe et al. (2005), and Hongoro & Normand (2006), all of whom stressed that health 
worker motivation and performance are a complex interaction of factors at different levels. The 
concept of performance has different elements embedded within it. Thus, the depth and breadth 
of the concept of performance are influenced by individual and organisational mandates 
(Dieleman & Harnmeijer, 2006). In organisational contexts, to meaningfully understand and 
explain performance, it is often studied with concepts such as motivation, job satisfaction, etc. 
(Dieleman & Harnmeijer, 2006; Franco et al., 2002; Rowe et al., 2005; WHO, 2000, 2006).  
In conceptualising performance, Dieleman & Harnmeijer (2006) describe the performance as 
‘implementing tasks to a certain standard in line with the mission and goals of the 
organisation’. Using the WHR 2006 definition of performance, Dieleman & Harnmeijer 
(2006) explain improved performance as a combined effect of four elementsavailability, 
productivity, responsiveness, and competence. These are influenced by performance 
outputs improved working conditions, motivation, job satisfaction, retention, absenteeism, 
skills and knowledge, and accountability. These outputs are determined by factors at the 
                                                          
30Dieleman & Harnmeijer (2006) noted in their report that the subdivision between health facility (micro 
level) and health system (macro level) is not always clear-cut, and depends on the roles and responsibilities 





health systems, health facility, and individual levels. This is summarised in an overall 
conceptual framework (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3 Framework for analysing health worker performance  
 
Source: (Dieleman & Harnmeijer, 2006) 
In conceptualising AWW performance, I decided to use the Dieleman & Harnmeijer (2006) 
conceptual framework on health worker performance as a departure point. This is primarily 
because the Dieleman & Harnmeijer (2006) conceptual framework clearly defines 
performance and used definitions of concepts such as motivation and job satisfaction from 
existing theories on motivation and performance. Moreover, they use a systemic approach 
to health worker performance (situational analysis, intervention (input/process), outputs, 
effects, outcomes, and impact) which would be valuable to adapt in a context like AWWs. I 
consider it as a point of departure to build my own conceptual framework on AWW 
performance as it was developed for ‘professionally trained health staff in facilities’. For 
AWWs who are community-based, the conceptualisation of performance requires 
contextualisation using the empirical evidence from studies that specifically focused on CHW 
performance.  





As described earlier, the performance of human resources for health is influenced by factors 
at the health system, health facility and individual levels. However, considering the AWWs 
are community-based, their performance could also be influenced by contextual factors 
such as community-level factors. The public health literature that specifically focuses on 
CHW performance has a diverse and extensive number of studies that have examined a wide 
range of factors that influence a CHW’s performance. These studies present empirical 
evidence from different programmes, political and geographical contexts. I reviewed this 
empirical evidence to better understand CHW programme and context-related factors that 
could influence the performance of CHWs that could also be relevant for AWWs. In 
conceptualising AWW performance, I aim to include the lessons from this empirical evidence 
to define the categories of determinants that clearly lead to performance.  
The majority of the studies that have examined CHW performance suggest that intrinsic and 
extrinsic factors at the individual, programme, community, and institutional levels influence 
the motivation and performance of CHWs. For example, financial incentives (e.g. fixed 
salaries, pay for performance, and income from selling products in the community) and non-
financial incentives (e.g., material rewards, social recognition, and community trust and 
respect) influence CHW performance in positive and negative ways (Bhattacharyya et al., 
2001). Moreover, CHWs are an integral part of the social context, so their interactions with 
the community, and how they are perceived within the community also influences their 
performance (Bhattacharyya et al., 2001; Razee et al., 2012).  
Two systematic reviews by Kok et al. (2014, 2015)31remain the most recent and 
comprehensive studies that synthesised evidence on factors influencing CHW performance. 
These two effectively present a synthesis of various intervention 32 design factors and 
contextual factors that are shown to have influenced CHW performance.  
The Kok et al. (2014) review summarised six intervention design factors identified by the review 
as key in influencing CHW performance. These factors influence different performance outcomes 
                                                          
31 The Kok et al. (2014, 2015) reviews came in December 2014 and January 2015. By then I had already 
reviewed the same papers reviewed by  Kok et al. (2014, 2015) but decided to use their findings to avoid 
duplication and for consistency.  
32 Although Kok et al. (2014) do not explicitly say why they used the term ‘intervention’; I believe it is 
because they used the definition of CHWs from Lewin et al. (2010) which considers the CHW as part of an 
intervention. To remind the definition of CHWs by Lewin et al. (2010) pg 2: “any health worker carrying out 
functions related to health care delivery; trained in some way in the context of the intervention, and having 





differently (see Table 6). Moreover, variations in the design of CHW programmes have a 
significant influence on performance. The six intervention design factors are— 
1. Nature of tasks and time spent on service delivery; 
2. Human resource management (CHW characteristics, workload clarity of tasks/roles, 
selection and recruitment process, incentives, supervision, performance appraisal, and 
training);  
3. Quality assurance (protocols and guidelines, and monitoring and evaluation);  
4. Community links (support, selection, monitoring, and community expectations);  
5. Health system links (embedment within the health department and communication and 
coordination);  
6. Resources and logistics (job aids, transport, and supplies).  
Table 6 presents a summary of the intervention design factors identified by the review as 
prominent factors that positively, negatively and in mixed ways influence CHW performance. It 
also provides information on factors that are thought to influence CHW performance but where 





Table 6 Intervention design factors that proved to have positive, negative, and mixed influence on CHW performance33 
Type of influence on CHW 
performance  
Intervention design factors proved to influence CHW performance  
Positive  Nature of tasks and time spent on service delivery  
 Inclusion of curative tasks in CHWs job description  
 Longer service delivery times  
CHW characteristics  
 Higher education level  
 Experience with health conditions to be dealt with 
 Fewer household duties and lower wealth  
Incentives: financial and non-financial 
Supervision: availability of supervision  
Training  
Community support  
 Selection and monitoring  
Health system links  
 Recognition by and coordination and communication with other health staff 
Negative  Human resource management 
 High workload 
 Lack of clarity on CHW roles  
Lack of resources and logistics  
Mixed  CHW characteristics 
 Gender 
 Age  
 Marital status  
 Past experience  
Selection of CHWs from within the community they serve   
 
No evidence  Mechanisms and specific factors related to training and supervision  
Performance appraisal  
Quality assurance 
 Guidelines and protocols 
 Specific aspects of monitoring and evaluation related to health system  
Health system links  
Experience sharing visits  
Career advancement  
Functionality of the referral system  
 
The five main contextual factors that influence CHW performance identified by the review are:  
1. Community: socio-cultural factors (such as social and cultural norms, values, 
practices and beliefs, gender roles and norms, and disease-related stigma), safety 
and security for the CHWs, and education and knowledge levels of target groups;  
2. Economic: economic hardships of the CHW;  
3. Environment: geography and distance, and climate;  
4. Health system policy: CHW and human resources policy, legislation related to CHWs, 
and political commitment;  
                                                          





5. Health system practice: health service functionality, human resources provisions and 
their match with CHWs’ expectations, level of decision-making, costs of health 
services, and governance/coordination structure.  
Out of these five contextual factors, community factors (context)  are found to most 
prominently influence CHW performance (Kok et al., 2015).  
These contextual factors sometimes serve as a pre-condition for the performance of CHWs 
or CHW programmes and represent characteristics of settings in which the programme 
operates. Pre-condition factors such as the presence of well-functioning health services 
including functioning logistic and supply chains affect the ability of CHWs to conduct their 
jobs. These factors affect CHWs and beneficiaries.  
The overall empirical evidence on CHW performance is useful in conceptualising AWW 
performance as it helps to elaborate determinants of performance. However, not all factors 
identified in the CHW contexts are relevant for AWWs. A few factors are either absent or 
yet to be found influential or potentially influential in the AWW context. For example, AWWs 
are female, married, without a defined performance appraisal system, and not covered by 
legislation. Table 7 provides a comparison of overall empirical evidence on factors 
influencing CHW performance in the AWW context. It shows whether the factor identified 
by the Kok et al. (2014, 2015) review is relevant in the AWW context (based on the 
descriptive literature on the ICDS) and shown to influence AWW performance (based on the 







Table 7 Relevance of factors influencing CHW performance in the AWW context 
Factors  Sub-factors  Whether the factor is 
relevant in the AWW 
context? 
Is there evidence 





Tasks and in-service delivery time  Yes No 
Human resource management  
AWW characteristics 
  
Gender Not relevant  
Education Yes Yes 
Experience (years) Yes Yes 
Experience (with the health 
conditions) 
Yes No 
Residence/ community of origin Yes No 
Age Yes No 
Household duties Yes No 
Marital status Not relevant  
Social class Yes No 
Wealth Yes No 
Workload  Yes No 
Clarity of tasks/roles Yes No 
Selection and recruitment process Yes Yes  
Incentives Yes Yes 
Supervision Yes Yes 
Performance appraisal Not relevant  
Training Yes No 
Quality assurance  





Monitoring and evaluation  Yes No 
Community links  





Expectations  Yes No 






Communication and coordination  Yes No 






Transport  Yes No 
Supplies  Yes Yes 






Safety and security  Yes No 
Education and knowledge level of the 
target group  
Yes No 
Economic context (AWWs) Yes No 
Environment  





Climate  Yes No 
Health system links  






Legislation related to CHWs Not relevant  
Political commitment  Yes No 
Health system practice 





Human resources provision and their 










In conclusion, the studies that have examined the influence of various factors on CHW 
performance suggest that a range of intervention-related and context-related factors 
influence CHW performance. Not all factors are relevant in the AWW context or are shown 
to influence AWW performance as the evidence on factors influencing AWW performance 
is limited. However, the overall empirical evidence is useful to conceptualise perform ance, 
especially to define the determinants of performance.  
2.5 Role of mobile phone technology-based interventions on performance  
One of the evidence gaps identified in Table 7 is the potential for mobile phone-based job aids to 
influence AWW performance. In the last decade, the exponential growth of mobile phones and 
search for effective ways to deliver health services to populations have resulted in a rapid 
proliferation of small-scale pilots of m-Health projects across the world. The term m-Health is 
used to describe interventions that use the potential of mobile phones to improve the health 
system functioning (Agarwal et al., 2015; Labrique et al., 2013). M-Health interventions are 
commonly used for client education and behavioural change communication, sensors and care 
diagnosis, registers/vital events tracking, data collection and reporting, electronic health records, 
electronic decision support, provider-to-provider communication, provider work planning and 
scheduling, provider training and education, human resources management, supply chain 
management, and financial transactions and incentives (Labrique et al., 2013).   
The growing body of literature that examines the use of m-Health by CHWs claims that the use 
of mobile phones by CHWs presents promising opportunities to improve the range and quality of 
services provided by them (Agarwal et al., 2015; Braun et al., 2016; Källander et al., 2013). 
Although a large number of m-Health interventions using CHWs exist, the number of high-quality 
studies that evaluated the influence of m-Health strategies on CHW level service performance, 
health system efficiencies and uptake and cost-effectiveness of service delivery, and 
improvement of population health outcomes remain low or absent (Agarwal et al., 2015; Braun 
et al., 2016; Källander et al., 2013). M-Nutrition, an evolving field of research on the use of mobile 
phone technology in nutrition service delivery too suffers from this research gap (Barnett et al., 
2016; Barnett & Gallegos, 2013; Barnett et al., 2016) 
In the field of m-Nutrition, so far only three studies have examined the influence of mobile phone 
technology on nutrition service delivery. These studies suggest that mobile phones do have a 
potential to improve data accuracy, timeliness, and responsiveness of nutrition surveillance such 
as weight monitoring (Barnett et al., 2016; Berg et al., 2009; Blaschke et al., 2009). All these 





application) in improving the weight monitoring service provided by CHWs. In addition to the 
evidence34 that mobile phones help to improve the overall data collection accuracy, speed, and 
the effective use of data by the worker in nutrition surveillance, we also need more empirical 
assessments on how these improvements can increase coverage, utilisation, efficiency, quality, 
or household level outcomes.  
Sustaining CHW motivation to adopt the use of mobile phone technology in their work is crucial 
for the scale-up and sustainability of these small-scale projects and pilots (Källander et al., 2013). 
The role of monetary incentives35 is one potential factor that could motivate CHWs to adopt the 
use of mobile phone technology (Källander et al., 2013). The well-established evidence base on 
incentives suggest that it is a key influential (positive and negative depending on the availability, 
type, and value) factor in CHW performance36 (Alam et al., 2012a, 2012b; Bartos et al., 2009; 
Bhattacharyya et al., 2001; Callaghan-Koru et al., 2012; Furth & Crigler, 2012; Lewis, 2010; 
Rahman & Tasneem, 2008; Rowe et al., 2007; Srivastava et al., 2009; Winch et al., 2008). 
Considering the (limited) evidence suggests that mobile phones help improve nutrition 
surveillance by CHWs and monetary incentives play a crucial role in improving the motivation and 
performance of CHWs, combining these two (monetary incentives and mobile phones) could lead 
to better quality of services and improve the number of beneficiaries receiving services. However, 
empirical assessments that examined the question of incentivising CHWs to use mobile phone 
technology have not emerged so far. This could be because i) monetary incentives are not 
identified in the technology acceptance literature as a factor that could influence the adoption of 
technology and ii) reservations on the cost-effectiveness of combining mobile phone technology 
and monetary incentives. Hence, findings from my second research question would be one of the 
first studies that examined the combined effect of monetarily incentivised mobile technology on 
the uptake of services provided by CHWs like AWWs and their performance.  
                                                          
34 Studies were conducted in three countries (Kenya, Malawi, and Indonesia) using small and purposefully 
chosen samples.  
35 A well-established body of evidence on technology acceptance (not just for CHWs) suggest factors such 
as perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, trust and perceived self-control lead to the perceived 
intention to use. Monetary incentives are not part of this literature (Blanas et al., 2015; Davis, 1989; Kim & 
Garrison, 2009).  
36 The evidence also suggests that incentivising CHWs based on their performance could make them biased 
towards those activities. Two studies that support this notion studied one of India’s CHW work force, 
ASHAs.  However, ASHAs do not receive a monthly salary or stipend and fully rely on performance oriented 





2.6 Conceptual framework on AWW performance 
In this section, I present the conceptual framework on AWW performance developed based on 
the lessons from the conceptual and evidence review presented in the earlier sections (2.3 to 
2.5). The framework forms the conceptual basis of my thesis.  
As discussed in the earlier section, I chose the conceptual framework of Dieleman & 
Harnmeijer (2006) on health worker performance as the point of departure (see Figure 3). 
To adapt the framework to the specific context of AWW performance using the analysis in 
section 2.4, I conducted the following steps: 
1. Realigned the health facility and health system determinants as programmatic and 
organisational factors to recognise the fact that the AWW is based at a child development 
programme facility (AWC), not at a health facility. Moreover, the AWW is not employed 
by the health department but by a non-health department which is a part of the broader 
organisational structure; 
2. Added a category of community factors on top of the individual, programmatic and 
organisational categories of determinants to recognise the influence of various 
community factors on the AWW who is based in a community setting. This brings it in 
line with recommendations of various authors who have regrouped the determinants 
into: health worker characteristics  (individual level), health system and facility 
characteristics (macro and micro levels), characteristics of the wider political and 
socioeconomic environment (contextual factors), and community/population 
characteristics (contextual factors) (Hongoro & Normand, 2006; Rowe et al., 2005; WHO, 
2006);  
3. Excluded one of the ‘effects’, availability, because AWWs are village-level workers 
selected from the community rather than trained and deployed to facilities. The evidence 
on the ICDS and AWWs does not suggest the availability of applicants at the recruitment 
stage or retention of AWWs as an issue. Thus, the availability aspect is not relevant in the 
AWW context; 
4. Although I use the overall definition of performance as ‘implementing tasks to a certain 
standard in line with the mission and goals of the organisation’  (Dieleman & 
Harnmeijer, 2006), I adapted it for the AWW context. Implementing tasks to a certain 
standard in line with the mission and goals of the organisation in the AWW context 
means that the AWW makes the ICDS services accessible with adequate quality. 
Moreover, every service has access and quality elements. Thus, I define AWW 





with adequate quality’. Access can be defined as making service accessible for a certain 
number of beneficiaries and quality as making services accessible with required fidelity 
to guidelines37;  
5. Recognised the direct link between determinants and performance – considering a few 
determinants categories such as the availability of resources can directly influence AWW 
performance not just via the outputs and effects, I incorporate it to the framework;  
6. Included household level outcomes to recognise that improved access and quality of 
supply only translate into programme impact if there is utilisation of services by 
beneficiaries at the household level;  
7. After refining the framework, I drew up an initial list of sub-factors for the four categories 
of factors (individual, programmatic, community and organisational) that are identified 
as determinants leading to performance. These sub-factors listed are those that have 
been shown to impact on performance outputs in the literature in the Kok et al. (2014) 
systematic review, with some contextualization for the ICDS programme 
Figure 4 presents the resulting conceptual framework on AWW performance I employ in this 
thesis. 
In summary, the conceptual framework on AWW performance envisages that the individual, 
programmatic, community, and organisational factors are determinants of performance. These 
determinants of performance are interdependent and lead to improvements in outputs such as 
working conditions, motivation, job satisfaction, accountability, and AWW’s skills knowledge, and 
attitudes. These outputs further lead to effects such as improved productivity, competence, and 
responsiveness of the AWWs and lead to performance outcomes at AWW level i.e. improved 
access and quality. Table 8 presents the ‘access’ and ‘quality’ aspects of each of the main services 
of the AWW in Bihar. Although I contextualised the activities using Bihar state-level documents, 
the core services are similar across the country. I used this table to guide my data collection tools 




                                                          
37 For example, in the case of food distribution (THR and HCM) making the service accessible to required 
number of beneficiaries (i.e. 40 children 3-6 years, 40 children 6 months to 3 years, 8 pregnant women and 
8 lactating mothers) with fidelity to guidelines (specific quantity of decent quality rice and dal for each 











Table 8 Performance elements for the main job responsibilities of an AWW in Bihar (SWD, 2015a, 2017) 
Core 
services 







l  Teaching:  
-Rhymes, alphabets, stories, and games by the AWW  
-Record of children  
-Keep the space clean and attractive for children  
-Use teaching aids such as blackboard, posters, 

























 HCM (daily lunch) 
-Distribute pre-decided menu based hot cooked 
meal such as Khichdi, Rasiya, and Halwa.  
-Once a week eggs 
-Purchase raw materials and give it to AWH for 
cooking  






 Children 3 to 6 years 
THR (monthly dry ration)  
-Identify beneficiaries (children based on 
malnutrition status; women based on 
pregnancy and child age)  
-Inform beneficiaries  
-Distribute pre-decided quantity of rice and lentils 
for each beneficiary category.  
o Severely malnourished children: 4 kg 
rice and 2 kg lentils 
o Malnourished children: 2.5 kg rice 
and 1 kg lentils  
o Pregnant and lactating women: 3 kg 
rice and 1.5 kg lentils  
o Everyone, twice a week eggs  
-Record of purchase and distribution  
Monthly  
 
9 am 5 
pm  
8 





Children 6 months to 3years: 
(28 severely malnourished 











  -Provide space for VHSND  
-Help the ANM to carry out the VHSND at the AWC 
premises  
-Ensure age-appropriate immunisation and reporting  







Pregnant women  












s Weighing of pregnant women and children 






Pregnant women, children 
below three years 
Weighing of pre-school children 



























  Group counselling   




After 1pm   
All  
 
Women, adolescent girls  
Home visits  
-Visit mothers to counselling them one to one on 
individual needs such as breastfeeding, complementary 




After 1pm  
All 
(23 per day)  
 
Pregnant women  
Lactating mothers  






  Referral of Severely and Acutely Malnourished (SAM) 
children  
-Identification of SAM children and referral to district 
facilities and accompany them if needed 








In this chapter, I presented the lessons from the conceptual review of the literature to 
demonstrate the conceptual and empirical research gaps in understanding AWW performance. 
Although I primarily located the AWWs within the public health literature considering they are a 
type of CHW, I also discussed their similarities and dissimilarities with standard definitions of 
CHWs and facility-based frontline health workers. Moreover, by presenting the current literature 
context of the fields of m-Health and m-Nutrition, I highlighted the limited number of studies that 
have examined m-Nutrition interventions and the value addition of examining the influence of 
mobile phone technology on AWW performance. To conceptualise AWW performance, I used the 
definition of performance and the understanding of how performance is generated from the 
Dieleman & Harnmeijer (2006) conceptual framework on health worker performance as a 
departure point. I developed it as a conceptual framework on AWW performance by 
contextualising it to the AWW context using empirical evidence on CHWs and AWWs and the ICDS 
programme context. I presented the definition of AWW performance as ‘AWWs making services 
accessible to the required number of beneficiaries with adequate quality’ (i.e. adhering to 
guidelines) and visualised the conceptual framework of AWW performance. I also discussed the 
key adaptations I took in developing the conceptual framework and provided a detailed 
description of the two aspects of the AWW performance definitionaccess and quality in the 
context of AWWs in Bihar. In the next chapter, I present the overall methodological approach 
undertaken in this thesis to explore the concept of AWW performance using the conceptual 
framework.  
 
                                                          






 Chapter Three: Empirical context and methodology  
In the previous chapters, I introduced my research including my personal and academic 
motivation, the geographic and programmatic context, the specific research questions, the 
overall analytical approach, concepts, and a conceptual framework developed to study AWW 
performance. This chapter focuses on how I designed and implemented my doctoral research. In 
this chapter, I discuss the main features of the BCSP, my rationale for choosing it to situate my 
doctoral research within, and how I utilised the BCSP context. Although I introduced my overall 
analytical strategy in Chapter 1, this chapter describes in detail the methodological foundation of 
this thesis and the specific methods I used in qualitative and quantitative research.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 3.1 describes the BCSP empirical 
context; section 3.2 discusses my rationale to conduct qualitative and quantitative research and 
my approach in combining them; section 3.3 outlines the qualitative methods used including 
selection of participants, data collection, and data analysis; and section 3.4 provides a brief 
overview of the quantitative data and estimation strategy.  
3.1 Empirical context: the BCSP  
The BCSP, primarily a maternal and child nutrition Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT), was piloted in 
three administrative blocks of Gaya district of Bihar from August 2014 to November 2016 (OPM, 
2017). The government of Bihar piloted the BCSP to understand the feasibility of developing a 
system to deliver a maternal and child cash transfer with maximum transparency, whilst 
efficiently and effectively monitoring the meeting of conditions by beneficiaries (OPM, 2014). The 
BCSP targeted pregnant women and mothers of young children. These beneficiaries were eligible 
for a monthly payment of Rs. 250 ($ 3.75) between the end of the first trimester of pregnancy 
and the child’s second birthday (a total of 30 months). The transfer was conditional to influence 
appropriate health and nutrition behaviours (OPM, 2014).  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the BCSP design attempted to improve the overall delivery of health 
and nutrition services at the village level by investing in both demand-side interventions 
(incentivising beneficiaries to take up services through the CCT) and supply-side interventions 
(investing in the performance of AWWs by introducing mobile phone technology and monetary 
incentives) (OPM, 2014). The AWW in programme villages played a crucial role in the BCSP, as 
she was responsible for registering beneficiaries, reporting on their receipt of conditions and 





with a mobile phone upon which a BCSP application known as the CommCare39 application was 
preloaded. Using the mobile phone application, AWW registered beneficiaries on the application, 
reported on service availability and recorded which beneficiaries received which services. The 
AWW received incentive payments to use the phone and to provide services to beneficiaries 
(OPM, 2014). The mobile phone application aimed to improve AWW’s service delivery by 
providing the following three features:  
 a case management tool to follow-up with pregnant women  
 pre-installed Behavioural Change Communication (BCC) messages that could be played 
to beneficiaries during counselling sessions 
 a pre-installed weight monitoring tool to ease the weighing of children.  
Furthermore, the weight monitoring tool in the mobile phone application provided an automatic 
calculation of the nutritional status of the child (e.g. severely underweight) when an AWW 
entered weight monitoring data and gave appropriate instructions (e.g. refer to the NRC) (OPM, 
2014).  
The BCSP, has two interventions designed as three treatments assigned to three administrative 
blocks. The two interventions are i) a demand-side intervention (cash transfers to pregnant 
women and mothers with young children) and ii) supply-side intervention (the provision of mobile 
phones and monetary incentives to AWWs). The three treatments arei) cash transfer with 
“hard” conditions and the supply-side intervention, ii) cash transfer with “soft” conditions and 
the supply-side intervention, and iii) just the supply-side intervention i.e. mobile phones and 
monetary incentives to AWWs (OPM, 2014, 2016) 
In one block, the transfer was conditional on meeting “hard” conditions where women were 
required to receive certain services, particularly weight monitoring of pregnant women and 
children, Iron and Folic Acid (IFA) supplementation for mothers, Vitamin A supplementation for 
children, ante-natal and post-natal check-ups for women and appropriate treatment for 
diarrhoea. In the second block with “soft” conditions, the transfer was conditional on women 
attending VHSNDs every month. To delineate the effect of the supply-side intervention (mobile 
phone application and monetary incentives to AWWs), the third block in BCSP was assigned to 
provide the mobile phone application and incentives to AWWs but no cash to the beneficiaries. 
As part of the BCSP, an impact evaluation was designed at the inception stage itself. The BCSP 
impact evaluation design selected a fourth administrative block as a comparison block for the 
                                                          





impact evaluation purpose (OPM, 2014). The demand-side intervention (cash for beneficiaries) 
targets pregnant women and the supply-side intervention (mobile phone technology and 
monetary incentive) targets AWWs. 
I do not consider my research as an impact evaluation of BCSP, rather it is examining whether the 
supply-side intervention by the BCSP had any impact on services provided by the AWWs as the 
formal BCSP evaluation does not cover this aspect.  
Figure 5 shows that all three treatment blocks have the supply-side intervention for AWWs and 
only the first two blocks have the demand-side intervention.  
Figure 5 The BCSP design  
 
To clarify terminology, “the supply-side intervention” is also termed in the thesis “the AWW 
treatment”, “mobile phone and monetary incentives intervention”, and “technology augmented 
intervention”. I call it the “supply-side intervention” and “the AWW treatment” when comparing 





intervention” and “technology augmented intervention” when analysing data related to the 
intervention.  
The BCSP mobile phone application was designed to improve an AWW’s performance by 
improving her productivity, competence, and responsiveness (in line with the performance 
effects in the conceptual framework). In particular it focused on weight monitoring of children 
and pregnant women, facilitation of the VHSNDs, and counselling activities. As an incentive, AWW 
received Rs. 5 (approx. $ 0.08) per child for entering the weight of the child in the weight 
monitoring tool and Rs. 100 (approx. $1.5) per month for filling the service availability form on 
the VHSND (OPM, 2014). The BCSP aimed to improve service quality, increase the number of 
children being weighed at the AWC and improve attendance during the VHSND as it provided a 
direct incentive for AWWs to conduct these activities and beneficiaries to receive them. 
The VHSND is a monthly service delivery platform organised at the AWC every month. The 
schedule of the VHSND is pre-decided between the Health and Social Welfare departments. At 
the AWC level, the ANM, ASHA, and AWW work together to provide a set of health and nutrition 
services. An ANM visits the AWC on VHSNDs and provides Ante Natal Care (ANC) check-ups for 
pregnant women, child immunisations, and referrals. The AWW weighs children and pregnant 
women, and provides counselling. The ASHA informs the beneficiaries and facilitates their 
participation (GoI MWCD, 2010; OPM, 2014).  
Table 9 provides a summary of services expected to have been influenced by the supply-side 
intervention and the rationale. 
Table 9 The ICDS services expected to have been influenced by the BCSP supply-side intervention  
Services and expected influence Rationale  
Direct Weighing   
Child  
 
The AWW receives Rs. 5 per child. She has the weight monitoring 
tool to calculate the grade and a pre-recorded counselling 
message for the mother depending on the child growth grade.  
Women  No direct monetary incentive or weight monitoring tool, but the 
pregnancy care application asks for the pregnant woman’s weight, 
which also needs to be recorded in the Maternal and Child Health 
(MCH) card.  
Direct   VHSND attendance   
Child  
Women  
The AWW receives Rs. 100 to fill out the service availability form 
on the VHSND. It is identified to be a platform for weighing 
services. Considering the AWW is incentivised to weigh, and the 
process (grading and counselling) is eased by the phone, she 
would have an incentive to attract more beneficiaries on the 
VHSND (caregivers of children and pregnant women) so that she 
can weigh more beneficiaries and earn more money. 
Indirect  Counselling  The phone has BCC videos and audios useful individual and group 
counselling. As a secondary impact, AWWs could use those to 
improve the quality of their counselling sessions and attract more 






I decided to utilise the BCSP setting for my thesis due to two reasons. They were: 
 Programme design features: these enabled me to examine the effect of an intervention 
that aimed to improve AWW performance in line with the conceptual framework 
 Evaluation design and availability of the impact evaluation data: allowing me to 
comprehensively explore the influence of the intervention on AWW performance  
Programme design features: global evidence suggests that weight monitoring services have a 
significant role in combating child undernutrition if combined with effective infant and young 
child behavioural change counselling (Black et al., 2013; Mangasaryan et al., 2011). The evidence 
on the ICDS suggests that the quality of the weight monitoring service suffers from resource and 
capacity constraints such as the unavailability of weighing equipment and growth charts and 
AWWs’ lack of knowledge and skills in using growth charts, leading to low uptake of services 
(Planning Commission, 2011). The BCSP seems to have incorporated these issues into the design 
by providing an automatic weight monitoring tool with a counselling component. This explicitly 
targets the unavailability of growth charts as they are no longer needed, as well as the knowledge 
and skills of AWW as the application independently undertakes the calculation and provides 
tailored counselling messages. Moreover, the theory of change of the BCSP is in line with the 
conceptual framework on AWW performance used in this thesis. The BCSP aims to improve the 
performance of AWWs by focusing on improving two factors (mobile phone and monetary 
incentives) also identified in the conceptual framework. Through the mobile phone and monetary 
incentives intervention it expects to improve the performance of the AWWs by improving their 
productivity, competence, and responsiveness.  
The BCSP also incentivised the AWW to report the weight outcome per child. Essentially, the BCSP 
introduced monetary incentives similar to their peers, ASHAs, on top of the AWWs’ fixed monthly 
income.  The evidence on the influence of monetary incentives on ASHA workers who are solely 
dependent on performance-oriented monetary incentives suggests that they are biased towards 
those services they receive payment (Scott & Shanker, 2010; Srivastava et al., 2009). The BCSP 
context enabled me to explore whether this phenomenon holds true in the context of AWWs as 
well. Although I would not be able to delineate the separate effects of the mobile phone and 
monetary incentives, the findings will be an addition to the existing knowledge base within the 
public health and the public service delivery literature.  
Evaluation design and availability of the impact evaluation data: the BCSP pilot used a quasi-





BCSP impact evaluation focuses on estimating the impact of the cash transfer on maternal and 
child health and nutrition outcomes (OPM, 2014, 2016).  
The BCSP used a quasi-experimental impact evaluation design rather than a randomised 
controlled trial (RCT) design because the random allocation of treatment (cash transfer or AWW 
treatment or both) at the AWC or village or beneficiary level was not possible due to the need to 
test the ability of government administrative tiers to deliver the programme in the same way that 
they would have to were it to be scaled-up (OPM, 2014). The BCSP pilot was conceived and 
implemented as a government policy similar to policy changes in real-world settings. The 
government of Bihar decided the choice of the district, implementation mechanisms, and time of 
roll out. The evaluation team matched administrative blocks to ensure robust comparisons 
between blocks based on an evaluation strategy. 
A quasi-experimental treatment allocation using a block matching exercise was done at the 
baseline stage to allocate treatments to blocks (OPM, 2014). At the baseline stage, blocks were 
selected based on a matching algorithm to ensure they were as similar as possible. 
Econometrically, matching was not done on the evaluation indicatorsi.e. beneficiary uptake of 
ICDS services that would be influenced by the BCSP. Rather, it was done on factors that may have 
had a confounding effect on these indicators (OPM, 2014). The number of matching factors was 
kept limited to avoid over-specification, and only continuous scale variables were used. The 
following variables were considered:  
 Female literacy  
 Population per AWW (to proxy service delivery)  
 AWW per LS (to proxy supervisory levels)  
 Average population per village (to proxy population density)  
 Proportion of socially excluded groups (SCs), who may face differential access to services 
due to discrimination  
 Male: female population ratio (proxy for migration)  
Based on this matching exercise, one block was selected as the ‘pure control block’ (the 
comparison block for my research) for the overall BCSP impact evaluation. The best match for the 
pure control block received only the supply-side intervention, i.e. mobile phone technology and 
monetary incentive intervention (hereafter, T3). The other two blocks were assigned for the 





The availability of a treatment arm comprising only the mobile phone technology and monetary 
incentive intervention alongside a comparison arm in the evaluation design makes it possible to 
estimate the effect of the intervention on different outcomes. This was not the primary aim of 
the BCSP impact evaluation. However, I found this possibility econometrically viable and it met 
my motivation to study the effect of technology-based strategies to improve AWW performance.  
Before starting my PhD, I worked on designing and managing the BCSP evaluation as a national 
survey manager at OPM. The BCSP pilot was funded by DFID. My involvement with the BCSP and 
DFID’s open access data policy gave me the opportunity to use the impact evaluation survey data 
for my doctoral thesis. Moreover, I was familiar with the geographic area and spent long periods 
of time before my PhD conducting explorative studies and surveys. Due to the viable evaluation 
design, availability of data, and previous experience in the area, I decided to situate my doctoral 
research examining the influence of the mobile phone technology and monetary incentives 
intervention on AWW performance in the BCSP setting.  
As described earlier, I utilise the BCSP setting to answer my second research question (RQ2). Using 
the BCSP quantitative data, I compare between two different sample populations: one set of the 
population that access AWCs where AWWs use the mobile phones and receives monetary 
incentives and a second set in the comparison block where the intervention is absent. Moreover, 
to attribute impact to the bundle, I measure the change over time and compare it to the change 
over time in the counterfactual. A comparison group (non-intervention area) is one way of having 
a counterfactual, which the BCSP clearly provides. This quasi-experimental specification is 
described in more detail in Chapter 5. My qualitative fieldwork comprising the two separate 
objectives was conducted in two blocksthe T3 and the comparison blocks. The two objectives 
were1) understand what and how individual, programmatic, community and organisational 
factors influence AWW performance and 2) understand how and why the technology augmented 
intervention with a monetary incentive component influences AWW performance. 
3.2 Combining qualitative and quantitative research: rationale and analytical 
approach  
As described in Chapter 1, my thesis employs qualitative and quantitative research methods. The 
qualitative and quantitative findings together will help to address my overarching research 
question more comprehensively than I believe a single research method could do. In Figure 6 I 
have visualised how each chapter contributes towards the overall mixed methods analytical 
approach. Although I have used mixed methods by sequentially combining qualitative and 





either qualitative or quantitative research methods (shown in Figure 6). In Chapter 7, I bring 
together the findings from studies that used both qualitative and quantitative methods. In this 
section, I will discuss my rationale to conduct qualitative and quantitative research and the 
philosophical approach in combining qualitative and quantitative research strategies used all 
throughout my doctoral study. 
Figure 6 Overview of qualitative and quantitative research used in the thesis 
 
3.2.1 Rationale to conduct qualitative and quantitative research  
“[...] choose the combination or mixture of methods and procedures 
that work best for answering the (your) research questions.” 
 (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004)  pg. 17 
My qualitative research aimed to gain a deeper understanding of factors that help and hinder 
AWWs in their performance, and the role of monetarily incentivised mobile phone technology. I 
needed to capture AWWs’ feelings, emotions, and opinions about their job responsibilities to 
meaningfully understand factors that influence their performance. In general, the purpose of 
qualitative research is to gain an understanding of the quality or nature of human experiences 
and what these phenomena mean to individuals (Bernard, 2006; Bryman, 2012; Draper, 2004). It 
can be broadly embedded in the interpretative and naturalistic tradition, as it seeks to understand 
and explain beliefs and behaviours within the context that they occur (Draper, 2004). Qualitative 
research methods are used in a range of fields and disciplines. In the literature on performance, 
especially in the public health literature that discusses human resources for health including 





factors influencing it. To understand workers’ viewpoints, feelings, and thought process about 
factors influencing their motivation and performance, the majority of these studies used 
qualitative research methods (Glenton et al., 2013; Kok et al., 2014). Hence, to understand 
AWWs’ perspectives and experiences on factors that influence their performance, especially their 
experiences regarding the introduction of monetarily incentivised mobile phone technology, I 
decided to use qualitative research methods. Although conducting one-off qualitative interviews 
can be considered as one of the limitations of my qualitative research, I did extensive context 
setting phase to overcome this challenge (in detailed described in the next section).  
My quantitative research aimed to examine the influence of monetarily incentivised mobile 
phone technology used by AWWs on the household uptake of ICDS services linked to the 
intervention. I decided to use quantitative research methods to examine the influence of the 
bundled intervention because I had access to quantitative data collected as part of an impact 
evaluation that allows me to assess the association between the levels of service uptake and the 
intervention. Quantitative analysis also has the benefit that it draws on a larger representative 
sample that allowed me to make a generalisable conclusion about the impact of the intervention 
on service uptake at the household level. The tradition of quantitative research, which is rooted 
in the positivist and materialistic tradition, places its emphasis on the measurement and 
quantification of phenomena as essential steps in the process of inquiry. In the public health and 
programme evaluation literature, the majority of studies that have examined the influence of 
specific factors on service uptake used quantitative research methods such as descriptive or 
causal analysis using social surveys (Glenton et al., 2013; Kok et al., 2014). Due to the availability 
of a unique data set (two rounds - before and after) and sampling methodology I could make a 
generalisation to the whole population and compare and generalise between two different 
sample populations—one segment of the population that access AWCs where AWWs use the 
mobile phone and receive monetary incentives and a second set where the intervention is absent.  
3.2.2  ‘Pragmatic approach’ in combining qualitative and quantitative research  
Since the 1990s, the mixed methods approach emerged as a third research paradigm establishing 
it alongside the positivist (associated with quantitative methodologies) and constructivist 
(associated with qualitative methodologies) paradigms. According to Johnson et al., (2007: 
p.117), “we currently are in a three methodological or research paradigm world, with quantitative, 
qualitative, and mixed methods research all thriving and coexisting”.  
Pragmatism is one of the philosophical partner of the mixed method approach. It provides a set 





which differentiates the approach from purely quantitative approaches that are based on the 
philosophy of (post) positivism and purely qualitative approaches that are based on the 
philosophy of constructivism (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). I use this pragmatic approach in 
combining qualitative and quantitative research methods as proposed by Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004) and developed by Morgan (2007).  
The pragmatic approach puts emphasis on three key aspects: abductive reasoning, 
intersubjectivity, and transferability. In the pragmatic approach, abductive reasoning relies on 
connecting theory and data by using inductive qualitative and deductive quantitative approaches 
sequentially. The abductive process, i.e. the movement back and forth between different 
approaches to theory and data can happen in a single project or different projects that 
complement each other (Morgan, 2007).   
The intersubjectivity aspect of the pragmatic approach captures the duality of subjectivity and 
objectivity in the research process. It allows the coexistence of beliefs that there is a single ‘real 
world’ (quantitative belief) and that all individuals have their own unique interpretations of that 
world (qualitative belief). The intersubjectivity aspect of pragmatic approach allows exploration 
of findings that emerged from one research strategy in the context of the other (Morgan, 2007).  
Transferability, the third aspect of the pragmatic approach, means the implication of findings to 
other research settings. In the research process, it is the movement back and forth between the 
contextual inference in qualitative research (i.e. research findings are relevant for the studied 
context) and generality inference (i.e., research findings can be generalised to a wider population) 
in quantitative research (Morgan, 2007).  






In applying the pragmatic approach, I used qualitative and quantitative research methods 
sequentially. Figure 7 depicts the sequencing while mixing the methods. Although I consider this 
thesis as a single project, it is also a combination of separate projects (or chapters) that use 
qualitative and quantitative research methods to complement each other to gain a better 
understanding of the concept of performance in the AWW context. In Chapter 7 I discuss the 
qualitative and quantitative research findings in relation to each other to present a 
comprehensive understanding of AWW performance. Moreover, I also discuss the implications 
of findings for different geographical and policy contexts.  
3.3 Qualitative methods  
Qualitative methods offer richer meanings of intricate details of phenomena such as feelings, 
thought process and emotions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). I chose the qualitative method of 
interviewing to deeply engage in capturing the perceptions and experiences of AWWs on working 
arrangements, relationships and negotiations with peers, supervisors, community members, and 
family, and overall motivation (Bernard, 2006; Ritchie et al., 2014). I chose semi-structured 
interviews with open-ended questions as the qualitative interview method to provide an 
opportunity for participants to directly articulate their meanings and interpretations to events 
and experiences (Ritchie et al., 2014). Furthermore, to understand the multi-dimensional concept 
of performance, the qualitative approach allowed me to explore the concept by allowing the 
participants’ self and voice in the research process. The semistructured interview structure also 
provided space for any sensitive topics to emerge and to ensure the privacy of the interviewee. 
3.3.1 Selection of sites and participants  
As I described earlier, I had access to the survey data from the BCSP evaluation surveys which had 
demographic information on AWCs and AWWs. Using the BCSP survey data on AWCs and AWWs, 
I undertook a twostaged purposive sampling. The stages in selecting the sites and participants 
are illustrated in Figure 8. As the first step, I purposively selected two administrative blocks 
assigned as the third treatment block (T3) and comparison block for my qualitative fieldwork. This 
was because one of the aims of my qualitative fieldwork is to understand AWWs’ perceptions and 
experiences in using the mobile phone and monetary incentives and how it influences their 
performance. As the second step, using the survey data set for the chosen two blocks, I selected 
the participants for the qualitative research purposively. For each block, the BCSP had randomly 
selected 55 AWWs. From the list of 55 AWWs from each block, I selected 30 AWWs (15 from each 





 Distance to the block office from the Gram Panchayat (GP)40  
 Caste41 of the AWW  
 Education of the AWW    
Figure 8 Selection of sites and participants 
 
The distance the worker travels for meetings and office work has been suggested to influence 
work routines (Saprii et al., 2015). The distance to the block office from the Gram Panchayat is a 
significant distance an AWW needs to travel regularly for official work such as meetings, voucher 
signing to receive money to buy food, and monitoring report submission. The distance might also 
influence how frequently the AWW sees her supervisor and receives external monitoring visits. 
Thus, the distance factor could potentially have an impact on AWW performance. Therefore, I 
purposively selected AWWs who lived within different distances from the Gram Panchayat. The 
caste of the AWW could be influential in her relationship with the community and the overall 
trust she receives from the community (Mander & Kumaran, 2006). Education of the worker is a 
key recruitment criterion and evidenced to influence AWW performance (Gujral et al., 1991), thus 
was included as a selection criterion.  
Considering one of the objectives of my qualitative research was to understand the influence of 
the mobile phone technology and monetary incentives bundled intervention on AWW 
                                                          
40 Gram Panchayat is the lowest elected governance tier and consists of a group of villages. 





performance, I did not use any intervention specific criteria42to select participants. This was 
because I did not want any programme implementation bias to affect my selection of participants. 
3.3.2 Data collection 
I used semi-structured interviews guided by a topic guide based on the conceptual framework on 
AWW performance (see Chapter 2 for details). I carried out several rounds of iterations of the 
topic guide after multiple field visits to further contextualise the topic guide and to aid the flow 
of the interview. Discussion topics in the guide included the following domains: overall 
motivation, workload, supervision, training, community, and incentives associated with the AWW 
role. In addition to these, it discussed facilitators and barriers influencing the delivery of each of 
the six ICDS services (supplementary nutrition, immunisation, health check-up, referral services, 
pre-school education, and nutrition and health education) at the AWW level. In the block where 
the AWWs were using the monetarily incentivised mobile phone technology intervention, I 
discussed in detail about their perspectives and experiences regarding the intervention. I did 
three phases of pre-test interviews to refine the topic guide. Ten pilot interviews were conducted 
to finalise the topic guide. The extensive phase of pre-test and pilot gave me ample time to refine 
myself as a qualitative researcherto tune my body language, voice modulations, and familiarise 
myself with the context.  
In addition to the interviews, I also collected administrative background documents and asked 
clarification questions to the BCSP Programme Manager in the district after the interviews with 
AWWs for more clarity about the programme implementation. The views or experiences of the 
Programme Manager or ICDS officials were not sought because the aim of the research is not to 
present a multi-stakeholder perspective; rather it is to focus on the primary user perspective. The 
collected documents and clarifications were used to support and elaborate on AWW views and 
experiences. 
I conducted the qualitative interviews with the help of a female research assistant, two note-
takers and a logistics manager43. I interviewed half (15) of the participants, and the research 
assistant conducted the rest. The selected female research assistant was fluent in the local Bihari 
                                                          
42 The BCSP criteria could have included the AWW’s differential programme participation, phone use ability, 
period of phone use etc.  
43 I received funding from the POSHAN (Partnerships and Opportunities to Strengthen and Harmonize 
Actions for Nutrition in India) project led by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and 
funded by BMGF. The funding was awarded to include one more donor-funded programme piloted to 
improve AWW performance in another district in Bihar. Due to my PhD time constraints, we decided to 
carry out the fieldwork in the second district using a team trained by me. Thus, I needed to include a 
logistics manager and train him on study objectives and routine by working with me in Gaya, so that he 





dialect (Magahi). We did the initial introduction together because she was a good entry point for 
an outsider like me to get to know the AWW and her social relationships. I listened to all 
interviews conducted every day by the female research assistant to check whether the interviews 
were of expected depth. Two note-takers (one male and one female) teamed up with the female 
interviewer and myself to record meticulous field observations. A few examples from the field 
observations include the details of the physical setting of the interview, the body language of the 
participants and any details participants wanted to share without the presence of the audio-
recorder (Bernard, 2006). The interview phase of the field work was completed in three weeks 
before the state assembly elections in Bihar. Gaya was under the high-security category due to 
the presence of the Naxalite movement44. An experienced male field logistics manager was 
included in the team to mitigate any risks in logistics arrangements due to the elections. It was a 
practical decision to include two male members to avoid any gender or context-specific potential 
risks due to the state elections and the presence of insurgency. I provided five days of training, 
which included three days of classroom training and two days of field training to introduce them 
to the research objectives, interview techniques, and the daily fieldwork routine and logistics. I 
kept a daily diary in English to describe the day in detail. I also kept a small ‘notes to self’ journal 
in my mother tongue  Malayalam to jot down my thinking around stories I heard and scenes 
I witnessed. There was also a team diary to log daily activities and record de-briefing sessions to 
reflect on our daily experiences.  
All interviews were audio-recorded with the permission of the AWWs. Each interview lasted for 
45—60 minutes. Every day, as part of the fieldwork team routine, I saved the audio-recordings in 
designated folders onto a password protected web-based server. I followed a systematic file 
naming procedure. After conducting the first six interviews45, I read the interview transcripts 
carefully to make further iterations to the topic guide. Each interview was verbatim transcribed 
and translated into English. After the translation, all transcripts went through one more round of 
                                                          
44 The Naxalite movement started in Bihar from 1967 as a peasant struggle as part of the wider Naxalite 
movement in India (B. Bhatia, 2005; Sundar, 2011). It originally started in Naxalbari, West Bengal, thus the 
name Naxalite. The movement represented the revolutionary branch of Indian Marxism aiming to take 
control of the Indian state through armed struggle rather than parliamentary democracy (Sundar, 2011). 
In 1995—96, approximately 17 Naxalite groups were active in different parts of Bihar (B. Bhatia, 2005). One 
of the main groups is the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), and the rest are part of the Communist Party 
of India (CPI) (MarxistLeninist) (B. Bhatia, 2005). Since 2004 after the merger of CPI (ML) People’s War 
and the MCC, the Communist Party of India (Maoist) is the biggest Naxalite political force. The CPI (Maoist) 
is one of the main actors in my research area, Gaya. The Indian state has attempted to crush the movement 
since 1970 and considers Naxalism as a security threat which needs to be fought with the army and special 
forces. The fighting between the Naxalite groups and the state has caused several episodes of violence 
across state and country (Sundar, 2011).  





quality control verbatim quality (word by word against the audio) and translation quality. I read 
the transcripts several times during the transcription, translation, and quality control phases to 
familiarise myself with the content and to start coding.  
My positionality during the fieldwork was influenced by my identity as an Indian student studying 
at a British university, and as a South Indian. In addition, while conducting qualitative fieldwork 
my primary training in quantitative methods and experience in surveys influenced my 
positionality. Being a student at a British university, I felt it was easier to seek interviews with 
AWWs as they seemed to value that identity. Although the British university student identity 
helped me, I was aware of the distance my outsider urban identity could have created. I involved 
the female research assistant, a middle-aged woman from one of the northern districts of Bihar 
to ease my entry into villages. I wanted to minimise the distance between us due to our identities. 
The presence of the female research assistant, her age and knowledge in the local dialect helped 
to bridge this identity gap. Moreover, being with her and other team members (one female and 
two males) and me being the youngest and my local attire to some extent helped me merge into 
the local Bihar context.  
As a quantitative researcher with previous experience in survey management, I had to approach 
the qualitative data collection in a different way. I used the extensive phase of pre-test and 
piloting of topic guide to achieve the right level of comfort in the interview process. During the 
pre-test phase, I realised that the qualitative interviews required a totally different body language 
compared to survey interviews. I had to remind myself to relax, smile, and consider it as a visit to 
get to know someone. During this phase, I also realised that AWWs were not used to people 
talking to them about their perceptions, feelings, or problems as working women. They were, 
however, used to spot checks, surveys, enquiries, and social audits. To increase AWWs’ comfort, 
I relied on my young-female-student identity and tried to connect with AWWs on a personal level. 
Talking about their own children proved the best way to connect with them. Children of all 
interviewed AWWs pursued higher education in district headquarters, or Patna (the state capital), 
or Delhi. They expressed pride in their children’s achievements, and discussions about children’s 
educational trajectory helped to set the mood for an open discussion about work and life.  
As part of the context setting before starting the interviews, I talked to AWW labour union leaders 
in the district and the state. In my selected sample, two AWWs led the union activities in their 
area, and I interviewed them in the first round. When a research team visits a village, the news 
spread informally. Interviewing the AWWs who led the union activities in a way alleviated the 
inhibitions of rest of the AWWs. Before my fieldwork period, AWWs called in a national level strike 





district and block headquarters. The strike in Bihar started off as an indefinite strike with twelve 
demands: minimum wage, permanent employment, pension, insurance and so on. A few AWWs 
even set fire to their uniform as a symbolic protest method. After a few days of the strike, the 
government agreed to hike their salary by 25%. Although it was an earlier promise, AWWs called 
off the strike due to the invisible pressure put on them by the government. During my field work, 
many interviewed AWWs spoke about their participation in the strike, as a resistance to the 
government’s attitude towards them. I also documented newspaper articles that reported on the 
AWW strike. 
My field sites were situated 50 to 60 kilometres away from Gaya town, bordered with rocky hills 
with very limited public transport connectivity. Due to the distance and lack of accommodation 
at the sites, we travelled in a hired car. Women travelling into villages without close family or 
male members is unusual in rural Bihar. The presence of the two male members helped us in this 
regard. 
The ethics committee at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)46, USA and 
University of Sussex, UK gave the ethics approval for the research. An Indian organisation, Centre 
for Media Studies (CMS), New Delhi provided the local ethics approval. The oral consent 
information explained the purpose of the research, participant’s right to anonymity and voluntary 
withdrawal at any stage of the interview, expected time commitment and my contact details. The 
interview audio recordings include the oral consent given by the participants at the start of the 
interview. During the pilot stage, I noted that a few AWWs did not feel comfortable in the 
presence of the audio-recorder. Thus, before starting the interview and official consent 
procedure, we spent time with AWWs in explaining the research aims, clauses in the consent 
form, and started the interview once we achieved a friendly rapport. The female research 
assistant was an experienced interviewer trained in the importance and delivery of oral consent. 
Because the consent was audio-recorded, it was easier to check the consistency of the process. I 
anonymised the interview recordings and transcripts by deleting names, locations, and AWC 
codes from the transcripts to preserve the anonymity of participants. Each participant was 
assigned a unique identification number for de-identification and tracking purposes. The 
qualitative interviews discussed sensitive issues within the ICDS context, hence, in presenting the 
findings, especially qualitative interview excerpts I decided not to include names of the blocks, 
panchayats, and demographic characteristics of AWWs to avoid any potential threat to 
                                                          
46 As mentioned earlier, the data collection for this research was funded by POSHAN project led by IFPRI 
and funded by BMGF. Because the data collection was funded by IFPRI, I took ethical clearance from IFPRI 





anonymity. Although my previous identity associated with the BCSP baseline could have been an 
ethical concern, however, the time gap between baseline data collection and qualitative data 
collection (two years) and my distance with the programme implementation phase helped in this 
regard.  
3.3.3 Data analysis 
I used a hybrid method of inductive and deductive thematic analysis to analyse the data (Fereday 
& Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Ritchie et al., 2014). As suggested by Fereday & Muir-Cochrane (2006), 
the hybrid method incorporated both a data-driven inductive approach (Boyatzis, 1998) and the 
deductive a priori template of codes approach (Crabtree & Miller, 1999).  I chose this method of 
analysis because it allowed me to combine deductive analysis guided by the conceptual 
framework on AWW performance and inductive analysis with the generation of new emerging 
themes from the data.  
I developed a code list as a data management tool for organising fragments of similar or related 
text to facilitate interpretation (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). This code list was developed a priori, 
based on the research question and the conceptual framework on AWW performance. It included 
seven broad categories of codes, namely: motivation, selection and recruitment, workload, 
service-specific facilitators and barriers, community, supervision, and training. I revised the code 
list after testing the applicability and reliability of codes to the raw data. In the initial phase, I 
coded two interview transcripts using the a priori code list. A few sub-codes were not needed as 
the main codes were found to be organising the data meaningfully. After testing the code list, I 
uploaded the transcripts and coded it with the help of the qualitative data management program 
NVivo 10. I entered the codes developed from the code list manually to NVivo as nodes and coded 
transcripts by matching codes with fragments of data selected as representative of the code. 
Though the coding used an a priori code list, I did not restrict the analysis to the preliminary code 
list. While coding transcripts, inductive codes were assigned to fragments of data that showed a 
new theme emerging from the text. These ‘data-driven’ codes were either separate from the 
categories in initial codes (e.g. caste, corruption) or they expanded a code from the code list (e.g. 
self-identity under the motivation code). After line-by-line coding of ten transcripts, I wrote a 
summary of each code. During the coding and summarising processes, I wrote analytical memos 
for each code to capture emerging analytical threads and operational notes. These analytical 
memos and summaries helped me to connect codes to identified themes in the data. In the next 





describe the meaning that underpinned the theme. This rigorous47 process of analysis (step-by-
step with a clear audit trail) until the clustering phase ensures that these clustered themes were 
representative of the initial data analysis and assigned codes.  
In analysing qualitative interviews as a researcher predominantly trained in quantitative methods, 
I found the mental load different from conducting quantitative analysis. I found this process 
similar to learning a new language and reminded myself of being a bilingual (native language and 
English). I relied heavily on the process of writing in the form of analytical memos, summaries, 
and chapter drafts to attain the analytical saturation. 
To answer the second aim of my qualitative research, I only used data from Block 2 (T3block), 
where the intervention was underway.  
3.4 Quantitative methods  
In this section, I only introduce briefly my quantitative analysis, as it is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5.  As discussed before, I use two rounds of survey data from the BCSP pilot evaluation 
undertaken by OPM. The two surveys present a panel of Primary Sampling Units (PSUs)—in this 
case, the PSU is the catchment area of AWCs. From the treatment and comparison blocks, each 
survey round collected data from approximately 55 AWCs, 1500 households (with at least one 
woman having a child less than age two) and community fixed characteristics from 55 PSUs. 
To estimate the impact of the monetary incentives and mobile phone technology intervention on 
the household uptake of the ICDS services linked to the intervention, I use the Difference-in-
Difference (DID) estimation strategy (Card & Krueger, 1993; Wooldridge, 2003). The rationale for 
using the DID estimation strategy and how I applied it using the data is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5.  
3.5 Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter discussed the overall methodological approach used in this thesis. As 
part of the mixed methods research strategy, I conducted qualitative and quantitative research 
to answer my specific sub-research questions. I chose the pragmatic approach from the mixed 
methods paradigm to combine the use of qualitative and quantitative research methods. I 
sequentially used these methods to complement each other to present a coherent narrative on 
AWW performance. I discuss the findings using each method in light of the other in the last 
chapter (Chapter 7). In the qualitative research, I interviewed 30 purposively selected AWWs 
                                                          





using a two-stage selection criteria. I used a hybrid method of deductive and inductive thematic 
analysis to analyse the data. In the quantitative analysis, to estimate the impact of the mobile 
phone and monetary incentives intervention on the household level service uptake of ICDS 
services linked to the intervention, I applied the DID estimation strategy on a panel of workers 
and linked mothers and children in treatment and comparison blocks. Moving on from context 
and methodology, in the next chapter, I discuss the findings of my qualitative research that 
explored the individual, programmatic, community, and organisational factors that influence 






Chapter Four: Individual, programmatic, community, and organisational 
factors that influence Anganwadi workers’ performance  
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present findings from my qualitative research which aims to understand the 
individual, programmatic, community, and organisational factors that influence AWW 
performance.  
As demonstrated in the literature review (Chapter 2), in understanding the factors that influence 
the motivation and performance of AWWs in delivering services, the perspectives of the AWWs 
are often underexplored. Hence, I focused my research inquiry to unpack the determinants of 
performance from the point of view of AWWs themselves. To unpack the concept of AWW 
performance from their point of view, I believe it is important to gain insights into what factors 
AWWs perceive as facilitators and barriers in performing their job responsibilities. Hence, the 
research aimed to capture a deeper understanding of an AWW’s lived experiences and 
perceptions as a village woman and as a programme worker.  
Structurally this chapter has four sections and relevant subsections. The next section 4.2 
discusses briefly the concepts and methods used in the research. Section 4.3 presents the findings 
of this research. The findings section is followed by a discussion section (4.4) and concludes with 
a summary of conclusions (4.5).  
4.2 Background  
My qualitative research was guided by the conceptual framework on AWW performance laid out 
in Chapter 2. The framework contextualised the definition of performance in the AWW context 
as ‘AWWs making services accessible to the required number of beneficiaries with adequate 
quality’ (i.e. adhering to guidelines). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, I conducted qualitative research among 30 AWWs. I used semi-
structured interviews with open-ended questions as the qualitative interview method to provide 
an opportunity for participants to directly articulate their meanings and interpretations to events 
and experiences (Ritchie et al., 2014). The semistructured interview structure also provided 
space for any sensitive topics to emerge and to ensure the privacy of the interviewee. I selected 
the interview participants using a two-stage purposive sampling. I chose the blocks purposively 
to include the block where only the BCSP’s mobile phone and monetary incentives intervention. 
I used the demographic characteristics of AWWs from the BCSP baseline survey conducted in 





headquarters, education, and caste as the selection criteria as these could influence AWWs’ 
performance and lived experiences. I conducted the fieldwork in the two blocks of Gaya in 
AugustSeptember 2015. I used a hybrid method of inductive and deductive thematic analysis to 
analyse the data (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006).   
4.3 Findings 
I discuss the analytical findings after providing a summary of the demographic characteristics and 
job responsibilities of AWWs and the infrastructural conditions of AWCs. Findings are categorised 
into four categories namely: individual, programmatic, community, and organisational factors 
that influence AWW performance.  
Figure 9 Age and education levels of interviewed AWWs, block wise                         
    
 
As shown in Figure 9, most of the interviewed AWWs were in the 31—40 age group or younger 
(eleven in the below 30 age group). Only two AWWs belonged to the 41—50 age group. 
Considering the minimum education qualification for the job is ten years of education, seven 
AWWs belonged to this group. The rest possessed higher education levels: fourteen completed 
twelve years of education, a considerable number (eight) of AWWs were graduates, and one even 
completed her post-graduate degree. In the selected group of AWWs for interviews, one 
practised Islam, and the rest believed in Hinduism. They belonged to three caste categories— 
General48, OBC49, and SC50. Most (seventeen) of the AWWs were from OBC, including the only 
Muslim one. Though AWWs primarily belonged to the village (marital home) where the centre is 
                                                          
48 General category included higher caste groups like Brahmans, and Rajputs etc.  
49 OBC community mainly comprises of Yadavs and Kormis, in Bihar.  
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located, not all (fourteen) lived in the same hamlet as the centre. Five lived in the town for their 
children’s education and commuted to the village every day.   
Table 10 provides a detailed description of AWW job responsibilities summarised from the 
interviews. It shows that the interviewed AWWs have a wide set of responsibilities ranging from 
pre-school teaching to food distribution to weighing and counselling. The responsibilities listed in 





Table 10 Detailed Responsibilities of AWWs reported in the interviews 
Core services Activity Content Frequency 
and Time 
Type and number of 
beneficiaries 
Pre-school  Teaching   Rhymes, alphabets, stories, 




9 am12 pm 
Children 3 




HCM (daily lunch 
with the help of 
AWH) 
Distribute pre-decided 
menu based Hot cooked 
meal such as Khichdi, 





to 6 years 
40  
THR (monthly dry 
ration)  
Distribute pre-decided 
quantity of rice and lentils 
for each beneficiary 
category. Twice a week eggs  
Monthly  
 









3years   
40  
Immunization  Provide space for 
VHSND  
Help the ANM to carry out 









years   















years   
All 
Health Checkups Weighing of 
pregnant women 
and children  
Weight check, counselling, 











school children  
Weight check, counselling 





















Home visits  Visit mothers to counselling 
them one to one on 
















Referral  Referral of SAM 
children  
Identification of SAM 
children and referral to 
district facilities  






Figure 10 AWC building type, block wise 
 
The literal meaning of the word ‘Anganwadi’ is ‘courtyard shelter.' This proved true for two AWCs 
included in the interviews—children gathered under a tree. Out of thirty interviewed AWWs, five 
AWWs either operated out of the courtyards of rented buildings or from the AWW’s home. 
Fifteen of the AWCs included in this research functioned in a building owned by the ICDS 
department, and the rest (eight) of them used the space given in other government buildings 
such as schools, community halls (Saamudayik bhawan), or local government (Panchayat 
bhawan) halls (Figure 10).  
4.3.1 Individual factors  
The initial financial motive rooted in family income needs, and family support emerged from the 
interviews with the AWWs as two individual factors that influence AWWs’ continued motivation 
and performance.  
Financial motives rooted in family income needs  
In the interviews, AWWs discussed three types of initial motives (financial, moral, and social) to 
take up the job. Whilst some AWWs actively chose to take up the role due to “moral” motives 
(the opportunity to positively impact their community), for many it was their families who were 
the driving force.  
For the majority of AWWs, their families decided to apply for the job after a brief consultation 
with them. Their families tended to be more focused on the “financial” and “social” motive – the 
additional income and prestige within the community and access to social and bureaucratic 
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remained entangled with the family because she lacked an independent identity in the village 
setting. As the sign of a deep-rooted patriarchy in villages, her identity intertwined with her 
marital family’s identity. Her identity in the village remained as the ‘daughter-in-law’ of a specific 
family or ‘wife’ of an adult male. In interviews, a few AWWs voiced the existing gendered power 
relation by referring to their husbands or other male members (e.g. father-in-law or husband’s 
elder brother) as ‘guardians’51. The ICDS programme in Bihar somewhat institutionalised this joint 
identity. For example, the ICDS AWW recruitment guidelines 52 list daughter-in-laws settled in the 
village’ as an eligibility criterion. Though the guidelines must have included this criterion 
pragmatically based on the common societal practice of women shifting from her natal home to 
marital home after marriage, it directly connects the identity of an AWW to her marital family 
even at the stage of recruitment. Thus, institutionally and societally, family identity is entangled 
with the female worker’s (AWW) identity and the financial and social motive to take up the job is 
deeply rooted in family income needs.  
Even those AWWs who entered the ICDS with a set of moral motives, with or without the help of 
the family, needed to support their families financially. They too shared the family identity. Thus, 
the motives rooted in family income needs directly or indirectly influenced an AWW’s initial and 
continued motivation. In some cases AWWs fought against the familial and social pressures that 
prevented her from working outside the home. In these cases too, they chose to work as an AWW 
to contribute to the family income and secure their children’s future. In one of the interviews, a 
graduate AWW who works predominantly in a Dalit settlement and who echoed the opinion of 
many AWWs, said:  
“Reason is that see everybody, even every woman wants to do something now, 
and they do not want to sit idle at home as earlier women used to do. Now we 
are getting educated, and for the sake of our children, we have to do it. Then 
poverty is also a reason as we are very poor.”  
(AWW Interview) 
As the above quote illuminates, irrespective of the wider drivers leading AWWs to take up the 
role, there was a strong “finance” motive for workers and their families; the salary (Rs. 3000 per 
month) was a key source of household livelihood. Therefore, the finance motive was more 
important than the social and moral motives, both for taking up the role but also for continued 
motivation. To conclude, the initial financial motive rooted in family income needs did not directly 
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influence the access or quality aspects of performance. Nevertheless, this emerges as a significant 
factor influencing AWWs’ continued motivation. The conceptual framework on AWW 
performance used in this thesis, which is derived from the literature, did not have the initial 
financial motive of the worker as a factor contributing towards continued motivation.  
Family support  
The families of AWWs not only influenced their initial motives to obtain an AWW position. The 
majority of AWWs reported that their husbands often support them in their daily job 
responsibilities. Husbands help them in bringing sacks of rice from the collection point in the 
Gram Panchayat, filling out the ICDS monitoring registers, and providing transport to the block 
office. AWWs whose husbands were deceased are either helped by sons or other male family 
members as most of them lived in joint families. The husband or other family members who 
support the AWW in daily job responsibilities helps the AWW to make services such as food 
distribution accessible (performance outcome) to beneficiaries. One of the AWWs helped by her 
husband who works as a local self-government representative in the village explains why she 
needs help from family to fulfil her job, especially in bringing heavy rice sacks: 
“Both husband and wives are involved in this job. This Anganwadi is not meant 
for one. It cannot be done unless two people are there. When the rice comes, 
my husband has to go and bring it.  It is very heavy, and a woman cannot lift it. 
So for that, I send my husband. No matter it takes 3 hours or 2 hours, my 
husband will bring it from there. If there is some urgent report or vaccination is 
going on at my place, then I cannot go leaving my duty. So I have to send my 
husband. So out of 3000, only 1500 is given to the worker and 1500 to her 
husband. So what does one get?”  
(AWW Interview) 
4.3.2 Programmatic factors  
Two programmatic factors, which emerged in the interviews, which seem to influence AWW 
performance, are the service preferences of beneficiaries and AWWs, and work environment 
factors. I further classify the work environment factors as workload, honorarium, supervision, and 
resources.  
Service preferences of beneficiaries and AWWs  
The services AWWs deliver comprise of productoriented services (involves a product such as 





individual and group counselling) (Kosec et al., 2015). A dominant view existed among AWWs 
suggests that beneficiaries preferred productoriented services over informationoriented 
services. AWWs perceived that beneficiaries’ explicit preference for products attracted better 
attendance for the THR distribution and immunisation compared to the individual and group 
counselling sessions. The majority of AWWs felt that there was a higher likelihood of beneficiary 
visits on product distribution days (i.e. of dry rations, eggs, money for uniforms, and vaccines). 
They felt that this occurred due to the beneficiaries’ perception of an AWW as a source of benefit 
and the belief that they should receive a tangible benefit for their time. AWWs often mentioned 
that while giving counselling messages during home visits, the beneficiaries said: “you do not give 
us anything and keep telling us the same things”.  
In the past, AWWs provided tea and snacks for beneficiary women and their children during group 
counselling sessions at the AWC. However, the SWD cut the budget for refreshments (per month 
Rs. 200 ($3). Once the refreshments discontinued, it became difficult for AWWs to convince 
women to attend group counselling sessions. The beneficiary women showed their disinterest by 
responding to AWWs’ request to attend meetings as “you call us and do not even give us 
‘nashtapani’ (tea and snacks)”. Consequently, fewer beneficiaries attended the sessions. A few 
AWCs even discontinued the sessions due to the lack of the budget and beneficiary interest. This 
adds further elaboration to the claim that beneficiaries showed a preference for the 
productoriented services over informationoriented services. In the below quote an AWW 
eloquently explains the beneficiary preference for the productoriented services.  
“We do not need to tell them much the day we distribute egg, rice or dress. The 
day money is distributed; there is no need to tell more than once. However, on 
the day of Mahila Mandal (group counselling) and immunisation, we have to 
call them several times. Some lie and say that they cannot come they have to 
go somewhere. We feel very bad, and many times we get angry as well and 
say that “on the day of distribution you all come running. When we call you to 
tell something, then you all don’t come”.  
(AWW Interview) 
In comparing the two productoriented services (food and vaccines), AWWs felt a minority of 
beneficiaries needed further convincing to take up immunisation. The hesitant minority were 
either persuaded to take up immunisation by using the food as an incentive or via the help of 
external monitors53. Pre-school services, predominantly an information-oriented service is linked 
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to a product i.e. food in the form of daily hot cooked meals. Interviewed AWWs perceived that 
children, as pre-school beneficiaries, also showed a clear preference towards the product 
component of the service. On days without food (due to lack of supply from the state), all AWWs 
said that the daily attendance of children fell. The type of food also influenced children’s 
attendance. For example, children showed clear preference towards eggs, Halwa, and Rasiya. On 
days of egg distribution, more than forty children turned up.  
Even when the food was not available, AWWs reported that they provided pre-school teaching. 
A few AWWs stated that they even distribute biscuits and toffees by themselves to keep children 
interested in the pre-school activities on days without food. Although this could be due to strict 
supervision, detailed exploration revealed another type of preference. This preference stemmed 
from AWWs’ preference towards the pre-school service. The majority of AWWs self-identified 
themselves as teachers. AWWs stated that they liked pre-school services the most, as it gave 
them the status of a teacher for children. A teacher’s job remains as an available, achievable and 
respectable position for educated women in villages. Moreover, ‘pre-school teaching’ remained 
as the most visible role of an AWW in the village setting as people often referring to the AWC as 
the ‘school for small children’. In the interviews, the majority of AWWs added that they had 
always aspired to becoming teachers but were not able to get positions as teachers. The below 
quote by an AWW who used to be a literacy programme facilitator is a good example revealing 
the initial aspiration to become a teacher: 
“What else could I do, I filled the form here and got selected. I came for 
teacher only. Later on, when the vacancy came for a teacher’s post, I was 
short of money54.”  
(AWW Interview) 
To conclude, the perception that beneficiaries have a preference for product-oriented services 
has a mixed influence on AWW performance. This encourages the AWWs to make 
productoriented services such as food distribution, immunisation and pre-school accessible and 
hinders the provision of informationoriented services like home visits and group counselling 
sessions. AWWs also prioritise pre-school teaching due to their self-identity as teachers.  
Work environment 
In this section, I summarise the influence of various work environment factors such as workload, 
honorarium, supervision, and resources on AWW performance.   
                                                          





Workload: AWWs commonly viewed themselves as an overburdened workforce. In the 
interviews, AWWs frequently compared their responsibilities to other occupational groups that 
served the village population such as ANMs, teachers, and village government officials. Based on 
this comparison, AWWs often felt that they had to undertake a disproportionate amount of the 
total work in the community whilst also tending with frequent additional requests to undertake 
work that was not part of their job description. For example, AWWs were often asked to 
undertake work such as surveys for government departments, facilitate health smart cards for 
Below Poverty Line (BPL55) families, facilitate the formation of self-help groups, mobilise 
communities to participate in elections, and undertake official duty on the state or national 
election days.  
“[……] we do feel that we are the only ones who are burdened with all the work. 
We have been made a multi-purpose worker. The entire load comes to us. In a 
village, AWW is there, then the ward members, the village head, ASHA, ANM, 
doctor, BDO, CEO, etc. However, the entire burden is on us only”.  
(AWW Interview) 
The majority of AWWs I interviewed felt overburdened and emphasised that the high workload 
demotivated them and influenced job satisfaction, especially as they felt that the government did 
not pay them an adequate wage for their effort.  
Honorarium:  All interviewed AWWs discussed low and delayed honoraria as a major demotivating 
factor in the work environment. There were two ways in which low honorarium induced 
demotivation.  
Firstly, AWWs considered the honorarium as a proxy for the government’s respect towards them. 
Despite being an educated workforce, they complained that their pay remained lower than the 
daily wage rate of casual manual labourers. Under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(NREGA), a casual manual labour receives Rs. 167 per day ($2.5) for a maximum of 100 days of 
employment. In the case of AWWs, the monthly (average 25 days per month) honorarium is Rs. 
3000 i.e. Rs. 120 per day ($45 per month, $1.8 per day). In one of the interviews, a graduate AWW 
who serves a predominantly Muslim community questioned the disparity between the AWW 
wage and local labour market wage and voiced her demoralisation in the below quote. She said:  
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“These days, a labourer also brings Rs. 200 in the evening as a day’s wage. 
Are we not worth more than a labourer? Are we not worth being a labourer even 
after doing graduation?  We were sad when we did not get increment this time. 
This hurt not only me but all the Sevikas56”.   
(AWW interview) 
AWWs’ demotivation was aggravated because they have not received any increment in their pay 
since 2009. In the expenditure sharing agreement between the state government and the central 
government to implement the ICDS, the latter contributed towards the honorarium of AWWs. 
The central government has not revised the honorarium (i.e. Rs. 3000 per month) since 2009. 
Though the state promised to raise the pay by 25% as an additional contribution from the state 
budget, it has not materialised so far57. This caused loss of trust between the AWW and the state 
government and stirred the statelevel strike that AWWs participated in a few weeks before the 
interviews58. Moreover, AWWs also received their monthly honorarium with three to four months 
of delay. The lack of financial liquidity and predictability also added to their demotivation. 
Secondly, AWWs felt the provision of immunisation service to be an activity outside their 
responsibility. This perception arose because the ASHAs receive performance pay for 
immunisation and AWWs do not. After the introduction of ASHAs, AWWs were introduced to the 
concept of performance pay based on outcomes. From 2007—2012, both ASHAs and AWWs used 
to receive performance pay for immunisation as part of the Muskan-Ek-Abhiyan59 programme 
(Goel et al., 2012; Kosec et al., 2015). Although the performance pay for AWWs got discontinued 
after the completion of Muskan-Ek-Abhiyan, the incentives for ASHAs continued as the ASHAs are 
completely dependent on performance payments. A quote from an AWW confirms the 
discontinuation of the payment:  
“[…] like earlier we used to get something extra for doing immunisation but 
now we do not get anything.” 
(AWW Interview) 
AWWs and ASHAs, two villagelevel female workers, working together in the same village 
towards similar goals can naturally compare their payment packages. Interestingly, none of the 
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57 Announced by the Chief Minister of Bihar before the state elections in October 2015 (http://bssc-
bihar.in/bihar-sevika-salary-anganwadi-sahayika-salary-25-increase/) 
58 Discussed in Chapter 3. 
59 In October 2007, a special campaign called Muskaan Ek Abhiyan (The Smile Campaign) was launched 
under National Rural Health Mission to give a fillip to the immunization program. The programme 





interviewed AWWs perceived that the ASHAs received better payment than them. In absolute 
terms, they felt demotivated due to the discontinuation of the performance payments for 
immunisation.  
Thus, the feeling of not being valued by the state government due to the inadequate honorarium 
(in both absolute and relative terms), the unreliable timing of honorarium payment, and the 
discontinuation of performance pay negatively influenced AWW motivation and self-esteem. 
Supervision: The interviews with AWWs suggest that, when the departmental supervisor(s), 
external monitors and community monitoring group60 members provide supportive supervision 
(i.e. help the worker in convincing reluctant beneficiaries to vaccinate their children, explain 
monitoring checklists, formats, and registers, and help with the THR distribution) the AWW 
appreciates the support and feels that the assistance enables her to fulfil her responsibilities. This 
in turn positively influence her motivation and delivery of overall services.  
The departmental supervisors visited them once a month, external monitors paid random visits 
during immunisation drives or polio rounds, and community monitoring members were supposed 
to be present during the monthly food distribution days.  
In a few cases when the AWW receives supervision that functions more as auditing and is 
hierarchical, the supervisorsupervisee relationship gets disturbed and negatively influences an 
AWW’s motivation and the access and quality of overall services. An AWW recollects how a 
supervisor’s behaviour evoked fear and damaged the purpose of providing feedback or task 
assistance:  
“What a voice she [supervisor] has! [...], if there was a mistake she used to 
explain in such a bad manner […]. If there is a person, who has such a voice 
that one would fear and think that if one has to ask something then how should 
we ask?”  
(AWW Interview) 
The demotivation increased especially when supervisors were acting as a channel for 
organisational corruption (i.e. when a supervisor takes a share from the money that AWWs are 
meant to use to procure food for beneficiaries—discussed in a later section). Giving a share of 
money to the supervisor directly affects an AWW’s ability to adhere to food distribution 
guidelines. Some AWWs reported experiencing corrupt practices more from their departmental 
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supervisor than from external or community monitors. However, a few AWWs mentioned that 
community monitoring group members ask for a share of food during the food distribution.  
Resources: The interviews with the AWWs suggest that, three types of resources influence an 
AWW’s performance: human, material, and financial. Table 11 summarises findings with regard 
to different resources and how these factors influence AWW performance.  
Table 11 Summary of work environment resource factors 
Work environment 
factor: Resources  
Sub-factors  How these factors influence performance  
Human  Anganwadi Helper  Positively influences performance by helping to 




Erratic availability, inadequate 




Negatively influence performance by 
demotivating the AWW and impacting on the 
access and quality elements of food distribution  
Job aid Job aids such as immunisation 
due-list register  
Positively influences the quality element of 
immunisation service by helping the AWW to 
adhere to guidelines   
Infrastructure Lack of building  Negatively influences AWW motivation and 
performance by influencing the access and 
quality elements of pre-school teaching 
Financial  Inadequate and erratic funds (for 
food and uniform)  
Negatively influence AWW motivation and 
performance by causing rifts in the community 
and affecting the access and quality elements of 
food distribution and pre-school  
 
The only additional human resource support to the AWW is the Anganwadi Helper who cleans the 
AWC, prepares food, and brings the children to the AWC. A few AWWs reported that absence of 
the helper in previous circumstances overburdened them. Thus, the presence of helpers seems 
to influence AWW performance by helping to improve the access and quality elements of pre-
school services.  
Interviewed AWWs highlighted how constraints in material resources such as supplies and 
infrastructure negatively influence their performance.  
Regarding supplies, the erratic availability, inadequate quantity, and low quality of rice supply 
influence an AWW’s ability to deliver the service as prescribed by the guidelines. The issues of 
rice supply negatively influence the access and quality elements of food distribution. The erratic 
availability of rice negatively influences children’s attendance at the AWC. The availability, 
quantity and quality issues regarding rice supply also strain the AWW’s relationship with the 
community because people frequently suspect that the AWW deliberately avoids the distribution 





“[….] Sometimes there are lapses in the supplies. Our children come to the 
AWC bringing their plate and ask “Didi, will there be food today?’. I feel bad 
when there is no food because they go back without eating. The women in 
the village fight with me sometimes when we are unable to deliver food 
because of no availability.”  
(AWW Interview) 
According to the interviewed AWWs, they are given roughly two quintals of rice61 per month. A 
majority of AWWs reported that they receive less than the required quantity of rice. This meant 
that they distribute less than the required amount of rice per beneficiary. AWWs also held a view 
that the quality of rice they received varied—sometimes the rice is old, broken, and with stones. 
AWWs are often asked by their supervisors to ‘manage’ these limitations. The erratic availability, 
inadequate quantity, and low quality of rice negatively influence an AWW’s motivation and 
directly impact on the access and quality elements of AWW performance outcomes.  
In the interviews, AWWs pointed out that the AWC infrastructure, especially the unavailability of 
AWC buildings with a kitchen area (especially the space to set up a stove), storage (to store food 
items, utensils, registers, and teaching aids), and water facilities (for cooking and cleaning 
children) affected their workload and further influenced their motivation and the quality of pre-
school services. AWWs who use communal spaces in the villages due to the lack of infrastructure 
(AWC building) faced difficulties in freely interacting with children. Use of the communal space 
(e.g. community halls) for several AWWs meant that the worker frequently had to deal with anti-
social behaviour and harassments by drunkards, continuous damage to the mud stove and 
offensive wall graffiti. This negatively influenced the motivation of AWWs and the quality of pre-
school services.  
The majority of AWWs filled registers for different services as required documentation. AWWs 
use immunisation due-lists to keep track of age-appropriate immunisation for children. Based on 
children’s date of birth, they prepare immunisation due-lists for monthly immunisation days. 
Unlike other registers which they felt were filled to show that they were carrying out their tasks, 
the immunisation due-lists were mentioned by AWWs as a register that helped them. It helped 
them to identify children for age-appropriate immunisation. Thus, the immunisation due-list 
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number an AWW needs to cater to for that age group). On THR days, an AWW delivers 3 kilograms of rice 
and 1.5 kilograms of lentils to 8 pregnant women and 8 lactating mothers. Out of the 40 children between 
6 months to 3 years, AWWs distribute 2.5 kilograms of rice and 1 kilogram of lentils to 12 severely 





register acts as a job aid for the worker to adhere to guidelines, and therefore enhances the 
quality of services.    
AWWs receive two types of financial resources—a) a monthly fund (Rs. 11,000/ $165) to procure 
and distribute food except for the rice (inclusive of transport allowance) and b) an annual uniform 
fund (Rs. 250/ $3.75) per child) to distribute among forty preschool children. The monthly fund 
to procure and distribute food is pre-fixed i.e. the government budgeted a certain amount of 
money for each of the raw material such as Dal (lentil), vegetables and eggs. The predefined Dal 
price given to the AWW is Rs. 55 per kg. However, the market rate during the fieldwork was Rs. 
80—90 per kg and sometimes even higher. To cope with inflation, the AWW distributes less 
quantity (in the case of dal) to beneficiaries. They explain this to the community by pointing them 
to the current price. For example, a severely malnourished child should receive four kg of rice and 
two kg of dal. In reality, the worker only distributes less than four kgs of rice and Rs. 110 worth of 
Dal i.e. the money she receives for two kgs. As in the case of supplies, erratic availability and 
inadequacy of funds due to inflation negatively influence AWW’s ability to deliver food grains to 
a required number of beneficiaries with required quality.  
In the case of uniform funds, the money given for forty children per AWC (i.e. targeted to a fixed 
number) creates rifts with the community. The community demands uniform money for all 
children in the family, and this clash of expectation has caused even episodes of physical fights 
with AWWs and community members (in two cases). Thus, the targeting of funds to distribute 
among beneficiaries also adversely affects the AWW motivation and performance.  
4.3.3 Community factors  
Caste dynamics  
As described in Chapter 1, in India, different caste groups are categorised into caste categories 
for administrative purposes (see Box 1 in Chapter 1). This categorisation necessarily reflects a 
traditional hierarchy. For example, that there are ‘higher caste’ groups such Brahmans and 
Kshatriyas that are categorised in the ‘General’ category; a group of the traditionally most 
excluded castes and tribal peoples categorised respectively as SC and ST, and those in between, 
the OBC. These are categories reflecting historical disadvantages and are important for various 
measures of redressal such as quotas for state education and employment. These caste 
categories are very broad, and within them, caste groups are perceived to be hierarchically 
organised. For example, although Paswan and Ravidas belong to the SC category, Paswan is seen 





In a few interviews, caste dynamics between the AWW and community, and discrimination 
towards the AWW, emerged as factors influencing AWW performance. 
Caste dynamics of the AWW and community: AWWs serve communities with multiple caste groups 
who geographically live in separate hamlets. In two cases, where the AWW belongs to a higher 
caste than the predominant community caste, the caste dynamics explicitly influence the AWW’s 
motivation and the access to and quality of services. Due to the targeting of the material and 
financial resources, AWWs find it hard to satisfy any caste, and this has led to physical violence 
between the AWW and the community. The hostile environment caused by physical violence 
interrupts the overall functioning of the AWC and delivery of services.  For example, in one of the 
cases where an AWW belonged to the OBC and worked in a predominantly SC (Manjhi) hamlet; 
she faced conflicts with Manjhis and other higher caste groups (Rajputs, Yadavs). Due to the strict 
ceiling for food and other material benefits (uniform money for children), she could not either 
cover all Manjhi families or all from other caste groups. This led to perceptions of bias, physical 
violence episodes and created a hostile environment prohibiting the worker from doing her job.  
“[…..] Villagers are trying hard to throw me out. They say that someone else 
should come at my place. Rajput people do not like a poor person working 
like that, and think that I should be thrown away just like that…….. 
[…..] They think, and the villagers tell me, to distribute the things among the 
people of my caste (general caste) only. However, whatever I am getting, that 
is not sufficient for them. If I am getting things for eight pregnant women, then 
14-15 pregnant women would come for it. Now they say, forcefully that give 
us the Poshahar (supplementary food) else give us money. Villagers only say 
such things”.  
(AWW Interview)  
Caste discrimination:  AWWs who belong to a lower caste group than the majority of the 
community faced caste discrimination from the community. In one of the cases, an AWW faced 
physical violence, and the community members prohibited her from using the AWC premises and 
caused overall service delivery disruption. In one example, the AWW belonged to the SC but a 
lower caste sub-group (Ravidas) compared to the majority of the community which were also SC, 
but a higher caste sub-group (Paswan). A quote from the interview suggests that the conflicts 
started right from the recruitment stage. Furthermore, the worker was banned from running the 





AWW: Yes, then people came and said... I cannot do flag hoisting [on the 
Republic Day celebrations], they beat my husband and me, but some people 
said you do the flag hoisting.  
Interviewer: What was the reason for beating you again? [This was the third 
time she reported the incidence of violence during the interview] 
AWW:  This is a Paswan Tola. When the recruitment happened, a Ravidas 
was chosen. I belong to Ravidas. Those people said that in a Paswan tola 
only a Paswan could be there not a Ravidas. “Paswan is cooking, and a 
Chamar (Ravidas) is sitting in the chair… so this is what they said regarding 
the recruitment.  
(AWW Interview) 
Seasonal migration  
In the community context, seasonal migration by low income and lower caste groups during the 
monsoon months emerged as a factor negatively influencing AWW performance. Many low-
income families migrate to brick kilns62 every year for a few months. Seasonal migration was 
perceived as a challenge to the AWW as it complicated the delivery of food and other benefits. 
The strict demarcation of the AWC catchment area and ceiling on food distribution meant that 
when a family migrates out, they are no longer eligible to receive the food. In that case, AWWs 
replaced them with other families. However, when the low-income families return from the kilns, 
they needed to be re-introduced to the list and these created frictions in community dynamics. 
The friction happens because the families who get removed from the list fight with the AWW.  
In another case, one AWW recollected from her experience that the health and nutrition situation 
of women and children had deteriorated when they come back from the kilns. This meant that 
an AWW’s responsibility increased as children from families returning from seasonal migration 
often had poorer nutritional status (due to poor living conditions in brick kilns) and consequently 
needed more support from the AWW: 
“Now lots of them are going to brick kilns in a month; all have taken 50,000 
from the contractors as loans.  They are blowing it up on chicken and alcohol. 
                                                          
62 According to the latest data by the Mining Department, the district of Gaya has the highest number of 
brick kilns in Bihar. The data showed that the district of Gaya has 489 functional brick kilns in the year 2016-
17 whereas the second highest, Patna, has only 388 (http://mines.bih.nic.in/Brick-Kilns.htm). These brick 
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to the kilns with their families during the work. A few studies have reported the exploitative labor 
relationships and low living conditions of laborers, especially women and children on the brick kiln sites in 





By the time, they go, they finish it all up. There they will drink, work, fight and 
repay- that is the situation. There is a wife of Paswan. I could not believe that 
she would survive. She had no strength in her body. Like that, she came back 
from brick kilns. She was admitted in that state. She also gave birth to a small 
daughter while she was there. People could not believe that she would survive 
seeing her state. Her mother in law and father in law fed her, and she regained 
health. Now again she has taken money to go to the brick kiln. What is the 
solution for this?”.  
(AWW Interview) 
The seasonal migration of low income and caste groups is also a proxy for the low economic 
condition and poverty in the community. Seasonal migration acts as a barrier for the AWW to 
identify the most deserving beneficiaries for food entitlements, thus directly influencing her 
ability to adhere to guidelines in choosing beneficiaries—one element of the AWW performance 
outcome.   
4.3.4 Organisational factors  
Corruption  
An organisational factor that emerged as a factor influencing AWW performance is corruption. I 
categorised corruption as an organisational factor because the interviews with AWWs suggest 
that it is a broader organisational phenomenon rather than an ICDS specific one.  
Both institutionalised and individualised practices of corruption influence AWW performance. 
AWWs stated examples of institutionalised corruption as bribes during the selection process to 
increase the chance to be selected as AWW, monthly fixed cuts to supervisors, pilferage of rice 
from sacks before it reaches the AWC, and fraudulent reporting. 
 A few AWWs disclosed that they had given money to intermediaries (middlemen) during the 
selection process to get the job and that they pay a monthly cut (Rs. 500 to 2000) to supervisors, 
which they understand, is shared with others in the ladder of hierarchy. AWWs pay monthly cuts 
from the financial resources they receive to procure and distribute food. AWWs also indicated 
that they received less than the required quantity of rice per sack (3540 instead of 50 kgs) 
because there is pilferage during the transport to AWCs. Receiving less than the required quantity 
meant not distributing the mandated food entitlements to beneficiaries.  However, AWWs are 
forced to report that they have distributed the required quantity. AWWs felt demotivated facing 





AWWs’ motivation and force her to not adhere to guidelines on distributing food entitlements. 
Thus, they contribute to a direct and negative impact on the AWW performance.  
In the below quote, an AWW elaborated on the deep-rooted, bureaucratic corruption practices. 
The same AWW also paid a bribe through a middleman to get the job.  
When the CDPO joined here, she was very strict and no one had courage to 
talk to her. No one had the courage to keep the Centre closed or to not work 
but within 2 months she showed her true face. […] She was so strict. But 
gradually when she settled here then her real face came out….only about 
money. I am telling you the reality about Anganwadi. Everybody right from the 
top to bottom is after money in Anganwadi. At every step. Everything is only 
for the sake of money and whether anything is done or not they should get 
the money. From top level, if 10 are given then it becomes 2 while coming 
down to us. Step wise, people are sitting there to make money and that’s why 
Anganwadi has a very bad reputation. That’s why if you ask a common person 
that what does she get from Anganwadi, I am Sevika I will tell you, but you 
will see how she hate us or complains about us. We are also helpless because 
we cannot give them what we are actually supposed to give. We are giving 
them whatever we are getting. If we don’t give money to our officers then there 
would be daily clash, explanation (Spastikaran) demanded etc. What can we 
do, it is under compulsion. What choice do we have but to follow the same. 
Supervisors come while I am working, I have already met the CDPO but now 
she also wants her share.  
(AWW Interview) 
Another AWW describes how she manages the pilferage of rice and adhering to distribution 
guidelines:  
“To distribute take-home rations, we have selected five women. We have to 
distribute in front of them.  Then at the time of distribution, we call the 
Mukhiya63 and make him sit in front. There is no problem in that. After that in 
front of him we keep all the things and tell him and the people the situation 
that we have received less rice, […]   However, here we will write in this that 
we have given 4 kgs, and you will have to sign. It is the intention of the 
government to cheat or not to cheat, but you have to cheat. Here we will write 
4 kgs, and you will have to sign for 4 kgs. However, in the other register, we 
write that we have received 228 kgs whereas we have received only 170 kgs”.  
(AWW Interview) 
                                                          





The individualised form of corruption practised was by the AWWs themselves. A few AWWs 
disclosed that they use the THR rice and lentils for their home use. Although AWWs defend their 
act of pilferage as a ‘consumption smoothing’ activity due to low and delayed remuneration, it 
can negatively influence the AWW performance outcomes— by not adhering to the quantity 
guidelines and not make the required amount of food entitlements accessible to the target 
number of children.  
“How do we give? We give 4 kg and 2 kg to severely malnourished. 3 kg and 
1.5 kg has to be given to pregnant women and lactating women. 2.5 kg and 
1.25 kg has to be given to malnourished children. We give a little bit less to 
women because it is not possible to manage in Rs. 3000. So when we give a 
little less to women, we get something for ourselves at the house as well. Also, 
Sahaika[helper] is there, so a little bit is given to Sahaika [helper] as well. We 
get money in 4-6 months, so she says that how will I purchase? She gets 
support in the way of pulse and rice from Anganwadi. So we do not purchase 
pulse and rice, we eat from it and rest we eat on credit. Rest, we pay the 
money of Rashan [food distribution] storekeeper when we get our money”.  
(AWW Interview) 
Although the AWWs admit to the practice of corruption institutionally and individually, they do 
not seem to take bribes from their programme beneficiaries. However, the interviews suggest 
that the beneficiaries are aware of the practice of corruption. The beneficiaries’ perception that 
AWWs participate in corruption adversely affects the AWW’s image in front of the beneficiaries 
and strains the relationship as well.  
4.4 Discussion  
One of the main aims of my qualitative research focused on understanding what and how 
individual, programmatic, community, and organisational factors influence AWW performance 
by capturing a deeper understanding of an AWW’s lived experiences as a village woman and as a 
programme worker. I found the following factors as influential in AWW performance: individual 
factors including initial financial motive and family support; programmatic factors including 
beneficiaries’ and AWW’s service preference and work environment; community factors 
including caste relationship of AWWs and the community and seasonal migration; and 
organisational factors including individualised and institutional corruption. The findings are 





Table 12 Summary of findings: factors influencing AWW performance 
































Individual  Initial financial 
motive  
Yes Motivation  All job No   
Family support No  Food 
distribution 
Yes Access +  





Motivation  Food 
distribution 
Yes Access + 
Immunisation Yes Access + 














Honorarium  Yes Motivation  
Self-esteem  
All job No   
Supervision  Yes Motivation  
 




Human: helper  












Material: job aid Yes Skills and 
knowledge 





Yes Motivation  Pre-school  
Food 
distribution 
Yes Quality   





Pre-school  Yes Quality   
Community  Caste dynamics of 
the AWW and 
community  
Yes Motivation  All job  Yes Access  
Quality  
 
Seasonal migration  No  Food 
distribution  
Yes Access  
Organisational  Corruption   Yes Motivation  Food 
distribution  




The conceptual framework on AWW performance (presented in Chapter 2) envisages that the 
individual, programmatic, community, and organisational factors are determinants of 
performance. These determinants of performance are interdependent and lead to improvements 
in outputs such as working conditions, motivation, job satisfaction, accountability, and AWW’s 
skills knowledge, and attitudes. These outputs further lead to effects such as improved 
productivity, competence, and responsiveness of the AWWs and lead to performance outcomes 





The findings of this chapter confirm the interdependence of factors that influence AWW 
performance envisaged by the conceptual framework. The interdependence of factors are visible 
within categories and between categories. For example, I categorised the ‘preference of 
beneficiaries and AWWs’ as a programmatic factor; however it is a good example of 
programmatic and community contexts interacting with each other and their dynamics 
influencing AWW performance. Another example of an interdependent factor is caste. The 
conceptual framework on AWW performance classified ‘social class’ of the AWW as an individual 
factor. However, the findings suggest that caste influenced AWW performance due to caste 
dynamics of the AWW and the community, which makes it more of a community factor than an 
individual or programmatic factor.  
The conceptual framework on AWW performance also provides a summary of factors that have 
been identified to influence the performance of workers such as the AWWs. Some of the factors 
I discussed in this chapter as influential on AWW performance were present in the framework, 
and others in the framework did not arise in my findings. I also found newly emergent factors 
that influence AWW performance not identified in the literature, and hence were not in the 
framework (see Table 13).  
Table 13 Comparing the factors found in the framework and in my research findings 
Framework Findings Individual  Programmatic  Community   Organisational  
Yes Yes Initial financial 
motive 




Resources   
Caste dynamics  None 
No Yes Family support Service preference 





















































In comparing the factors listed in the framework and in this chapter, I find four sets of newly 
emerged factors  i) family support (individual factor); ii) perceived service preference of 
beneficiaries and AWWs (programmatic factor); iii) seasonal migration of low-income families 
(community factor); and iv) corruption practices (organisational factor).   
Family support: Although a couple of studies have reported the influence of household duties on 
community-level workers’ performance, the role of family on daily job responsibilities is often 
underexplored (Alam et al., 2012b; Olang’o et al., 2010). The family support, which emerged in 
the AWW context as influential in their performance, offers a deeper understanding of the 
interaction between her personal and professional worlds and demonstrates that the blurring of 
this boundary is often a coping strategy of the AWW. The finding also highlights that, beyond 
directly helping the AWW, the family’s income needs have shaped her motive to take on, and 
then continue with, the job even if she is demotivated.  
Preference of the beneficiary and AWW: The AWW perception of beneficiary preference towards 
product-oriented services and individual preference rooted in her self-identity as a pre-school 
teacher offers unique empirical understanding on how an AWW manages her diverse service 
delivery basket and her latent biases towards certain services. Although a few studies have 
pointed out the identity clashes that AWWs feel, i.e. pre-school teacher vs. nutrition worker, the 
findings of this chapter contribute a rich analytical account of how her self-identity as a pre-school 
teacher augments her motivation and favours the delivery of pre-school and food distribution to 
encourage pre-school attendance services, but impedes the delivery of information-oriented 
counselling services (Gupta, 2001, 2012). This finding highlights the unique ways in which 
beneficiary preferences for product-oriented services significantly shapes an AWW’s 
performance. It also underscores that beyond the skills and knowledge of a worker, beneficiary 
preference is also a critical determinant of performance.  
Seasonal migration: The finding on the influence of seasonal migratory patterns of low-income 
households on AWW performance could be argued as a unique feature of the local Bihar context. 
However, migratory patterns induced by seasonality, poverty, conflict, and calamity increasingly 
exist in many geographical and programmatic settings. The community-level workers are 
primarily tasked to reach out to the community members and groups who are excluded by the 
formal systems (Lewin et al., 2010). Hence, this finding seeks to contribute towards providing a 
better understanding of the relationship between meta factors such as migration on worker 






Corruption: The topic of corruption—its different forms, nature, and mechanisms are more 
widely discussed in the fields of political sciences, economics, anthropology, and sociology than 
in public health. At the start of my thesis (and until now), the studies that examined the 
performance of community and facility-based health workers did not identify corruption as a 
factor that could influence performance64. Although they recognised that factors within the 
formal health system policy and practice are influential on performance, the dynamics of 
bureaucratic practices and politics is often considered as part of the local context and remains 
inadequately explored. The findings of this chapter emphasise that individual and institutional 
corruption hampers the performance of AWWs as they use the food items themselves or give a 
share of the financial resources to their supervisors. In addition to providing novel empirical 
evidence of the relationship between corruption and AWW performance, this finding contributes 
towards a deeper understanding of the embeddedness of corruption in community-level health 
and nutrition service delivery.  
The findings which resonate with the existing literature arei) initial financial motive (individual 
factor); ii) work environment factors (programmatic factor) and iii) caste dynamics of the AWW 
and the community (community factor). Although I consider the caste dynamics as an existing 
factor identified in the literature, so far only a few studies have studied it in the Indian CHW 
context. Hence, the findings of this chapter will be an important contribution towards 
understanding the influence of caste on the performance of workers such as the AWW.  
AWWs consistently reported their current low honorarium and high workload as sources of 
demotivation. The literature on CHW performance also confirms this finding that high workload 
and low and irregular financial incentives negatively influence CHW motivation (Alamo et al., 
2012; Burn, 2008; Callaghan-Koru et al., 2012; Ge et al., 2011; Gusdal et al., 2011; Javanparast et 
al., 2011; Kalyango et al., 2012; Kebriaei & Moteghedi, 2009; Kok & Muula, 2013; Lewis, 2010; 
Medhanyie et al., 2012; Perez et al., 2009; Puchalski Ritchie et al., 2012; S. M. Rahman et al., 
2010). The low honorarium of AWWs has been discussed as a crucial constraint for AWWs in the 
ICDS literature as well (Biswas & Verma, 2009; HUNGaMA, 2011; Nayak & Saxena, 2006; NIPCCD, 
2009a, 2009b; Saxena & Srivastava, 2009). The importance of the honorarium for AWWs as a key 
source of household income runs against the original design of the ICDS which is predicated on a 
voluntary worker with a strong moral motive who receives an honorarium.  
                                                          
64 A few of studies on the ICDS have highlighted practices of corruption in the ICDS, but did not report 
evidence for it or explore its relationship with AWW performance (Diwakar, 2014; Drèze, 2006; Faker et al., 
2012; Akhil Gupta, 2001, 2012, NIPCCD, 2009a, 2009b; Planning Commission, 2011; Sinha, 2006; 





Many studies reported supervision (availability, frequency, and location) to be important to 
increase CHW performance. However, due to unavailability of details of the supervision structure 
and its implementation these studies could not examine the influence of the nature of supervision 
on CHW performance (Amare, 2009; Callaghan-Koru et al., 2012, 2013; Chanda et al., 2011; 
Gusdal et al., 2011; Hill et al., 2008; Javanparast et al., 2011; Kok & Muula, 2013; Lewis, 2010; 
Martinez et al., 2008; Moetlo et al., 2011; Nsabagasani et al., 2007; Perez et al., 2009; Puett et 
al., 2013; Rowe et al., 2007; Simwaka et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2013; Suri et al., 2007). Although 
the same limitations apply to my research, the mixed influence of supervision on AWW 
performance discussed in this chapter augments the existing evidence on supervision and 
performance. It extends the understanding on how the nature of response AWWs receive from 
supervisors constructively or adversely affects their performance. 
The negative influence of the lack of supplies, infrastructure, and financial resources and positive 
influence of job aids such as immunisation due-lists corroborate with the existing empirical 
evidence. The global literature on CHW performance suggests that job aids are often reported as 
facilitating CHW performance, while lack of supplies is often reported to hinder CHW 
performance (Gill et al., 2012; Hamer et al., 2012; Javanparast et al., 2012; Lemay et al., 2012; 
Rowe et al., 2007; Sadler et al., 2011). Resource constraints in the ICDS are also well-evidenced 
in the ICDS literature as a factor negatively influencing the functioning of AWCs (CBGA, 2011; 
Dasgupta et al., 2012; FOCUS, 2006; HUNGaMA, 2011; Nayak & Saxena, 2006; NIPCCD, 2009a, 
2009b; Planning Commission, 2011; RSOC, 2014; Saxena & Srivastava, 2009). Thus, the negative 
influence of the lack of supplies, infrastructure, and financial resources and positive influence of 
job aids such as immunisation due-lists are in line with the existing empirical evidence.  
Training —categorised by the conceptual framework as a work environment factor—did not 
emerge from the AWW interviews as a factor they perceived as a facilitator or barrier in their 
performance. Although I found it surprising, a study by (Kosec et al., 2015) in Bihar also confirms 
this. They found that training was not a significant predictor of delivery of product-oriented 
services (Kosec et al., 2015). However, they take a cautionary approach by attributing it to the 
historically poor record of supervision and training in rural India. 
As discussed earlier, a few studies examined the influence of caste on the working of ASHAs and 
AWWs (Abbott & Luke, 2011; Srivastava et al., 2009). The four studies that examined caste in the 
ICDS context as a factor in achieving inclusive service delivery support the finding of this chapter 
(Borooah et al., 2014; Gill, 2012; Mander & Kumaran, 2006b; Thorat & Sadana, 2009). These 
studies did not look at how caste influences AWW performance; instead, they discussed the role 





(community members). The findings presented in this chapter clearly demonstrate the 
relationship between caste and AWW performance. These show the intricate ways in which caste 
dynamics operate in the AWW context. These also demonstrate how inclusive service delivery is 
hampered at the village settings due to physical violence induced by caste dynamics.  
In addition to contributing newly emerged factors towards the empirical literature, some other 
contributions and themes also emerge from the findings of this chapter.  
Firstly, the findings inform towards a better conceptual understanding on performance. The 
majority of the public health and nutrition literature on worker performance assumes that factors 
that influence performance affect through improving outputs (e.g. working conditions, 
motivation, job satisfaction, accountability, and worker’s skills, knowledge, and attitudes). The 
factors identified in this chapter also seem to affect outputs such as motivation, job satisfaction, 
self-esteem and skills and knowledge of the AWW (see Table 12). However, these findings 
question the strength of the linear relationship between outputs and outcomes. Some factors 
affect outcomes without affecting outputs (e.g. family support, helper, and seasonal migration). 
Some factors affect outputs without affecting outcomes (e.g. initial financial motive, high 
workload, and low honorarium). Although the majority of factors affect both outputs and 
outcomes, the relationship does not seem to be linear.  
Secondly, these findings also challenge the assumption that pervades the literature that 
motivation is one of the main drivers of performance outcomes. This chapter’s findings argue 
that, whilst among AWWs demotivation is a strong feeling, it is the initial financial motive to take 
up the job which retains them in the job. However, it is evident that the financial motives of 
AWWs are not fully satisfied by their honorarium. The findings also show alternate ways in which 
AWWs satisfy their initial financial motives (e.g. by consumption smoothing using the ICDS 
financial resources and supplies of food). It is the combination of the initial motive of the worker 
(the need to retain the job for financial needs rooted in family income needs) with the 
community’s expectations (for a product-oriented services) which ensure continued efforts even 
when her motivation is low. The main constraints to performance (outcomes) are factors outside 
of her control. These include unavailability of programmatic resources (means to do her job) and 
community demand for her services (the opportunity to do her job).  
This research is limited by several factors. First, the interviews were conducted by myself and the 
female research assistant; hence there are possibilities of interviewer biases. However, we 
worked closely with each other, listened to the audio every day and de-briefed every day as a 





argued that this could affect the generalisability of findings within the state and country. 
However, the findings presented in this chapter corroborates with the ICDS literature, and in fact 
augments it by providing a comprehensive picture on AWW performance. I believe that the 
findings are likely to be similar elsewhere in the state and the main conclusions from the findings 
will be relevant at the national level. Considering the generalisability was not the intention, the 
findings are contributing to the understanding on AWW performance by deeply capturing the 
voices and experiences of AWWs, which are not represented in the ICDS literature. I further 
discuss the policy implications of the findings in the last chapter (Chapter 7).  
4.5 Conclusion  
This chapter finds the following factors as influential in AWW performance; individual factors 
including initial financial motive and family support; programmatic factors including beneficiaries’ 
and AWW’s service preference and work environment; community factors including caste 
relationship of AWWs and community and seasonal migration; and organisational factors 
including individualised and institutional corruption. Some of the factors discussed in this chapter 
as influential on AWW performance are in line with the existing empirical evidence (summarised 
in the conceptual framework) as influential in the performance of workers such as AWWs, and 
other factors listed in the literature did not arise. I also found newly emergent factors that 
influence AWW performance not identified in the literature, hence not already summarised in 
the framework. The findings suggest that the initial motive of the worker (the need to retain the 
job for financial needs rooted in family income needs) and the community expectations (for 
product-oriented services) ensure continued efforts even when her motivation is low. The main 
constraints to performance (outcomes) are factors outside of her control. These include 
unavailability of programmatic resources (means to do her job) and relationships shaped by caste 
dynamics, seasonal migration, and practice and perception of corruption.  
Can technology and monetary incentives deliver improved uptake of the ICDS services? The next 
chapter explores this thread and presents findings from the quantitative analysis I conducted to 
understand the influence of the mobile phone technology and monetary incentives intervention 






Chapter Five: Effect of the mobile phone technology and monetary 
incentives intervention by Anganwadi workers on the household uptake 
of the ICDS services 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the overall factors that influence AWW performance. In this 
chapter I move on to explore the role of the mobile phone technology and monetary incentives 
intervention on AWW performance. This chapter specifically focuses on understanding the 
potential of mobile phone technology as a job aid combined with monetary incentives in 
improving the household uptake of ICDS services. I examine the effect of the mobile phone 
technology and monetary incentive bundled intervention on the beneficiary uptake of the ICDS 
services directly linked to the intervention by conducting quantitative analysis using two rounds 
of quasiexperimental survey data. To provide a comprehensive understanding of the influence 
of technology augmented interventions on health and nutrition service delivery, I decided to 
examine the influence of the technology augmented intervention at the household level and at 
the AWW level (Chapter 6). Moreover, the findings of the quantitative analysis aim to address the 
research gap identified (discussed in Chapter 2) in the fields of m-Health and m-Nutrition on the 
potential of technology augmented interventions to improve the performance of workers like 
AWWs. 
Structurally this chapter has seven sections and relevant sub-sections. The next section, 5.2, 
provides a brief recap of the empirical site features. The sections 5.3 and 5.4 discuss the data and 
estimation strategy used in the quantitative analysis. Section 5.5 presents the results of the 
quantitative analysis, and the last section (5.6) concludes this chapter with a discussion of 
findings. This chapter is also accompanied by a section on supplementary statistical tables in 
section 5.7.   
5.2 Background  
As described in Chapter 3, my quantitative research utilises the empirical context of the BCSP. I 
specifically examined the influence of the supply-side intervention of the BCSP. I chose the BCSP 
setting to understand the effect of the mobile phone technology and monetary incentive bundle 
on the household uptake of ICDS services due to its unique programme features, evaluation 
design, and availability of data.  
The BCSP has a unique programme design because it piloted a widely tested model of conditional 





monitoring. The BCSP introduced the mobile phone technology to ease AWWs’ effort in weighing 
of children and pregnancy case management. The monetary incentives component aimed to 
motivate AWWs to use the phone, comply with the cash transfer monitoring responsibilities, and 
incentivise them to weigh more children. These programme features offer a unique empirical 
setting to study the influence of the mobile phone technology and monetary incentives 
intervention on AWW performance in line with my conceptual framework.  
The BCSP evaluation design and the availability of the data enabled me to examine the impact of 
the mobile phone and monetary incentives intervention. Using the data, I compare between two 
different sample populations: one set of the population that access AWCs where AWWs use the 
mobile phones and receive monetary incentives and a second set where the intervention is 
absent.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the BCSP has three treatment blocks and one comparison block. To 
understand the impact of the supply-side intervention, I compare the third treatment block and 
the comparison block. The third treatment block only has the supply-side intervention and no 
demand-side intervention (i.e. cash transfer). I do not consider my research as an evaluation of 
the BCSP, rather I examine whether the supply-side intervention by the BCSP had any impact on 
services provided by the AWWs as the formal BCSP evaluation does not cover this aspect. 
Although my research is only focusing on the third treatment block and the comparison block, to 
offer comparisons and to explain the results better, I also use the data from the first two 
treatment blocks in which both demand and supply-side interventions are employed. 
In this chapter, I focus on household level outcomes identified in the conceptual framework on 
AWW performance (discussed in Chapter 2) which is a level above AWW level performance. I did 
not measure the impact of the intervention at the AWW level using quantitative data because of 
the small sample size at the AWW level. 
5.3 Data  
I use two rounds of survey data (baseline in 2013 and midline65 in 2015) from the BCSP pilot 
evaluation undertaken by OPM. The two surveys present a panel of PSUs—i.e. the catchment 
                                                          
65 The second round of the data is called midline because the overall evaluation had three rounds of data 
collectionbaseline, midline, endline. Endline data collection was carried out in November 2016. However, 
due to monetary constraints, the overall evaluation did not include the comparison block (‘pure control’ 
block for the cash transfer) in the endline. Thus, the only opportunity to estimate the effect of the mobile 
phone technology and monetary incentives intervention on household utilization of the ICDS services is by 





area of AWCs. Thus, it is a panel of AWCs, but a different cross-section of households per PSU per 
survey round due to the need to have comparable age groups over time.  
My engagement in the designing and managing of the OPM evaluation of the BCSP pilot and the 
evaluation donor DFID’s open access data policy gave me the opportunity to use the data set for 
my doctoral thesis. My overall doctoral research ethical clearance from the University of Sussex 
covers the secondary data analysis of the BCSP impact evaluation data as well.  
From each block, each survey round collected data from approximately 55 AWWs, 1500 
households (each with one woman having at least a child less than age two years of age) and PSU 
characteristics from 55 PSUs. Household, woman and child datasets cover demographic 
characteristics, household food security and diet, child anthropometry, Body Mass Index (BMI) 
and haemoglobin levels of the woman to assess anaemia status. Anganwadi data includes 
observations about the AWC infrastructure, AWW level service delivery frequency and quality, 
observations about the AWW’s behaviour and capacity to provide various services such as dry 
ration distribution, hot cooked meals, and immunisation days, adherence to reporting procedure, 
and flow of financial resources.  The BCSP data also has PSU level data on infrastructure, 
availability and access to markets, health, and education services. The baseline was conducted 
from July to September 2013, and the midline was carried out after two years (August to October 
2015). Table 14 depicts in detail the sample size of different components of the two rounds of 
surveys and data collection periods for each round. Table 25 in section 5.7 provides the sample 
size for both cash treatment blocks (T1 and T2) as well. Annex C summarises the sampling 
methodology used for the survey, data quality procedures during the data collection and data 





Table 14 Sample size for T3 and Comparison blocks 
Data  Sample size  
 Baseline 2013 
 (July to September 2013) 
Midline 2015  
(August to October 2015) 
 Treatment 
(T3) 
Comparison Total Treatment 
(T3) 
Comparison Total 
Household 1515 1454 2969 1545 1393 2938 
Woman 1515 1454 2969 1545 1393 2938 
Child 1566 1498 3064 1610 1455 3055 
Anganwadi 53 53 106 53 52 105 
Community 
(PSU) 
53 54 110 54 52 110 
 
The intervention expected to directly influence two services (weight monitoring and VHSND 
attendance) and indirectly influence one service (individual and group counselling). However, due 
to data limitations66 at the baseline stage, I decided to focus on services which are hypothesised 
to be directly influenced by the intervention (weight monitoring and VHSND attendance for 
children and women). Although the baseline was conducted in AugustSeptember 2013, the 
programme only started after a year in August 2014. Hence, by the time of midline data 
collection, the maximum exposure to BCSP would have been twelve months. Considering the 
intervention was only active at the maximum for a year, I decided to restrict my child level sample 
to less than one-year-old children.  
5.4 Estimation strategy  
In the absence of randomised controlled trials and when programmes are rolled out as a ‘natural 
experiment’ or follow a ‘quasi-experiment’, using a DID estimation strategy is considered a 
popular way to estimate causal relationships (Card & Krueger, 1993; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2007, 
2009; Wooldridge, 2003). In this analysis, to estimate the effect of the mobile phone technology 
                                                          
66 AWW level service delivery frequency and quality for services provided by the AWW was not collected 
at the baseline. For example, frequency and quality aspects of individual and group counselling services are 
not available for the baseline period. This was because the mobile phone technology and monetary 
incentives intervention evolved after the baseline (AugustSeptember 2013) and before the start of the 





and monetary incentives bundled intervention on the beneficiary uptake of the ICDS services, I 
use a DID estimation strategy.  
The DID estimation consists of identifying a specific intervention or treatment67 and then 
compares the difference in outcomes68 after and before the intervention for groups affected by 
the intervention to the same differences for unaffected groups. The DID estimation strategy is 
widely used because of its simplicity and potential to avoid the endogeneity problems that 
typically arise when making comparisons between heterogeneous individuals (Duflo, 2009). It is 
also an explicit way to remove time constant confounders69 and can be easily used with grouped 
data, typically at the regional unit. The double differencing removes biases in the second-period 
comparisons between the treatment and comparison group that could result from permanent 
differences between those groups. It also removes the biases from comparisons over time in the 
treatment group that could be the result of time trends unrelated to the treatment (Imbens & 
Wooldridge, 2009).   
Commonly, the treatment is directly provided to individual beneficiaries or households or any 
other participant groups. In this analysis, the main70 treatment I focus on is at the AWW level. The 
change in outcome is measured as the difference between beneficiary (children or pregnant 
women) uptake of services provided by the AWWs who received the treatment compared to 
beneficiary uptake of services provided by AWWs who did not receive the treatment. The 
beneficiary level treatment is defined as children and pregnant women who attended the VHSND 
or were weighed by AWWs.  
As mentioned earlier, the treatment in the first two blocks has pregnant women or mothers of 
children also receiving cash transfers conditional upon meeting soft or hard conditions.  
I employ an intent to treat (ITT) estimation in my analysis, which ignores noncompliance, protocol 
deviations, withdrawal, and anything that happens after the treatment has been assigned (Gupta, 
2011; Hollis & Campbell, 1999; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2007). The ITT estimator is widely 
considered to be an important treatment effect estimator when trying to determine the effect of 
the intervention in practical settings. Within the treatment block, all pregnant women and 
mother/child dyads in my sample were eligible to receive the treatment, i.e. to be weighed by 
                                                          
67 The event for which I want to estimate the causal effect is called the treatment (Lechner, 2010).  
68 The outcome is the variable that will be used to measure the effect of the treatment. Outcomes that 
would be realized if a specific treatment has, or would have been applied, are called potential outcomes 
(Lechner, 2010).  
69 A confounder variable is a variable that is related to the treatment and the potential outcomes (Lechner, 
2010).  
70 I also estimate the treatment effect in the first two treatment blocks to provide comparison. Hence, I use 





AWWs who were using the mobile phones and receiving monetary incentives. As part of the ANC 
check-up during pregnancy, pregnant women are supposed to be weighed, and children are 
weighed monthly by AWWs. The weight monitoring included weighing and communication of the 
weight to the beneficiary with appropriate counselling messages. Hence, all pregnant women and 
mother/child dyads were “intended” to be treated, regardless of whether or not they actually 
received treatment. This ITT estimate would be smaller than the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
because the ATE is calculated based on the assumption of perfect compliance.  
Formally, the identification strategy for my ITT analysis can be summarised as follows: 
 𝑦𝑡






ℎ𝐵 is outcome 𝑦 for household h in block B at time 𝑡. 𝑇 is the treatment dummy that will 
be equal to one if the household is in a treatment block, irrespective of whether it actually was 
treated. M is a time dummy that is equal to one if the observation is from follow-up. Finally, 𝛼 is 
a constant, 𝑿 is a vector of control variables at the household, woman, child, AWC, AWW and 
PSU levels, and 𝑣𝑡
ℎ𝐵is an error term. The coefficient on the interaction of treatment with time (𝜔) 
can then be interpreted as difference-in-differences impact estimator of the treatment effect.  
Table 15 Key outcome indicators 
Key outcome indicators  
Child level  1. Proportion of children < 1 year who received weight monitoring ever 
after the birth weight check-up  
2. Proportion of children <1 year attended the VHSND  
3. Proportion of children < 1 year who attended the VHSND who received 
weight monitoring  
Woman level  4. Proportion of women attended the VHSND at least once during the last 
pregnancy  
5. Proportion of women who attended the VHSND at least once during the 
last pregnancy who received weight monitoring  
 
Table 15 summarises the key outcome indicators used in the analysis. Although I estimate ITT 
estimators for indicators 1,2, and 4; for indicators 3 and 5, I use the Local Average Treatment 
Effect (LATE) estimator (Angrist & Imbens, 1991). The LATE equals the ITT effect divided by the 
share of compliers in the population—in this case, the proportion of sampled women who 
attended the VHSND with their index child or during the last pregnancy. Thus, the LATE calculates 





In this analysis, the mobile phone technology and monetary incentives intervention is 
hypothesised to influence the proportion of children being weighed and attending the VHSND. 
For example, if I consider the proportion of children being weighed ever after birth weight check-
up as the outcome indicator, the effect of the intervention 𝜔 (impact estimator of the treatment) 
will be 
 
ω =  (𝑊𝑇𝐴 − 𝑊𝐶𝐴) − (𝑊𝑇𝐵 − 𝑊𝐶𝐵)   (2) 
 
WTA = proportion of children being weighed ever after birth weight check-up, midline; treatment block  
WCA = proportion of children being weighed ever after birth weight check-up, midline; comparison block  
WTB = proportion of children being weighed ever after birth weight check-up, baseline; treatment block  
WCB = proportion of children being weighed ever after birth weight check-up, baseline; comparison block 
In the first two treatment blocks, a combined effect of demand-side (cash transfer) and supply-
side (mobile phone technology and monetary incentives) is hypothesised to influence the key 
outcome indicators.  
I used the statistical software STATA version 11 for the quantitative analysis (StataCorp, 2009).  
Parallel paths assumption  
The underlying assumption for the DID method is that of ‘parallel paths’, which suggests the 
average change in the comparison group represents the counterfactual change that would 
happen in the treatment group if there were no treatment. Figure 11 illustrates this assumption, 
the dotted line being the assumed ‘parallel’ trajectory for treatment outcomes in the absence of 
the treatment. The difference in how those outcome indicators changed in the treated group vs. 
the comparison group is assumed to be due to the effect of the intervention on household uptake 
of the selected ICDS services. Households in the comparison block, which did not receive the 
treatment, provide a measure of what would have been expected to have happened to 
beneficiaries without the intervention. The DID measure thus captures the difference between 
treatment block at baseline and midline, minus the difference between comparison blocks at 





Figure 11 Difference-in-difference method estimation of treatment effect 
 
Source: Author    
Parallel paths require the assumption that there are no time varying, unobservable confounding 
factors that are systematically different between treatment and comparison areas. Using the 
BCSP quasi-experimental evaluation data, it is not possible to directly observe the validity of the 
parallel paths assumption due to the implementation occurring in the treatment block. In quasi-
experimental studies, it is normal to test for the likelihood of parallel trends occurring by i) 
comparing trends in outcome in time periods before the intervention to demonstrate similar 
historical paths and ii) comparing observable characteristics between treatment and comparison 
areas at the baseline to ensure that they are very similar, as they will influence changes over time 
and may be correlated with unobservables. Neither are direct assessments of parallel paths. The 
former cannot be undertaken due to the unavailability of pre-baseline data. To estimate parallel 
paths will require more than two rounds of data before the intervention has started. Thus, in this 
analysis, it is not possible to test for parallel paths, as there is no pre-baseline data.  
However, I will present the comparison of key observable characteristics for the treatment and 
comparison blocks to establish that these blocks have similar levels of observable characteristics 
at the baseline (i.e., test for equivalence). If there is a statistically significant difference between 
groups at the baseline on observable characteristics, I aim to check for means difference at 
midline for these characteristics which are independent of the intervention. Comparing the levels 
of outcome indicators and observable characteristics (of PSU, household, woman, child) to 
establish the parallel paths assumption is not the most robust strategy, but useful when more 
than two rounds of data are not available, and the blocks were pairwise matched at the baseline 





analysis was best matched with the T3 block—i.e. supply-side intervention only block. The 
matching was to try and ensure treatment and comparison areas were as similar possible to 
minimise the likelihood of the parallel paths assumption not holding (see Chapter 3 section 3.1)  
Test for equivalence 
Table 16 displays the significance levels of means difference of groups (comparison vs. treatment) 
at the baseline and midline71 for observable confounding factors. I used these variables as 
covariates in this analysis.  In general, it is only required to examine the means difference of 
groups at the baseline for selected observable characteristics. However, in this case, I found 
significant means difference at the baseline for household head’s education, and household’s 
access to agricultural land, drinking water, and toilet facility. At the woman level, significant levels 
of means difference are showcased by variables such as the proportion of women without any 
education, age at marriage, receipt of at least one tetanus injection during the last pregnancy, 
and institutional delivery during the last pregnancy. All the reported variables at the child level 
are not significantly different at the baseline between the two groups.  
In cases where a set of variables show significant differences at the baseline, it is advisable to look 
at multiple time periods before the baseline to cross-check whether the difference is historically 
similar, also known as tests for the parallel paths assumption. In this analysis, due to the lack of 
pre-baseline data, I decided to look at the means difference between the two groups at midline. 
I decided to do this to check whether the baseline difference still holds at the midline for variables 
which showed significant levels of differences at the baseline. If they are significantly different at 
baseline and midline, they could be different before the baseline too.  Although this is not the 
perfect way to test for parallel paths, understanding whether the means difference between the 
groups that were different at baseline showcase the same levels of difference at midline could 
still be relevant for the DID analysis. Moreover, these characteristics are independent of the 
programme and the significant difference in both time periods could mean that the direction of 
influence of these variables on the key outcome indicators remains the same.  
Table 16 suggests that all variables that showed a significant difference at the baseline show more 
or less the same difference at midline, providing evidence to support the DID model specification. 
One variable, the proportion of household heads with a middle level of education, showed 
significantly different means at baseline but not at midline. However, it is a sub-category of the 
overall household head’s education with a small sample size. Also, the difference at the baseline 
                                                          
71 I used ttest command in STATA 11 to calculate the means difference between the comparison and 





was significant only at the 95% confidence interval. In the DID regression, I ran models with and 
without this variable as a covariate to see whether it changed the impact estimator. Two other 
variables, access to toilet facilities and mothers with secondary education, dropped the 
significance level at the midline. Also, the proportion of households that belong to the general 
category and mother’s age show a significant difference at midline. I introduced these variables 
into the DID regression model one by one to control for any bias towards the impact estimator.  
If parallel paths do not hold, the estimate of the effect of the intervention will be imprecise or 
biased. To further improve the validity of the DID model specification, I also add controls to the 
regression based on observed confounding factors.  
5.5 Results and discussion  
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics  
In this section, I present the descriptive statistics of observable characteristics included in the 
regression models (Table 16 and Table 17). In Table 18, I present the descriptive statistics of key 







Table 16 Descriptive statistics: household, woman, and child characteristics (T3 and Comparison blocks) 
Variables  Baseline 2013 Midline 2015 
 Treatment (T3) Comparison T3-C Treatment 
(T3) 
Comparison T3-C 
 Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD  
Household            
Male headed 0.97 
 







          
No education 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.50 -0.06*** 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.50 -0.08*** 
Primary 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 -0.01 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.01 
Middle 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.32 0.03** 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.01 
Secondary   0.15 0.36 0.11 0.32 0.04*** 0.16 0.37 0.11 0.31 0.05*** 
Higher secondary  0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.00 
Graduate 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.00 
Post-graduate 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.00* 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.00* 
Religion            
Hindu  0.97 0.17 0.97 0.17 0.00 0.96 0.19 0.96 0.19 0.00 
Islam   0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.00 
Caste            
Scheduled caste (SC)  0.48 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.02 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.00 
Other Backward Class 
(OBC)  
0.42 0.49 0.42 0.49 -0.01 0.44 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.03 
General  0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 -0.01 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34 -0.03*** 




0.45  -0.04** 0.40  0.44  -0.04** 
Access to drinking 
water facility  
0.99  0.90  0.09*** 0.99  0.84  0.15*** 
Access to toilet facility  0.10  0.07  0.04*** 0.14  0.11  0.03** 
Asset Index  3.03 1.36 2.88 1.37 0.15*** 3.10 1.35 2.62 1.44 0.47*** 
Woman           
Age 26.12 4.97 25.97 4.79 0.14 24.85 4.75 25.44 4.96 -0.58*** 
Education            
No education 0.68 0.47 0.72 0.45 -0.05*** 0.59 0.49 0.65 0.48 -0.05*** 
Primary 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.01 
Middle 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.01 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.26 0.01 
Secondary   0.08 0.27 0.05 0.21 0.04*** 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25 0.02** 
Higher secondary  0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.01 
Graduate 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.00 
Post-graduate 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 
Age at marriage  14.72 3.06 14.21 3.12 0.51*** 15.40 2.80 15.18 2.72 0.22** 












Received at least one 
tetanus injection 
during last pregnancy 
0.96  0.91  0.05*** 0.89  0.82  0.07*** 
Had institutional 
delivery in for last 
childbirth 
0.56  0.45  0.11*** 0.65  0.53  0.12*** 
Child           
Age  13.57 6.96 13.90 6.97 -0.33 11.81 6.53 11.67 6.31 0.14 
Sex: Girl 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.01 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.50 -0.02 
Moderate stunting 0.55  0.58  -0.02 0.40  0.39  0.02 
Moderate 
underweight  
0.50  0.52  -0.01 0.45  0.45  0.00 
Moderate wasting  0.24  0.22  0.02 0.29  0.29  0.00 
N= 1566  1498   1610  1445   






Descriptive statistics of observable characteristics: household, woman and child level 
Table 16 presents household, woman and child characteristics, also included in the regression 
models as covariates to improve the robustness of the model. Although Table 16 provides the 
proportion of households with access to clean drinking water and toilet, I did not use these 
variables directly in the regression models because the Asset Index72 variable I used in the 
regression as a covariate is a composite variable including these two variables. Moreover, in the 
regression models, I used a continuous variable for the household head’s and mother’s education.  
As shown in Table 16, the majority of the households in both blocks are headed by male members 
(more than 92%), practise the Hindu religion (97% and 96%), and belong to SC or OBC categories 
(85%) at baseline and midline. Considering the majority of the households are headed by male 
members, almost half of them do not possess any education. In the T3 and comparison blocks, 
the majority of households did not own agricultural land or have access to a functional toilet 
facility, but they have access to safe drinking water facilities such as hand pumps.  
In both blocks, the mean age of the sampled women at baseline and midline is approximately 25 
to 26 years, and a majority married below the legal age of marriage (i.e. 18 years), do not have 
any education, and on average reported having three children. The proportion of women who 
reported undertaking employment outside the home increased from baseline to midline in both 
blocks. The proportion of women reported to have taken at least one tetanus injection during 
their last pregnancy decreased in both blocks from baseline to midline, but the proportion who 
had an institutional delivery for the last childbirth increased in both blocks.  
The baseline sample has children with average age 14 months for both blocks, but the midline 
sample has a slightly younger cohort (almost 12 months). In the baseline sample, both blocks had 
a slightly higher proportion of girls than boys, but this proportion reversed in the case of the 
midline sample. More than half of children are either stunted or underweight at baseline in both 
blocks, but this proportion reduced by midline for both blocks. At baseline, considering almost a 
quarter of children were wasted, it became almost one third by the midline in both blocks.  
                                                          
72 I used the asset index already provided in the data set. The OPM evaluation team calculated the asset 
index by using a principal component analysis (PCA) method (OPM, 2016). From a set of correlated 
variables, the PCA extracts a set of uncorrelated ‘principal components’. Each principal component is a 
weighted linear combination of the original variables. This method is also used by other standard surveys 
like the NFHS (OPM, 2016). The asset index was constructed by combining information on 33 household 
assets and housing characteristics such as ownership of customer items, type of dwelling, source of water, 
and availability of electricity, into a single asset index. The household population was divided into five equal 





Comparing the two blocks at two-time periods, the treatment block (T3) on average is slightly 
better than the comparison block in terms of standard of living (access to drinking water, toilet, 
and Asset Index), education (household head and mother), and services uptake (tetanus injection 
and institutional delivery) indicators, but slightly worse off in terms of access to agricultural land. 
The indicators which showed a significant difference (magnitude and direction) remains the same 
in both time periods. Table 26 in section 5.7  provides the descriptive statistics of the same set of 
variables for the cash transfer blocks T1 and T2. The levels of indicators in the cash transfer blocks 
are also similar to the T3 and comparison blocks. The variables (except two) that show significant 
means differences between T3 and comparison groups demonstrate means difference between 
T1 and T2 as well. The two variables that show a significant baseline difference in means of groups 
only for T1 and T2 are the proportion of households belonging to SC and OBC categories. 
However, the difference remains at the midline as well. Table 27 in section 5.7 summarises the 






Table 17 Descriptive statistics: AWC, AWW and PSU characteristics (T3 and Comparison blocks) 
Variables  Baseline 2013  Midline 2015  
 Treatment (T3) Comparison T3-C Treatment (T3) Comparison T3-C 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean Obs. Mean  
AWC           
           
AWC is functioning in a 
pucca building  
53 0.58 53 0.66 -0.08 44 0.64 37 0.84 -0.20** 
AWC has own building  53 0.36 53 0.34 0.02 53 0.23 52 0.37 -0.14 
AWC has a functional toilet 53 0.08 53 0.28 -0.21*** 44 0.16 37 0.22 -0.06 
AWC has portable drinking 
water facility  
53 0.40 53 0.47 -0.08 44 0.57 37 0.65 -0.08 
AWC has functional 
weighing machine(s) 
53 0.51 53 0.19 0.32*** 47 0.81 48 0.92 -0.11 
           
AWW           
Age (years) 52 0.34 53 0.35 -0.02* 53 0.36 52 0.38 -0.01 
Experience (years) 53 0.09 53 0.11 -0.02** 53 0.10 52 0.12 -0.02*** 
Education            
Middle 53 0.00 53 0.00 0.00 53 0.02 52 0.00 0.02 
Secondary  53 0.32 53 0.36 -O.04 53 0.28 52 0.40 -0.12 
Higher secondary  53 0.47 53 0.40 0.08 53 0.42 52 0.33 0.09 
Dip/certificate 53 0.02 53 0.04 -0.02 53 0.00 52 0.00 0.00 
Graduate 53 0.19 53 0.15 0.04 53 0.26 52 0.23 -0.03 
Post graduate 53 0.00 53 0.06 -0.06* 53 0.02 52 0.04 0.02 
Caste            
Scheduled Caste (SC) 53 0.19 53 0.08 0.11* 53 0.26 52 0.12 0.15* 
Other Backward Class (OBC) 53 0.62 53 0.64 -0.02 53 0.55 52 0.58 -0.03 
General  53 0.19 53 0.28 -0.09 53 0.19 52 0.31 -0.12 
           
PSU           
Average PSU population  53 1069 53 1260 -
190.67*
** 
52 1140 54 1254 -113.9* 
ASHA resides in the PSU  53 0.68 53 0.87 -0.19** 52 0.56 54 0.85 0.29*** 
Village headman resides in 
the PSU  
53 0.15 53 0.19 -0.04 52 0.23 54 0.22 0.01 
Note: Means of variables by group *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 17 summarises the levels of AWC, AWW, and PSU characteristics included in the DID 
regression model as covariates for T3 and comparison blocks. The proportion of AWCs with access 
to toilet facilities and functional weighing machines remained significantly different at baseline, 
and this difference has vanished by the time of the midline. Since the sampled children are too 
young to access the AWC infrastructure, the access to toilet indicator might not be relevant for 
our analysis. However, the means difference of access to the functional weighing machine at 
baseline and no difference at the midline could potentially bias our impact estimator or may even 
explain the direction of the impact estimator. Hence, I decided to include it as a control variable 
in the regression model. Furthermore, AWCs in the comparison block saw an improvement in 
building type, ownership, potable drinking water facility and functional weighing machine 
availability. Although there is a decline in the availability of functional toilets in the comparison 





Considering the data is a panel of AWWs, as expected, the characteristics of AWWs such as caste 
and education remained the same and age and experience increased from baseline to midline. 
The caste profile of the AWWs is different from the households’ caste profile outlined in Table 
16. While the majority of households belonged to either SC or OBC categories, the majority of 
AWWs belonged to OBC and General category.  
The PSU characteristics showed an increase in the PSU population in T3 block and a slight 
decrease in the comparison block from baseline to midline. Whilst the proportion of PSUs with 
ASHA’s presence decreased, the proportion of PSUs with the village headman’s residence 
increased in both blocks from baseline to midline. Table 28 in section 5.7 summarises the levels 
of the same list of variables for cash transfer blocks. Although the levels of AWC, AWW, and PSU 
levels are similar between T1 and T2, a significant means difference exists for variables such as 
availability of functional toilet, potable drinking water, and functional weighing machines. 
However, this difference disappears in midline for the availability of functional toilets and 
weighing machines but remains the same for potable drinking water facility.  
Key outcome indicators  
Table 18 reports the descriptive statistics for child and woman level indicators used in this analysis 
as key outcome indicators. I examine three indicators at the child level and two at the woman 
level (shown in Table 15).  
Child weighing  
Considering the intervention incentivised AWWs to weigh children and eased the weight grading 
process with the mobile phone application, the proportion of children being weighed by AWWs 
could be directly influenced by the mobile phone and monetary incentives intervention from 
baseline to the midline. Table 18 shows that the proportion of children below one year of age 
who received weight monitoring after birth weight check-up increased in the comparison block 
by ten percentage points. This proportion fell in the T3 block by 1.25 percentage points. At the 
baseline, means of T3 and comparison group was significantly different. The significance of the 
means difference remains at the midline, but with a reduced magnitude (0.16 to 0.05). Therefore, 
significant improvements were seen in the comparison block but not in T3 block.  
Across social categories (SC, OBC and General) this proportion increased in the comparison block, 
with the highest levels of increase reported for the SC category. However, in the T3 block, the 
slight decline (1 percentage points) experienced seems to be caused due to the decline in the 
OBC category (-3.13 percentage points).  





Considering the AWWs receive Rs. 100 (approx. $15) for filling the service availability form on the 
VHSND and Rs. 5 (approx. $ 0.08) per child for the weighing, if AWWs want to maximise their 
incentives, they can mobilise more beneficiaries (mothers of young children) to attend the 
VHSND. However, the proportion of mothers of children under one year of age that attended the 
VHSND at least once before the respective surveys declined in both comparison and T3 blocks. 
The fall is sharper in the case of the treatment (-37.69 percentage points) than in the comparison 
block (-30.70 percentage points). Although the proportion fell from baseline to midline in both 
blocks and the fall is sharper in the T3 block, the significant means difference exists between two 
groups (T3 and comparison blocks) at baseline and midline with a reduced magnitude.  
Across social categories, VHSND attendance fell in both comparison and T3 blocks. In both blocks, 
the fall was the highest for the General category compared to other two categories. Compared 









Table 18 Descriptive statistics: child and woman outcome variables (T3 and Comparison blocks) 
Variables Baseline 2013  Midline 2015  
 Treatment (T3) Comparison  Treatment (T3) Comparison  
 Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean T3-C Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean T3-C 
Child               
Children < 1 year who received weight monitoring ever 
after birth weight check 
771 0.41  717 0.25 0.16*** 903 0.40  816 0.35 0.05** 
 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 371 0.38  316 0.19   406 0.38  382 0.32   
Other Backward Class (OBC) 314 0.43  305 0.28   397 0.40  322 0.34   
General 86 0.48  96 0.40   96 0.49  104 0.47   
               
Children < 1 year attended the VHSND at least once 771 0.69  717 0.55 0.15*** 903 0.30  816 0.24 0.06*** 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 371 0.74  316 0.52   406 0.37  382 0.23   
Other Backward Class (OBC) 314 0.64  305 0.61   397 0.28  322 0.29   
General 86 0.59  96 0.47   96 0.16  104 0.14   
               
Children < 1 year who attended VHSND who received 
weight monitoring 
529 0.20  395 0.19 0.01 275 0.28  199 0.22 0.06 
 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 276 0.22  165 0.19   149 0.26  88 0.28   
Other Backward Class (OBC) 202 0.18  185 0.22   110 0.31  94 0.15   
General 51 0.16  45 0.09   15 0.27  15 0.33   
               
Woman               
Women attended the VHSND in the last pregnancy 771 0.47  717 0.33 0.13*** 903 0.31  816 0.22 0.10*** 
 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 371 0.49  316 0.32   406 0.38  382 0.19   
Other Backward Class (OBC) 314 0.49  305 0.36   397 0.27  322 0.27   
General 86 0.33  96 0.27   96 0.21  104 0.18   
               
Women who attended the VHSND at least once during 
the last pregnancy who received weight monitoring 
567 0.48  414 0.30 0.17*** 282 0.72  177 0.52 0.20*** 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 286 0.50  194 0.28   153 0.67  71 0.49   
Other Backward Class (OBC) 224 0.47  181 0.29   108 0.78  86 0.51   
General 57 0.40  39 0.46   20 0.75  19 0.68   





Child weighing at the VHSND 
Although the VHSND attendance fell in both blocks from baseline to midline across social 
categories, it is interesting to look at the proportion of children who attended a VHSND who were 
weighed from the baseline to midline. Considering the AWW has a chance to earn a higher 
magnitude of incentives and received hand holding support from the BCSP programme staff on 
the VHSND, there could be a higher likelihood of children who attend the VHSND being weighed.  
Overall the proportion of children below one year of age who attended the VHSND who received 
weight monitoring increased in both blocks from baseline to midline. However, in both blocks, 
less than one third of children who attended the VHSND received weight monitoring. The receipt 
of weight monitoring for children at the VHSND across social categories increased for both blocks 
except for the OBC category in the comparison block.  
Women’s attendance at the VHSND during the last pregnancy  
Women’s attendance at the VHSND in their pregnancy period is a crucial factor in this analysis 
because it helps to understand whether the technology augmented intervention (especially the 
pregnancy care management) attracted pregnant women to the VHSND platform.  
As shown in Table 18, less than half of women in both blocks reported attending the VHSND at 
least once during the last pregnancy. The proportion decreased from baseline to midline in both 
blocks. Although the T3 block experienced a higher decline, it remains higher than the comparison 
block at midline. In the T3 and comparison blocks, the decline was highest in the case of the OBC 
category (-20.45 percentage points and -13.44 percentage points respectively) compared to the 
other two categories.  
Woman’s weighing at the VHSND during last pregnancy  
The weighing of pregnant women by AWWs is neither directly incentivised nor digitised using the 
mobile phone application. However, the receipt of weight monitoring during the last pregnancy 
is a good proxy indicator to understand whether the pregnancy care application prompts the 
AWW to weigh more pregnant women at the VHSND. The VHSND is a platform where pregnant 
women turn up to receive ANC check-ups from the ANM and weighing service from the AWW. 
The MCH card given to the pregnant women at the start of the ANC check-ups also keeps a record 
of the ANC check-ups, weight monitoring and tetanus injections during pregnancy, and child-
related details (birth weight, child immunisation, and weight monitoring) post childbirth.  
The VHSND attendance fell for both blocks from baseline to midline. However, the proportion of 





increased in both blocks. The increase is visible across social categories in both blocks as well. In 
the T3 block, the increase is highest for the General category and lowest for the SC category. The 
same pattern is visible in the comparison block as well, but the increase is almost similar in the 
case of the SC and OBC categories.   
Key outcome indicators: child and woman variables for all blocks  
Overall, comparing the levels of key outcome indicators between the T3 and comparison group 
suggest that the comparison group improved or the treatment in T3 block has not achieved the 
hypothesised improvement. Is this true for the other two blocks which have cash transfer as well? 
Table 19 presents the levels of each of these indicators for all four blocks. It shows that the 
indicators related to weighing at child and woman levels improved in the cash transfer blocks. 
Two indicators, weighing at VHSND for child below one year of age weighing of and women during 
their last pregnancy showed a steep increase from baseline to the midline in the cash transfer 
blocks.  Moreover, the VHSND attendance indicators in cash transfer blocks did not experience 
decline like in the T3 and comparison blocks. Table 29 in section 5.7 presents in detail the levels 
of the key outcome indicators in the cash transfer blocks.  
Table 19 Descriptive statistics: child and woman outcome variables for all blocks  
Variables  
 Baseline 2013 Midline 2015 
 T1 T2 T3  C T1 T2 T3  T1 
 Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
Child         
Children < 1 year who received 
weight monitoring ever after 
birth weight check 
0.4 0.36 0.41 0.25 0.61 0.65 0.40 0.35 
Children < 1 year attended the 
VHSND 
0.44 0.54 0.69 0.55 0.47 0.53 0.30 0.24 
Children < 1year who attended 
VHSND who received weight 
monitoring 
0.24 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.73 0.67 0.28 0.22 
Woman         
Women attended the VHSND 
in the last pregnancy 
0.61 0.67 0.47 0.33 0.69 0.83 0.31 0.22 
Women who attended the 
VHSND at least once during 
the last pregnancy who 
received weight monitoring 
0.29 0.37 0.48 0.30 0.48 0.49 0.72 0.52 
5.5.2 Regression models  
Table 20 and Table 21 present the DID regression models for the key outcome variables with and 
without covariates.  
The DID impact estimator for the first outcome variable ‘children below one year of age weighed 





in this case, suggests that the intervention had a negative impact on children below one year of 
age ever being weighed after the birth weight check-up.  
In the case of child attendance at the VHSND, the DID coefficient is negative and non-significant. 
The DID coefficient of the third outcome variable, i.e. the proportion of children below one year 
of age who attended the VHNSD that received weight monitoring is positive and non-significant. 
Comparing to the DID coefficients without using covariates and the DID coefficients after using 
covariates, the magnitude of the coefficients slightly increased, but the direction and significance 
remain the same suggesting that the estimates are robust.  
In the case of the VHSND attendance, there has been an overall fall in children attending the 
VHSND from the baseline to midline in both T3 and comparison block. In the T3 block, this 
reduction is higher than the reduction seen in the comparison block. As a result, the DID impact 
estimate that compares the T3 and comparison block is negative but not significant. In the case 
of children who attended the VHSND that got weighed, it is different. Even when the VHSND 
attendance of children fell from baseline to midline in both treatment and comparison blocks, 
the proportion of children weighed at the VHNSD increased in both blocks. This increase is higher 
in the T3 block than in the comparison block. Although, the DID impact estimator is positive but 
not significant.  
Out of the three child level variables, inclusion of covariates increased the magnitude of the DID 
estimator of the first variable and decreased the magnitude of the rest.  
It is evident from Table 16 and Table 18 that in the majority of household, woman, and child 
characteristics, the T3 block is slightly better than the comparison block. Although I have 
controlled for these variables in the regression model, possibility of omitted variables in the 
regression model could be potentially biasing the regression coefficients. The potential bias in 
this model could arise from the household’s differential awareness about the services at the AWC, 
latent attitude towards taking up services, intrahousehold decision-making regarding service 
uptake for the child, and the AWW’s ability to utilise the weighing machine and mobile phone. 
Considering there are no direct variables that measure the awareness and attitude of the 
household towards the ICDS services and innate ability of the AWW, I have used proxy variables 
as controls. If these variables were available, they would be positively correlated with the 
independent variable (s). As no positive estimates were detected, an upward bias would not 
affect the findings unless the negative and insignificant estimates would have become 
insignificant. In any case, it is clear that the analysis finds that the intervention had no positive 





the variables and no impact on the rest. The potential omitted variables could be upwardly biasing 
the estimates.  
Table 20 Impact of AWW treatment (T3) on child level outcome indicators 
Variables 1. Children < 1 year 
who received weight 
monitoring ever after 
birth weight check 
2. Children < 1 year 
attended the VHSND 
3. Children < 1year 
who attended VHSND 
who received weight 
monitoring 
With covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time period dummy 0.108*** 0.0990** -0.294*** -0.343*** 0.0281 0.0967  
(-0.0321) (-0.0473) (-0.0325) (-0.0453) (-0.0525) (-0.0782) 
Post-treatment 
dummy 
0.168*** 0.156*** 0.134*** 0.149*** 0.00835 0.0135 
 
(-0.0343) -(0.0335) (-0.0418) (-0.0448) (-0.0398) (-0.045) 
Difference-in-
difference estimator 
-0.116*** -0.164*** -0.0758 -0.0666 0.0525 -0.0116 
 
(-0.0414) (-0.0529) (-0.0527) (-0.0628) (-0.0701) (-0.0927) 
Constant 0.242*** -0.02 0.537*** 1.472*** 0.191*** 0.843*  
(-0.0241) (-0.458) (-0.0303) (-0.446) (-0.03) (-0.496)  
      
Observations 3,207 2,444 3,207 2,444 1,398 1,152 
R-squared 0.016 0.063 0.128 0.158 0.007 0.038 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
At the woman level, in the case of women’s VHNSD attendance during the last pregnancy, the 
DID estimator is negative and non-significant. However, the DID estimator for the proportion of 
women who attended the VHSND at least once during the last pregnancy who received weight 
monitoring is positive and non-significant. These results suggest that the intervention did not 
have a significant positive impact on selected woman level indicators. The direction of the DID 
estimator for the women’s attendance at the VHSND during their last pregnancy suggest that the 





Table 21 Impact of AWW treatment (T3) on woman level outcome indicators 
Variables 4. Women attended the 
VHSND in the last 
pregnancy 
5. Women who attended 
the VHSND at least once 
during the last pregnancy 
who received weight 
monitoring 
With covariates? No Yes No Yes 
Time period dummy -0.112*** -0.164*** 0.223*** 0.217***  
(-0.0336) (-0.0493) (-0.0593) (-0.0799) 
Post-treatment dummy 0.135*** 0.115*** 0.183*** 0.164***  
(-0.0376) (-0.0431) (-0.0445) (-0.0488) 
Difference-in-difference 
estimator 
-0.0396 -0.0205 0.0114 0.0172 
 
(-0.0592) (-0.0658) (-0.0737) (-0.0954) 
Constant 0.327*** 0.881* 0.297*** 0.577  
(-0.0252) (-0.503) (-0.0348) (-0.527)  
    
Observations 3,207 2,444 1,440 1,207 
R-squared 0.034 0.055 0.077 0.108 




To improve the robustness of the DID model, conducting Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
analysis could be useful. However, it is not possible in this analysis as the household level data is 
not a panel, rather a repeated cross-section. PSM analysis across two-time periods can only be 
done for panelled households (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). Although the AWC data is a panel, 
it is a small sample (55 each for two blocks per time period) inadequate for the PSM level of 
analysis.  
Considering the DID impact estimators for all five indicators show either negative or no significant 
impact of the intervention, I decided to carry out heterogeneity analysis to understand whether 
the impact is different for subgroups73 of social categories and poverty levels. I ran regressions 
specifically for the poorest (the lowest in the wealth quintile based on the Asset Index) and SC 
group. Table 22 shows the DID estimator and standard errors for all five indicators for the poverty 
sub-group and SC sub-group.  
As shown in Table 22, the first two child-level indicators for the poorest sub-group is negative and 
significantchild weighing at 95% and child VHSND attendance at 99% confidence levels. 
Considering the overall DID estimate children’s VHSND attendance was -0.0666 and not 
significant, the DID estimate for the poorest sub-group is higher in magnitude and significant at 
the 99% confidence level. This suggests that the reduction in attendance of below one-year-old 
children from the poorest quintile is sharper in the T3 block than in the comparison block for the 
                                                          





poorest quintile. It also shows that the poorest quintile was in fact adversely affected by the 
intervention; more so than the average household.  
SC families are historically disadvantaged compared to the non-SC groups such as OBC and 
General categories. Although the sub-group DID estimator for SC is higher in magnitude, the 
direction and significance remain the same for the first indicator, child weighing. The other child 
and woman indicators have similar direction and significance compared to the overall DID 
estimator presented in Table 20 except for the women weighing at the VHSND.  
The sub-group level analysis shows that the overall negative impact of the mobile phone 
technology and monetary incentives intervention has strongly affected the poorest quintile and 
SC groups especially for the child weighing and child VHSND attendance (only for the poorest). 
Table 22 Heterogeneity analysis 
Variables Difference-in-Difference 
estimator 
 Poorest SC 
Included covariates? Yes Yes 
Child   












Woman   




Women who attended the VHSND at least once during the last pregnancy who 





       Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In addition to conducting a sub-group level DID analysis, I also estimated the DID estimate for 
cash transfer blocks (Table 23). In addition to comparing T3 and comparison blocks, I compared 
T1 and T2; T2 and T3; and T2 and the comparison block. Two interesting comparisons are 
between —i) T2 vs. T3 i.e. estimating the impact of the cash transfer minus the supply-side 
intervention and ii) T2 vs. C estimating the bundled impact of the supply-side intervention and 
cash transfer against no intervention. Although I carried out four DID models, the T1 vs. T2 





Table 23 Comparing the DID estimator for all blocks  
Variables Difference-in-Difference estimator 
 Diff T1 (T1 vs. T2) Diff T2 (T2 vs. T3) Diff T3 (T3 vs. C) Diff T5 (T2 vs. C) 
Included covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Child         
Children < 1 year 
who received weight 
monitoring ever 





















Children < 1 year 







































Woman         
Women attended 



















attended the VHSND 
at least once during 
the last pregnancy 


















Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As shown in Table 23, the DID estimator for all indicators in T2 vs. T3 and T2 vs. C are positive and 
significant. The direction and significance of the DID estimator for T2 vs. T3 suggest that the cash 
transfer has had a positive and significant impact on the uptake of services. Considering the 
comparison block did not have any intervention, I expected the DID estimators for T2 vs. C to be 
higher than that of the T2. vs. T3. However, the results suggest that the magnitude of DID 
estimators for T2. vs. C is lower for two indicators and similar for the rest to the T2. vs. T3 group. 
These results are interesting because it in a way suggests the T3 block experienced a much 
sharper decline in the uptake of services hypothesised to be influenced by the mobile phone 
technology and monetary incentives bundled intervention. Although the levels of these services 
have gone down in T3 and comparison blocks, the DID results suggest that a negative push down 
on service uptake is more visible in the T3 block than in the comparison block. The next section 
5.5.3 aims to explain the reasons for the negative impact in the T3 block.  
5.5.3 Mechanisms  
The overall DID estimation models for T3 vs. C show that the bundled mobile phone technology 
and monetary incentives intervention had no positive impact on the key outcome indicators. In 





after having a birth weight check-up. Although the mobile phone technology and monetary 
incentives bundled intervention did not have any positive impact, the cash transfer has a 
significant positive impact on these key outcome indicators. Comparing the DID estimates of T2 
vs. C and T2 vs. T3 suggests that the mobile phone technology and monetary incentives 
intervention seems to have made the indicators worse in T3 than in the comparison block.  
If I refer to Table 19 which showed the levels of key outcome indicators for all blocks, we can see 
a fall or not much improvement in the levels of these outcome indicators in T3 and comparison 
blocks. The VHSND attendance for both children and women fell drastically in T3 and comparison 
blocks. In assessing the levels of these indicators over time and DID impact estimators together, 
it seems that fall in T3 is much worse than the fall in comparison block. The cash transfer blocks 
did not experience a decline in VHSND attendance. In fact, the second cash transfer block rather 
experienced an increase. Moreover, both the cash transfer blocks experienced an increase in 
weighing of children and women during the last pregnancy at the VHSND. The reason for no fall 
in the VHSND attendance in cash transfer blocks could be that the VHSND attendance was one of 
the cash transfer conditions. Hence, to avail the cash transfers, beneficiaries (pregnant women 
and mothers of young children) had to attend the VHSND. The cash transfer, therefore, brought 
a demand-side push in those two blocks. In T3, although AWWs received incentives for reporting 
service availability on the VHSND, it seems like that a mobile phone technology and monetary 
incentives intervention alone could not bring an improvement in service uptake as per the cash 
transfer blocks.  
To understand why the AWW treatment did not have a positive impact and for some indicators 
had a negative impact led me to examine the intensity of the AWW treatment across all three 
treatment blocks. Table 24 shows that T3 block received a weaker treatment compared to the 
two cash transfer blocks. AWWs who were participating in the BCSP is higher in the cash transfer 
blocks than in the T3 block. AWWs who have problems with the phone are also higher in the T3 
block. In receiving the support from the BCSP team, the T3 block is far behind the cash transfer 
blocks. In the cash transfer blocks, an average AWW enrols almost doubled the number of 
beneficiaries compared to the T3 block. The proportion of AWWs who received any incentive 
remains considerably lower in the T3 block than in the cash transfer blocks. Moreover, AWWs in 
the T3 block received substantially less incentives than their colleagues in the cash transfer blocks.  
Considering the AWWs in the T3 blocks received less incentives compared to the cash transfer 
blocks, they might not have felt motivated to attract more beneficiaries for VHSNDs and weight 
monitoring. Also, Table 24 suggests that these AWWs received reduced support from the BCSP 





could have meant that, to ease the use of mobile phone application, AWWs might have reduced 
the caseload at the VHSND.  
Table 24 Intensity of the AWW treatment by programme blocks 
Programme participation indicators        
  
  
T1 T2 T3 
N=54 N=55 N=53 
Mean  Mean  Mean  
  
   
AWWs who are participating in the BCSP  0.98 0.96 0.85 
AWWs who have problems with the BCSP mobile phone app 0.35 0.27 0.41 
AWWs who receive any support regarding the BCSP  0.90 0.88 0.60 
Average number of beneficiaries enrolled in the BCSP  0.31 0.24 0.16 
AWWs ever received incentive payment from the BCSP  0.82 0.67 0.49 
Average amount received as the incentive  594 605 367 
 
Although Table 24 explains the low intensity of the mobile phone technology and monetary 
incentives intervention in the T3 block, it does not fully explain the reason behind the negative 
impact i.e. that the T3 block fell behind the comparison block where there was no intervention 
(at least for two variables). This negative impact could be due to the spillover effect of the cash 
transfer programme on the T3 block where there was no cash transfer for the beneficiaries. 
AWWs in the two cash transfer blocks and the treatment block were given mobile phones and 
performed similar activities. The beneficiaries from the treatment block were not receiving cash 
compared to their counterparts in the cash transfer blocks. These blocks are also adjacent to each 
other. A negative spillover effect of the cash transfer programme might have influenced the 
utilisation of the ICDS services in the T3 block due to making beneficiaries avail services which 
were accompanied by an incentive.  
Improvements in the comparison block due to other factors not related to the BCSP could also 
have influenced the AWW effort and improved the levels of household service uptake in the 
comparison block. This would mean a violation of the parallel paths assumption. As evident from 
Table 17, the AWC infrastructure has drastically improved in the comparison block. Although I 
have controlled for these factors in the DID regression models, unobservable factors the survey 
did not cover could also have improved the conditions in the comparison block. For example, the 
SWD, government of Bihar, formally launched the Bal Kuposhan Mukt Bihar (BKMB) or the Child 
Malnutrition Free Bihar campaign on August 15, 2014, to address the high level of child under-
nutrition (SWD, 2015a). This initiative organised additional training for AWWs, provided 
equipment and supplies to AWCs, carried out information and education sessions for 
beneficiaries (e.g. street plays, videos and films) at the community and district level. Considering 





intensity across blocks. Hence, the effect cancels out in a DID estimation. However, due to 
unavailability of data on block-wise activities under the BKMB, it is difficult to assess whether one 
specific improvement in the comparison block might have caused the negative or no impact of 
the intervention.  
To conclude, the bundled intervention did not have a positive impact either due to singular or the 
combined effect of i) the weaker intensity of the treatment, ii) a negative spillover effect of the 
cash transfer, and iii) unknown ICDS related improvements occurring in the comparison block.  
5.6 Discussion and conclusion  
As described in Chapter 2, within the emerging fields of m-Health and m-Nutrition, no studies so 
far have reported a combined intervention like the mobile phone and monetary incentives 
intervention I studied in this thesis. Moreover, the literature on the m-Health and m-Nutrition 
interventions targeted at CHWs have not reported the influence of interventions on the uptake 
of services at the household level. Hence, to discuss my quantitative research findings with the 
literature, I needed to depend on studies that i) examined the influence of m-Health and m-
Nutrition interventions targeted at households (not via CHWs) to improve service uptake 
and behavioural change practices and ii) explored the influence of monetary incentives for CHWs 
on service uptake and household level outcomes.  
A systematic review of mobile health interventions on coverage and use of ANC, postnatal care 
(PNC), and childhood immunisations in low- and middle-income countries could only find a 
handful of studies that examined the topic. The studies emphasise some evidence on changing 
behaviours at the household level (Watterson et al., 2015). Two studies, one in Zanzibar and one 
in Kenya, that explored the effectiveness of text message reminders and information delivered to 
pregnant women’s mobile phones found evidence of statistically significant increases in ANC in 
their intervention groups relative to their non-intervention groups (Fedha, 2014; Lund et al., 
2014). Although the findings of my quantitative analysis do not corroborate with the available 
evidence on the effectiveness of m-Health programmes on population-level service uptake, it 
could be because the intervention was routed via the community-level worker. The intervention 
is at the AWW level means which that the intervention’s acceptability and effectiveness at her 
level could be influencing the outcomes at the population level. The findings of Chapter 4 
highlight the nuanced ways in which various factors at the individual, programmatic, community, 
and organisational level influence AWWs.  
One of the interesting lessons from studying the impact of the mobile phone and monetary 





services significantly increased. This finding leads to two implications. First, it emphasises the 
importance of taking into account beneficiary interest. When the beneficiaries and AWWs were 
incentivised and the AWW received technology assistance for real-time monitoring, the 
household uptake of services saw a significant improvement. This also underlines the findings of 
Chapter 4 which emphasised the beneficiary’s interest for product-oriented services. Second, this 
finding in a way suggests the potential of mobile phone-based real-time monitoring for social 
protection interventions like the cash transfers. Because the evaluation design did not have a 
treatment with cash transfer and no mobile phone technology- monetary incentives intervention, 
it is hard to be conclusive about the impact of the cash transfer without the mobile phone 
technology intervention. However, it could be one of the future areas of research examining the 
role of mobile phone technology for CHWs in delivering cash incentives to improve household 
uptake of health and nutrition services.  
As described earlier, because the intervention is a bundle, it is difficult to tease out the effect of 
the mobile phones and monetary incentives. However, the review of the intensity of the 
treatments across blocks highlighted that in T3, AWWs received the lowest amount of monetary 
incentives and faced challenges due to the phone. The challenges in using the phone might have 
impacted the AWWs in earning more incentives. The few studies that examined the influence of 
worker level monetary incentives found that it improves household uptake of services. A study 
by (Kosec et al., 2015) in Bihar among ASHAs and AWWs found that monetary incentives even 
improved the uptake of counselling services. One of the few studies that used an RCT design to 
estimate the impact of providing monetary incentives in the form of pay-for-performance 
reported that it improved the nutritional outcomes of children (Singh & Masters, 2016). However, 
this study incorporated a demand-side intervention, i.e. more information and education of 
mothers. Although it is difficult to conclude from my findings on the singular effect of monetary 
incentives, engaging with the available (limited) evidence on the influence of monetary incentives 
on AWWs also highlight that if worker level interventions are to succeed, significant beneficiary 
engagement needs to be ensured using demand-side interventions.  
One of the limitations of my quantitative analysis is that it uses the midline data of a programme. 
Using the data that is collected after the completion of the programme could provide a complete 
picture of the intervention. However, in the BCSP context, due to financial limitations, the endline 
did not collect data from the comparison block. This made it impossible to tease out the impact 
of the mobile phone and monetary incentives intervention alone after the completion of the 
programme. Another limitation of my analysis stems from the unavailability of AWW level data 





sample size. I anticipate the qualitative research will help in overcoming this limitation and help 
to provide a comprehensive picture on the role of technology augmented intervention and AWW 
performance. This is the subject of Chapter 6. Moreover, the inability to test the parallel paths 
assumption remains as a limitation of my analysis.  
Do the findings presented in this chapter lead to lessons on the scale-up of the intervention? I 
would reserve that question for the last chapter after discussing the qualitative research findings 
on the technology augmented intervention’s influence at the AWW level in Chapter 6.  
To conclude, the findings suggest that the mobile phone technology and monetary incentives 
intervention did not have any positive impact on children below one year of age being weighed 
after the birth weight check-up. Neither did it impact on children below one year of age’s VHSND 
attendance. Rather, it negatively influenced (statistically significant) the weighing of children 
below one year of age. Although the impact of the intervention on the proportion of children 
below one year of age who attended the VHSND who received weight monitoring remains 
positive, it is not statistically significant. The reasons for the lack of impact and negative impact 
could be because of i) the weak intensity of treatment received by AWWs in T3 block compared 
to the other two cash transfer treatment blocks and ii) possibility of a negative spillover effect 
due to the proximity of the T3 block to two other treatment blocks (where beneficiaries received 
cash transfers). This contrasts to the significant positive effects detected when the mobile phone 








5.7 Supplementary tables   
 
Table 25 Sample size for T1 and T2 blocks 
Data  Sample size  
 Baseline 2013 
(July to September 2013) 
Midline 2015 
(August to October 2015) 







Household 1558 1534 3092 1506 1579 3085 
Woman 1558 1534 3092 1488 1566 3054 
Children 1616 1575 3191 1447 1532 2979 
Anganwadi 55 55 110 51 54 105 
Community 
(PSU) 






Table 26 Descriptive statistics: household, woman, and child characteristics (T1 and T2 blocks) 
Variables  Baseline 2013 Midline 2015 





 Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD  
Household            
Male headed 0.96  0.97  0.00 0.90  0.89  0.02 
Household Head’s 
education  
          
No education 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.01 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.01 
Primary 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37 -0.02 0.17 0.37 0.19 0.39 -0.02* 
Middle 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.34 0.01 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.00 
Secondary   0.12 0.32 0.12 0.33 -0.01 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.32 0.01 
Higher secondary  0.05 0.21 0.04 0.19 0.01* 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.00 
Graduate 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 -0.01 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.18 0.00 
Post-graduate 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Religion            
Hindu  0.94 0.24 0.93 0.25 0.00 0.94 0.23 0.94 0.24 0.01 
Islam   0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24 -0.01 
Caste            
Scheduled caste (SC)  0.40 0.49 0.49 0.50 -0.09*** 0.42 0.49 0.52 0.50 -0.10*** 
Other Backward Class 
(OBC) 
0.52 0.50 0.36 0.48 0.16*** 0.49 0.50 0.36 0.48 0.12*** 
General  0.08 0.28 0.15 0.36 -0.07*** 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.32 -0.03** 
Access to agricultural 
land 
0.56  0.41  0.15*** 0.53  0.40  0.14*** 
Access to drinking 
water facility  
0.96  0.97  -0.01 0.93  0.97  -0.04*** 
Access to toilet facility  0.10  0.16  -0.06*** 0.13  0.18  -0.05*** 
Asset Index  2.99 1.43 3.19 1.44 -0.20*** 2.93 1.41 3.15 1.42 -0.23*** 
Woman           
Age 25.74 5.05 25.65 4.76 0.09 25.28 5.08 24.80 4.67 0.47*** 
Education            
No education 0.68 0.47 0.65 0.48 0.02 0.60 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.02 
Primary 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.31 -0.00 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33 0.02 
Middle 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.00 
Secondary   0.06 0.25 0.07 0.26 -0.01 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.00 
Higher secondary  0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20 -0.01 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.26 -0.02** 
Graduate 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.20 -0.02*** 
Post-graduate 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age at marriage  14.83 3.21 15.13 3.37 -0.30*** 14.95 2.81 15.45 2.94 -0.50*** 
Number of children  2.91 1.75 2.83 1.70 0.08 2.94 1.78 2.78 1.67 0.16** 
Employment: non-HH 
work  
0.14  0.12  0.02 0.28  0.28  0.00 
Received at least one 
tetanus injection 
during last pregnancy 
0.92  0.93  -0.01 0.87  0.91  -0.04*** 
Had institutional 
delivery in for last 
childbirth 
0.56  0.62  -0.06*** 0.65  0.72  -0.07*** 
Child           
Age  13.73 6.80 13.24 6.71 0.49** 10.83 6.61 11.34 6.53 -0.51** 
Sex: Girl 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.50 -0.03 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.02 
Moderate stunting 0.46  0.50  -0.04** 0.43  0.42  0.01 
Moderate 
underweight  
0.46  0.51  -0.05*** 0.44  0.43  0.01 
Moderate wasting  0.27  0.27  0.00 0.26  0.26  0.00 
N= 1616  1575   1561  1671   






Table 27 Descriptive statistics: HH, Woman, and Child : Test for equivalence (C vs. T3; T2 vs. T3; T2 vs. T1)  
Variables  Baseline 2013 Midline 2015 
 T1-T2 T2-T3 T3-C T1-T2 T2-T3 T3-C 
Household        
Male headed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.03*** 0.00 
Household Head’s 
education  
      
No education 0.01 0.01 -0.06*** 0.01 0.03* -0.08*** 
Primary -0.02 0.03** -0.01 -0.02* 0.02 0.01 
Middle 0.01 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Secondary   -0.01 -0.03** 0.04*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.05*** 
Higher secondary  0.01* -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Graduate -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Post-graduate 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00* 
Religion        
Hindu  0.00 -0.04*** 0.00 0.01 -0.02*** 0.00 
Islam   0.00 0.04*** 0.00 -0.01 0.02*** 0.00 
Caste        
Scheduled caste (SC)  -0.09*** 0.02 0.02 -0.10*** 0.06*** 0.00 
Other Backward Class 
(OBC) 
0.16*** -0.06*** -0.01 0.12*** -0.07*** 0.03 
General  -0.07*** 0.04*** -0.01 -0.03** 0.02 -0.03*** 
Access to agricultural 
land 
0.15*** 0.00 -0.04** 0.14*** 0.00 -0.04** 
Access to drinking water 
facility  
-0.01 -0.02*** 0.09*** -0.04*** -0.02*** 0.15*** 
Access to toilet facility  -0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03** 
Asset Index  -0.20*** 0.17*** 0.15*** -0.23*** 0.06 0.47*** 
Woman       
Age 0.09 -0.47*** 0.14 0.47*** -0.05 -0.58*** 
Education        
No education 0.02 -0.02 -0.05*** 0.02 -0.01 -0.05*** 
Primary -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 
Middle 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Secondary   -0.01 -0.01 0.04*** 0.00 0.00 0.02** 
Higher secondary  -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02** 0.01 0.01 
Graduate -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02*** 0.01 0.00 
Post-graduate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age at marriage  -0.30*** 0.41*** 0.51*** -0.50*** 0.06 0.22** 
Number of children  0.08 -0.09 0.00 0.16** -0.01 -0.09 
Employment: non-HH 
work  
0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
Received at least one 
tetanus injection during 
last pregnancy 
-0.01 -0.03*** 0.05*** -0.04*** 0.02* 0.07*** 
Had institutional delivery 
in for last childbirth 
-0.06*** 0.06*** 0.11*** -0.07*** 0.07*** 0.12*** 
Child       
Age  0.49** -0.33 -0.33 -0.51** -0.47** 0.14 
Sex: Girl -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02 
Moderate stunting -0.04** -0.06*** -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Moderate underweight  -0.05*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 
Moderate wasting  0.00 0.03* 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 








Table 28 Descriptive statistics: AWC, AWW and PSU characteristics (T1 and T2 blocks) 
Variables  Baseline 2013  Midline 2015  
 Treatment (T1) Treatment (T2) T1-T2 Treatment (T1) Treatment (T2) T1-T2 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean Obs. Mean  
AWC           
           
AWC is functioning in a 
pucca building  
54 0.76 54 0.65 0.11 37 0.84 41 0.90 -0.06 
AWC has own building  54 0.57 54 0.46 0.11 51 0.55 54 0.43 0.12 
AWC has a functional toilet 54 0.28 54 0.09 0.19** 37 0.24 41 0.29 -0.05 
AWC has potable drinking 
water facility  
54 0.63 54 0.43 0.20** 37 0.81 41 0.59 0.23** 
AWC has functional 
weighing machine(s) 
54 0.67 53 0.49 0.18* 47 0.94 50 0.92 0.02 
           
AWW           
Age (years) 53 0.36 52 0.35 0.02 51 0.37 54 0.37 0.00 
Experience (years) 53 0.11 52 0.08 0.03*** 50 0.13 53 0.10 0.02** 
Education            
Middle 53 0.06 52 0.00 0.06 51 0.00 54 0.04 -0.04 
Secondary  53 0.34 52 0.37 -0.03 51 0.45 54 0.37 0.08 
Higher secondary  53 0.47 52 0.46 0.01 51 0.33 54 0.43 -0.09 
Dip/certificate 53 0.00 52 0.00 0.00 51 0.00 54 0.00 0.00 
Graduate 53 0.09 52 0.15 -0.06 51 0.20 54 0.13 0.07 
Post graduate 53 0.04 52 0.02 0.02 51 0.02 54 0.04 -0.02 
Caste            
Scheduled Caste (SC) 53 0.25 52 0.31 -0.06 51 0.14 54 0.28 -0.14* 
Other Backward Class (OBC) 53 0.62 52 0.42 0.20** 51 0.75 54 0.48 0.26*** 
General  53 0.13 52 0.27 -0.14* 51 0.12 54 0.24 -0.12 
           
PSU           
Average PSU population  54 1175 54 1282 -
107.15
* 
54 1234 55 1331 -97.9 
ASHA resides in the PSU  54 0.87 54 0.83 0.04 54 0.78 55 0.78 0.00 
Village headman resides in 
the PSU  
54 0.28 54 0.28 0.00 54 0.22 55 0.24 0.01 






Table 29 Descriptive statistics: child and woman outcome variables (T1 and T2 blocks) 
Variables Baseline’2013  Midline’2015  
 Treatment (T1) Treatment (T2)  Treatment (T1) Treatment (T2)  
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean T1-T2 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean T1-
T2 
Child               
Children < 1 year 
who received 
weight monitoring 
ever after birth 
weight check 
765 0.4 782 0.36 0.04* 979 0.61 999 0.65 0.04* 
Children < 1 year 
attended the 
VHSND 
765 0.44 782 0.54 -
0.10**
* 
979 0.47 999 0.53 0.06*
* 





335 0.24 421 0.17 0.07** 465 0.73 530 0.67 -
0.06*
* 
Woman               
Women who had 
their weight 
checked at least 
once during their 
last pregnancy, if 
they had received 
at least one 
antenatal check-up 
431 0.61 373 0.67 -
0.07** 
832 0.69 866 0.83 0.14*
** 
Women attended 
the VHSND in the 
last pregnancy 
765 0.29 782 0.37 -
0.08**
* 
979 0.48 999 0.49 0.02 
Women who 
attended the 
VHSND at least 




422 0.48 476 0.45 0.03 466 0.84 491 0.91 0.07*
** 







Chapter Six: Anganwadi workers’ perceptions and experiences in using 
the mobile phone technology and monetary incentives intervention  
6.1 Introduction  
The findings of the previous chapter indicate that the technology augmented intervention could 
not make improvements in the household uptake of services despite incentives and job aids 
appearing as factors affecting performance in the overall conceptual framework. How did AWWs 
perceive the intervention? Did they perceive the intervention to be useful in their daily job 
responsibilities? To provide a comprehensive picture of the technology augmented intervention’s 
influence, in this chapter, I present findings of the qualitative research that explored the influence 
of the intervention at the AWW level. As described earlier, the qualitative research explored 
AWWs’ perceptions and experiences in using the intervention via semi-structured interviews.  
The chapter is structured as follows. This introduction section is followed by a background section 
6.2, which recaps the empirical context and discusses the analytical framework used in this 
analysis. The third sub-section 6.3 presents the findings and the penultimate section 6.4 discusses 
the relevance, generalizability, implications for the policy and practice, and limitations of the 
findings. The last section, Error! Reference source not found., concludes the chapter with a s
ummary of conclusions from the findings.  
6.2 Background  
As discussed in Chapter 1 and 3, I conducted qualitative fieldwork which informs two different 
chapters with separate objectives. This chapter focuses entirely on AWWs’ perceptions and 
experiences in using the technology augmented intervention from the block where the mobile 
phone technology and monetary incentives intervention was active. This is based on 15 interviews 
from the T3 block.  
The BCSP considers AWWs as the fulcrum of the programme. AWWs are the sole agents of the 
programme, and a great degree of discretionary power is vested in them. The BCSP is designed 
in such a way that two types of service reporting (weight data and VHSND service availability) are 
monetarily incentivised, but using the mobile phone to manage the pregnancy care services and 
counselling services is not monetarily incentivised. The incentive structure is also different based 
on the type of reporting. The weight monitoring incentive is cumulative, but the VHSND form 
submission is a monthly fixed bonus. Within this unique incentive and technology context, AWWs 
could behave differently. They may comply with the tasks which are incentivised to maximise 





as job aid. To thoroughly explore the AWW’s perceptions, experiences, strategies, opportunities, 
and challenges using the phone, I decided to use the qualitative method of inquiry. I used semi-
structured interviews to understand whether the mobile phone has become part of the AWW’s 
day-to-day practice and to explore the underlying avidity or apathy regarding the intervention 
and reasons for it.  
6.2.1 Analytic framework  
In the overall thesis, I define AWW performance as ‘AWWs making services accessible to the 
required number of beneficiaries with adequate quality’ (i.e. adhering to guidelines). 
Understanding the influence of the mobile phone and monetary incentives bundle on an AWW’s 
perceived performance means exploring what an AWW feels the overall opportunities and 
challenges in using the bundle are particularly in conducting services such as weight monitoring, 
VHSND organisation, and counselling activities.  
Previous studies that looked at CHW or frontline health worker perceptions in using the mobile 
phone technology in their jobs used adapted versions of conceptual frameworks such as Davis’ 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Blanas et al., 2015; Davis, 1989; Goodhue & Thompson, 
1995) or the Task-Technology Fit (TTF) model (Mwendwa, 2016). In my analysis, I used an adapted 
version of the TAM by Blanas et al. (2015) to organise the emerging findings from my research. 
The initial version of the adapted TAM combined with an additional incentive component is given 
in Figure 12. I used this model to help me contextualise my findings and further develop it for 
studies integrating a mobile phone and monetary incentives bundle for workers such as the 
AWWs.  
The TAM was developed by Davis in 1985. He proposed perceived usefulness and perceived ease 
of use as fundamental determinants of user acceptance of technology especially in the case of 
computers. Later, Davis himself and others refined the TAM to study the acceptance of different 
various emergent technologies including mobile wireless technology, mobile phones etc.  TAM 
still remains as the most cited model by studies that assess technology acceptance in multiple 
fields.  In the field of m-Health, studies have used models like TAM to test the validity of the model 
in the health sector, to develop m-Health interventions, and as an analytic framework to 
understand technology acceptance of m-Health interventions by health professionals. I found the 
adapted version of TAM by Blanas et al. (2015) useful because they developed it to design the 
intervention and to analyse community-level health professionals’ perceptions in using the 
technology which is similar to my research objectives. Although Blanas et al. (2015) used the 
revised TAM to design their study, I only use it in the analysisi.e. to analytically organise findings 






Figure 12 Mobile phone and incentives adaptation of the mobile phone acceptance model  
 
Source: Adapted from (Blanas et al., 2015; Davis, 1989; Kim & Garrison, 2009) 
 
6.3 Findings  
I present the findings with a summary of demographic characteristics of AWWs. The findings are 
presented as five sub-sections based on the analytical framework as availability, usability, 
usefulness, relevance, and incentives.   
6.3.1 AWWs’ characteristics 
The group of fifteen AWWs I interviewed in the intervention (T3) block belonged to varied age, 
education, religious, and caste categories.  
Figure 13 Age and education background of interviewed AWWs 
   
The participants included eight AWWs who are between thirty-one to forty years of age and six 





AWWs completed twelve years of education and five completed an undergraduate degree. While 
three AWWs met the minimum education criteria to be selected as an AWW (ten years of 
education), one of them even possessed a post-graduate degree.  




The majority (eight) of AWWs belonged to OBC; four belonged to the General category and three 
from the SC. Except one, all others (fourteen) practised Hinduism. One AWW practised Islam and 
served a predominantly Muslim community.  
AWWs were using Nokia ASHA 206 phones with a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card. They 
received money in their bank accounts to buy the phone. The BCSP implementation team 
facilitated in providing group SIM cards for AWWs of the same block. The group SIM package 
came with free call facility among the group members (i.e. AWWs of the same administrative 
block) and a pre-paid internet data allowance to upload the data to the cloud-based Management 
Information System (MIS). AWWs registered pregnant women using the CommCare application 
case management tool at the fourth of pregnancy. As described earlier, the application is 
designed to facilitate AWWs follow-up pregnant women during their pregnancy period. Once the 
child is born, AWWs follow-up with the child’s immunisation schedule and monthly weight 
monitoring. On the day of the VHSND, AWWs used the CommCare application to fill out the 
service availability form. The service availability form contains YES or NO questions on the 
availability of equipment (weighing machine), personnel (ANM and ASHA), and medicines (IFA 
tablets and measles vaccination). Once connected to the internet, the data transmits to the cloud, 
and the MIS gets updated. The MIS is monitored by the BCSP team at the district headquarters. 
AWWs received monetary incentives in their bank accounts monthly. AWWs received training in 
batches from September to November 2014. The training lasted for one week, and each batch 





2015. In the training, the AWWs were taught to use the phone, local language (Hindi) typing, and 
use of the CommCare application. The Technical Support Officer (TSO) for the programme block 
facilitated the installation of the mobile application. During implementation, the TSO helped 
AWWs troubleshoot any issues, monitored phone use during the implementation, and processed 
AWW’s monetary incentives. A Programme Manager managed the programme along with a 
Technology Manager at the district level.  
6.3.2 Availability and access to mobile phone technology among AWWs  
Lack of availability of technology (in this case a functional mobile phone and SIM card) emerged 
in the interviews as a critical factor influencing AWWs’ use of technology. The literature on health 
cadre general acceptance of technology highlights the importance of the availability of the 
technology as a crucial factor leading up to perceived intention to use and actual use of the 
technology (Blanas et al., 2015). Findings of this chapter suggest that the availability of the 
technology is varied.  
One third of the AWWs (five) faced technical challenges and hence did not use the mobile phone 
at the time of the fieldwork. Two of the AWWs discussed having issues related to their SIM cards; 
one AWW did not receive the phone due to her recent re-appointment in the centre74; and two 
of them had phone related issues (one dropped the phone in the water, and the second one’s 
phone had issues from the start and was now waiting for a new one). Though the network 
coverage, especially the 3G access is also a crucial factor for the BCSP participation, the 
interviewed AWWs did not discuss challenges in connecting to the internet to submit the data 
.  
“… under BCSP program we have to organise the nutrition day via mobile. 
Earlier we use to call the mothers, pregnant women, adolescent girls and used 
to tell them about new topics like on vaccination day, on cleanliness, on 
pregnancy, on mothers and like that we used to explain to them.  But now on 
mobile we do it but my mobile is out of order since the past 2-3 months.” 
 (AWW Interview) 
As discussed above, in selecting the AWWs I did not use any BCSP specific selection criteria to 
select participants to avoid any programme bias eclipsing the perceptions and experience of 
AWWs on the influence of the monetarily incentivised use of mobile phones. This strategy proved 
                                                          
74 She was suspended a few years back for non-compliance of AWC rules. She fought a case and got back 





helpful in understanding one of the main challenges AWWs face in using the mobile phone 
technology—i.e. availability of mobile phones and functional SIM cards. Although the ICDS and 
the BCSP teams emphasised that all AWWs used the mobile phone in the block, this random 
selection of AWWs revealed the availability issues AWWs encountered. The technical challenges 
revealed in this analysis seem to be crucial in realistically understanding the magnitude of change 
the intervention can bring in the working lives of AWWs. The experiences of AWWs not currently 
using the phone suggest that they either did not receive the phone (two cases) or problems 
related to the phone or SIM card emerged while they were using it (three cases). One reason for 
the delays in repairing the SIM cards and phones or making the new phone available is related to 
the use of government procurement systems, as the BCSP used existing government systems 
(application, approval, and procurement) for replacement and repair. This suggests that the 
issues related to the newly introduced technology are identical to other equipment (such as 
weighing machines) and supply (growth charts, medicines, etc.) barriers evidenced in the 
literature as limiting the AWW (Biswas & Verma, 2009; HUNGaMA, 2011; Nayak & Saxena, 2006; 
NIPCCD, 2009a, 2009b; Saxena & Srivastava, 2009). Thus, the lack of availability of technology 
due to unresponsive existing government procurement channels limits the AWW in using the 
mobile phone in her work.  
6.3.3 Usability  
The perceived ease of use concerning the technology is another factor that emerged from the 
perceptions and experiences of AWWs as affecting performance. The perceived ease of use is 
identified as one of the founding elements in the TAM and evidenced in the literature on health 
cadre general acceptance of technology as influential in intention to use the technology (Blanas 
et al., 2015; Mwendwa, 2016). I define perceived ease of use in this analysis as the extent to 
which using the mobile phone technology is perceived as consuming time, energy, and effort 
(Blanas et al., 2015). The interviews suggest that the perceived ease of use of the mobile phone 
varied among participants primarily due to their varied levels of proficiency in using the phone. 
Not surprisingly, the majority of AWWs who perceived that the mobile phone application is easy 
to use tended to use the phone in their work compared to the ones found it difficult.  
The diverse views on perceived ease of use emerged in the interviews are summarised in the 
following quotes.  
“If we learn [how to use the mobile phone application] then it is easy. 






“The change due to [this] mobile is that I can save some time now. The work 
has become easy, and I like working.  Time is saved because there is no 
paperwork. That is why I like it”.  
(AWW Interview) 
As the two quotes depict, the perceived ease of use varied depended on the level of proficiency 
of the AWW. The first quote also suggests that a steep learning curve is associated with the mobile 
phone application. If an AWW can learn or attain a good level of proficiency, then the mobile 
phone can help her. Otherwise, it adds to her existing high workload. Two AWWs with low 
perceived level of proficiency shared this view about using the phone. However, they both were 
happy that the mobile phone did not involve any writing. What influences the level of proficiency 
is a crucial question here. Age, education and prior familiarity in using technology are three 
factors identified as important for acceptance of mobile phone applications as an aid for CHWs 
in an earlier study (Barnett, et al., 2016). However, in this analysis, I could not find evidence that 
the age and education influenced the level of proficiency in using the phone, as AWWs who found 
difficulty in using the phone varied in age and education. The one AWW who was below thirty 
and an AWW with a post-graduate degree found it difficult to use the phone application and used 
it only to comply with the minimum programme responsibilities. AWWs who found difficulties in 
using the phone application also mentioned having received additional training and day-to-day 
support from the BCSP team and the TSO. Out of the ten AWWs with a functional phone, three 
AWWs who found using the mobile phone application difficult took assistance from the TSO. Two 
others possessed basic skills and complied with the minimum programme requirement and the 
remaining five used the phone for programme tied activities (the VHSND reporting and weight 
monitoring) and non-programme tied activities (behavioural change counselling).  
The varied levels of proficiency with the mobile phone application existed due to the difference 
in the ‘period of use’ or the familiarity with the new technology among AWWs. AWWs who 
became familiar with the phone application over time valued its role in their work (discussed in 
the next section). The implementation documents suggest that AWWs in the intervention block 
received mobile phones in batches, and all batches received the phone by January 2015 (i.e. nine 
months before the fieldwork75). However, only a few interviewed AWWs mentioned that they 
received the phone four months to one year before the fieldwork. AWWs who found it difficult 
to use the phone either received the phone a few months ago, or experienced phone and SIM 
related issues, or missed the training session, thus were not familiar with the new technology.  
                                                          





6.3.4 Perceived usefulness  
The perceived usefulness, the degree to which workers believe the mobile phone technology will 
help them do their job, is another key theme that emerged from AWWs’ perceptions and 
experiences as influential in their performance. The majority of AWWs who use the phone found 
it useful in reducing workload (preparing and sending reports), improving communication (peers 
and supervisors), and enticing beneficiaries, thus directly influencing their motivation and overall 
performance.  
Reduced workload  
AWWs felt the mobile phone is useful in reducing their workload due to the ease in preparing 
(less writing) and sending (immediate reporting) reports. Most of the AWWs mentioned that they 
felt an ease in preparing and sending reports using the mobile phone. With the mobile phone 
application, case management of women (and children after delivery) was made possible and it 
reduced the writing AWWs had to do. Even the AWWs who found the phone difficult to use 
appreciated the fact that their writing responsibility reduced due to the phone.  
“Earlier we did not have Baal Samarthan [the BCSP]. Now we have started 
that is why we have got a mobile.  With the mobile, we send names of the 
pregnant women under Baal Samarthan [the BCSP]. Then we ask them to 
register the name when they deliver the child.  With the mobile, we also 
register their names, this way we maintain our register also”.  
(AWW Interview) 
AWWs also felt it was easier to send reports through the phone indicating the immediate 
reporting made possible due to the phone. Most of them mentioned that before using the mobile 
phone, the details (pregnancy records, growth data of children) used to be in their registers and 
never reached upwards. AWWs appreciated the immediate reporting due to faster transmission 
of data from their levels to supervisors.  
“It feels good. Earlier we had to fill the forms and submit, now I have just to 
send a message, and they get the information”.  
(AWW Interview) 
“On immunisation day, I do my reporting that there were this many mothers, 
children, etc. Now because of the negligence of the CDPO, Gram Sevikas 
they took the report and kept it in their drawers.  Now when the CDPO asks 
again, I have to give it again. So once again I get punishment.  Now I can 





directly to you that these many are pregnant women, these many mothers, 
these many malnourished, severely malnourished and these many children, 
and pregnant women were weighed. Now nothing is going wrong. There is no 
punishment also. So, this mobile is very useful thing”.  
(AWW Interview) 
As the above quote illuminates, one AWW considered repeated requests for filling up formats 
due to the supervisor’s negligence as a punishment76. The phone gave her an opportunity to avoid 
these kinds of issues and experience a sense of agency over her reporting activity as she felt 
connected to an external supervisory level above her. The feeling of a sense of autonomy in 
bypassing the supervision weakness seems to positively contribute to AWW motivation.  
Overall, the sense of reduced workload motivated AWWs to use the phone and directly influence 
the quality of services such as pregnancy care and VHSND preparation.  
Improved communication  
All AWWs mentioned that the mobile phone has now made communication between their peers 
and supervisors easier. They felt that, because of the ‘free’ call service between themselves they 
talk to each other more for discussing doubts with regard to administrative procedures. One 
AWW mentioned that they talked about Anganwadi matters, not home matters on the phone.  
“Suppose I do not know something then I can talk to a Sevika in the Panchayat 
and ask her.  I can also talk to the Madam (supervisor), and if Madam is not 
able to come and she is busy in some work, then I can talk to her. So, it is 
useful for communication”.  
(AWW Interview) 
The improved communication between peers and supervisors seem to directly influence the 
overall performance of AWWs.  
Enticed beneficiaries  
Another factor that contributed to the usefulness of the mobile phone and directly influenced 
AWW performance in counselling is the perception that beneficiaries are attracted by the phone. 
A few AWWs expressed this belief and mentioned that beneficiaries had come to ask about the 
phone and see videos on the phone. AWWs felt that the beneficiaries understood the videos 
better than the face-to-face counselling. Although the quotes below support the fact that AWWs 
                                                          





perceive that it is easier to entice beneficiaries using the phone, it could also be due to the 
‘novelty effect’ a new gadget brings in village settings. It could also be that the AWW herself is 
demonstrating her modest pride in possessing a new gadget.  
“Even yesterday 2-4 women asked about mobile. It quite allures them”.  
(AWW Interview) 
“This has impacted a lot. Women from village get so excited just to see in 
mobile. Madam, they like it a lot when we make then understand through 
pictures in the mobile".  
(AWW Interview) 
Interviews with the AWWs suggests that phone is useful as the beneficiaries are enticed by the 
phone. This seems to positively influence AWW motivation and to some extent the quality of 
counselling conducted by them.  
6.3.5 Relevance  
The interviewed AWWs found the mobile phone useful and relevant for carrying out specific tasks 
such as weight monitoring, pregnancy care, and counselling of beneficiaries. However, it pose 
challenges for convincing beneficiaries to attend the VHSND. Although the theme of relevance 
may seem to be identical to usefulness, it specifically means the degree to which the technology 
in question will assist the worker in carrying out particular responsibilities they have been tasked 
as workers (Blanas et al., 2015). Technology that is available, easy to use, and potentially useful 
might not be used be by the worker if it is not related to their work. In the case of the CommCare 
application, it was envisaged to directly improve services AWWs needed to carry out and the 
majority of AWWs felt that the mobile phone application helped them. However, in the case of 
VHSND attendance, AWWs faced unintended adverse effects due to the cash transfer operational 
in the other two blocks.  
Weight monitoring  
AWWs felt that the weight grading of children was easier with the mobile phone because it was 
simpler and quicker. The mobile phone application automatically calculated the grade when the 
AWW entered it on the phone. AWWs felt it eased their efforts; otherwise, they needed to use 
growth charts, which most of them found difficult to use. They also felt the instant grade 
calculation helped them communicate the status of the child to his or her mother. Earlier, AWWs 





later at home. The usefulness and relevance of using the mobile phone to undertake weight 
monitoring was appreciated more by AWWs who were well-versed with the mobile phone and 
application than the ones found it difficult. However, AWWs who faced difficulty in using the 
phone also found the growth chart difficult, and still preferred the phone. 
Although AWWs felt ease in conducting the weight monitoring service, they did not conduct all 
weight monitoring using the phone. The phone was used to register all pregnant women at the 
start of the programme and women who got pregnant afterwards. AWWs only conducted weight 
monitoring of children of these women—which is a small group compared to the existing 
beneficiary cohort. AWWs used mobile phone weight monitoring for children born after the start 
of the programme (roughly from the start of 2015) and continued using paper growth charts for 
children who were born before the programme (i.e. monthly weighing of children who are below 
three years of age and quarterly weighing of children between three and six years of age). This 
was because the mobile phone application could only register women who are pregnant and then 
follow-up their children after birth. Directly adding children was not possible with the application. 
Moreover, the limitations due to lack of quality weighing machines still existed. Thus, mobile 
phone weight monitoring did not seem to have influenced the number of children weighed, 
rather it improved the motivation of the AWW to conduct the weight monitoring service and the 
quality of the service by improving the accuracy and responsiveness of the AWW in AWCs with 
access to weighing machines.  
In that suppose, we want to know the weight. We ask the question and then 
after that press the button, we get to know from the information that appears 
whether the child is malnourished. So, it is easy for us.  Earlier we had to 
weigh, [fill] the chart, plot it on the graph and then calculate.  However, with 
the mobile it has become easy.   
[…...] The growth chart is big. We have to take it out then match it and write 
at the bottom and put a mark. After that, we can tell that the child is coming in 
this particular grade.  On the mobile, we get to know instantly and can then 
inform the mother in which grade the child is falling.  We can tell by seeing 
the mobile”.      
(AWW Interview) 
Pregnancy care and counselling services  
AWWs felt motivated using videos during counselling sessions (individual) and following the pre-





phone to an extent improved the perceived quality of services (case management of pregnant 
women and behavioural change counselling).  
“We have also become aware due to this [the BCSP] …Like, I am a Sevika I 
learned to operate the mobile. I like it very much.  After that on nutrition day 
the number of questions that are there I was not able to ask all questions 
before. Now it has become easy to ask questions on the POSHAN day (the 
VHSND), and I can get the information about children just by asking 
questions. Also, we can automatically get to know the grade of the child”.  
(AWW Interview) 
“The change is that these things were not there before. When they 
[beneficiaries] used to come for immunisation and we used to write in the 
register. Now via the mobile, we have to send. We sit with them. We make 
them listen to what all they have to do, first we play songs for them on the 
mobile.  That is why they understand fast. Earlier they were quiet”.  
(AWW Interview) 
AWWs who used videos in counselling felt the videos communicated effectively with the 
beneficiaries better than words—they were understood better by beneficiaries. They felt the 
beneficiaries showed a keen interest in viewing the videos during counselling sessions. One AWW 
mentioned that while registering pregnant women, the set of questions on the phone helped 
them to stick to all relevant information (such as last menstrual period, birth preparedness, and 
so forth) and it was more effective than before. AWWs who possessed decent levels of proficiency 
reported using the phone in counselling services.  
VHSND attendance  
Although improved VHSND attendance was one aim of the intervention, the interviews with 
AWWs suggest that they face difficulties in convincing beneficiaries to turn up for the VHSND. 
AWWs attribute this to the presence of the cash transfer programme in adjacent blocks as part 
of the wider BCSP. AWWs said beneficiaries in their block took vaccines and attended the VHSND 
in expecting to receive Rs. 250 per month. Beneficiaries complained that in other AWCs (in other 
blocks) pregnant women got money, but in their centres, AWWs were not giving them money. 
These beneficiaries were aware of the presence of the cash transfers in the neighbouring blocks 
and demanded their share. This strained the trust between beneficiaries and AWWs. AWWs 
needed to put in extra efforts to convince them about the absence of the programme in their 





on beneficiary attendance at the VHSND. This spillover effect affects the trust between the AWW 
and beneficiaries and negatively influences the AWW motivation and service uptake. This is in 
line with negative spillover detected in Chapter 5.  
 “So, in their mind, they feel that they are not getting 250 rupees, and Didi 
(Anganwadi Sevika) pocketed it.   They say 'is [the name of the block] second 
(step child)'? Yes, [the block] is. However, I say see, the state of 
health/nutrition is good here. Children, there are weak. There are weak 
children here too, but compared to another block there it is less. [….] If it 
comes from up (government) then the money will go to everyone’s account. 
Why will we keep your money? The day we get 250 rupees that day you will 
get it”.  
(AWW Interview) 
6.3.6 Incentives  
The incentive component is an added element unique to the intervention. Although the monetary 
incentives were hypothesised to directly improve AWW performance by positively influencing the 
access element of the weight monitoring service (performance outcome at the AWW level) and 
motivate AWWs (performance output at the AWW level), it did not improve both.  
AWWs did not demonstrate any explicit motivation or demotivation to receive incentives (Rs. 100 
per month for filling the VHSND service availability form and Rs. 5 per child for weight monitoring). 
They admitted to receiving incentives (mainly the Rs. 100 per month), but they were quite modest 
in opening up about their feeling in receiving the extra money. Although AWWs complained about 
the extra work they were asked to do (discussed in Chapter 4) such as the distribution of health 
insurance cards and election related responsibilities, they did not complain about the BCSP 
responsibilities. In effect, reporting through the phone was an additional responsibility that 
AWWs were not complaining about potentially suggesting that the extra work does not 
demotivate them due to the incentives effect.  
One AWW illuminated the issue further, in providing the example of how they collectively refused 
to fill a format for the health department because it was the ASHA and ANM’s work and they get 
paid for it.  For the BCSP they felt they are getting paid for sending the report and got the mobile 
phone. In the context of monetary incentives, one feature positively influenced AWWs is the ease 
in getting the money. The below quote underlines that— 






One reason AWWs did not demonstrate explicit motivation could be due to the low magnitude 
of incentives they receive. 
Although the majority of AWWs received Rs. 100 per month multiple times in their bank account 
by sending the VHSND service availability form, they did not receive a significant amount of 
money through weighing children. Most of them did not even remember how much they earned 
by weighing children because it was not much. This could be because of three reasons— 
i. The programme beneficiary registration barrier 
ii. The programme emphasis on the VHSND  
iii. The levels of proficiency   
The programme beneficiary registration barrier:  The programme only allowed registering 
pregnant women from the start of the programme and weighing children born after that. This 
meant, during the time of the fieldwork only a few programme children had been born and AWWs 
only weighed a few children. The number was not enough to generate the critical amount of 
money that could make a significant influence on AWW motivation. The payment details (as part 
of the clarifications asked the programme team) suggest that until September 2015, the 
maximum amount an AWW earned in the whole block is Rs. 25 (i.e. weighed five children). Thus, 
AWWs not receiving a sizeable amount of money because they are unable to unlock the full 
potential of the incentive opportunity due to the programme design features could be one of the 
reasons for AWWs not being motivated due to the monetary incentives. AWWs not weighing 
more children due to monetary incentives mean that it has not been able to positively influence 
the access77 element of the weight monitoring service as well.  
“Yes, we get payment, when we send the report about children, and pregnant 
women, and it reaches them then we get 100 rupees every month.  This is 
the policy of Bal Bihar Samarthan (BCSP)”. 
(AWW Interview) 
The programme emphasis on the VHSND: The majority of AWWs emphasised that they use the 
phone on the VHSND. This could be because the programme provides additional monitoring 
support that day and AWWs can earn a significant amount (almost a day’s wage) of money by 
sending the service availability form. However, weighing children just that day is not enough to 
generate a critical amount of money through weight monitoring. For an AWW to earn more 
money from weight monitoring, she needs to weigh children on other days as well to cover all 
                                                          





eligible children. Considering immunisation is the key activity on the VHSND, children eligible for 
weighing but do not have scheduled immunisation might not come for the day. In the interviews, 
the majority of AWWs primarily identified the mobile phone as something they use on the VHSND 
and not necessarily on other days—especially the ones who have basic or average levels of 
proficiency. The emphasis on the VHSND could also be hindering an AWW’s potential to expand 
the incentive opportunity and to an extent explain the lack of motivation towards monetary 
incentives.  
“Poshan (the VHSND) day we have to do it. Immunisation is done once a 
month, and we have to make an entry on our mobiles about pregnant women 
who have given birth.  We are told how to do it and that we will get Rs.5 for 
making one entry per child, and we do Poshan day (the VHSND) once a 
month, and for that, we are told we will get Rs.100”.  
(AWW Interview) 
The levels of proficiency posed a hindrance to AWWs in earning further monetary incentives. 
AWWs with basic levels of proficiency faced a steep learning curve in using the mobile phone. 
They were not able to send reports without assistance, and thus didn’t receive incentives so far 
(i.e. until September 2015). This vicious circle (the steep learning curvesno incentives low 
motivation) meant that incentives were not able to act as a motivating factor for AWWs with 
basic levels of proficiency.  
“They said you do the work; you will get 100 rupees. However, we are not 
able to do all the work that is why we are saying that we have not got the 
money. They say that when you have not done the work how can we give the 
money”.  
(AWW Interview) 
6.4 Discussion and conclusion  
By exploring AWWs’ perceptions and experiences in using the mobile phone and receiving 
monetary incentives, I found that the majority of the AWWs perceived the mobile phone 
technology to be easy to use. They also found it useful in reducing workload related to reporting, 
improving communication between peers and supervisors, and attracting beneficiaries. However, 
barriers to the smooth availability of the phone and SIM card, reduced relevance in specific tasks 
due to programme limitations, and no influence of the monetary incentives on AWW motivation 





phone technology bolstered with monetary incentives intervention has mixed influence on AWW 
performance.  
Table 30 Summary of findings 
Domains How were the phone and incentives 
influenced?  
Why?  
Availability  Varied availability influencing usage of 
phone application  
Due to using existing government procurement  
Usability  Varied ease of use of phone application  Varied levels of proficiency due; partly due to 
differential periods of use  
Usefulness  Found useful in reduced workload, 
improved communication and attracted 
beneficiaries  
Reduced workload due to ease of preparing and 
sending reports 
Improved communication with peers and 
supervisors 
Videos in the phone attract beneficiaries  
Relevance  Relevant in weight monitoring, pregnancy 
care, and counselling but limited by 
programme barriers 
Unexpected negative influence on VHSND 
attendance  
The BCSP registration barriers in including all 
young children and pregnant women 
VHSND attendance negatively influenced by 
AWW’s identity linked to the cash transfer  
Incentives  No motivation or demotivation for AWWs  The low magnitude of incentives and the BCSP 
programme registration barriers  
 
Table 30  provides a summary of findings. The findings of this chapter emphasise that the 
availability of the technology leads to usability (perceived ease of use). AWWs who found the 
application easy to use identified its usefulness quickly. If the technology is available, easy to use, 
useful, and relevant to task performance, an AWW seems to use it in her day-to-day work. 
Although interviewed AWWs found the application useful, issues in availability and varied 
usability limited the magnitude of usefulness reported by AWWs. Programme registration 
barriers and beneficiaries identifying the AWW with the cash transfer adversely influenced the 
relevance of the technology in specific services. The incentive component was designed to 
motivate the technology acceptance of an underpaid worker like the AWW. However, due to the 
low magnitude of incentives and programme registration barriers, the intervention missed a 
crucial opportunity to motivate an underpaid worker to take up the technology and earn more 





The studies that examined m-Health and m-Nutrition interventions used by CHWs report 
technological challenges. The majority of technological issues are related to disruptions in the 
mobile network, unavailability of power for charging, small size of the screen, and local language 
incompatibility of the mobile software (Barnett & Gallegos, 2013; Barnett, et al., 2016; Berg et 
al., 2009; Blaschke et al., 2009; Braun et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2013). Surprisingly, none of these 
issues emerged in my qualitative research context. This could be because the intervention was 
designed based on the existing evidence available in the m-Health and m-Nutrition fields. 
However, using the existing government procurement systems for hardware (Phone and SIM 
card) replacement created barriers in availability. This reason for the delay did not emerge in 
other contexts as the majority of studies were pilots and may not have used government channels 
of procurement.  
Other studies also report the varying levels of proficiency of CHWs in using the mobile technology 
(Barnett & Gallegos, 2013; Barnett, et al., 2016; Berg et al., 2009; Blaschke et al., 2009; Braun et 
al., 2013; Smith et al., 2013). However, the majority of them attribute it to the age and education 
of the CHWs and the inadequate training they received. The findings of this chapter suggest a 
differential period of use as the reason for varying levels of proficiency. The later beginners were 
still coping with the learning curve associated with mobile technology interventions, a finding 
which is also in line with other studies.  
The findings on usefulness of the mobile phone technology in reducing the workload related to 
reporting, improving communication with peers and supervisors, and attracting beneficiaries 
using videos; are in line with existing empirical evidence (Alam et al., 2010; Barnett, et al., 2016; 
Blanas et al., 2015; Bogan et al., 2009; Mwendwa, 2016; Ramachandran et al., 2010; Rotheram-
Borus et al., 2012). Although Blanas et al. (2015) underscored the importance of task relevance 
of mobile phone technology as a key factor in the take up of the technology, these chapter 
findings explain how the programme limitations and contextual factors limit the task relevance of 
the intervention. The finding related to the incentives component of the intervention is unique 
to this research context as no other studies have examined the combined influence of mobile 
phone technology and monetary incentives.  
As described in Chapter 5, I found no positive impact of the intervention at the household level. 
The quantitative analysis in Chapter 5 suggested the weak intensity of the treatment and negative 
spillover effect of the cash transfer intervention due to the proximity of the cash transfer blocks 
as the possible reasons for the lack of positive impact of the technology augmented intervention 
on the household level uptake of services. As shown in the quantitative analysis, AWWs in the T3 





T1 and T2 blocks. The qualitative findings presented in this chapter confirm these reasons and 
explain why the service uptake at the household level did not improve as expected. This chapter 
findings suggest that a minority of AWWs have difficulty in using the phone due to a shorter 
period of use (individual and institutional barrier). One third of AWWs discussed issues in the 
availability of phone and SIM cards related to the existing system related bottlenecks (institutional 
barriers) and overall did not show visible motivation in receiving monetary incentives; a factor 
likely due to the size of the incentives. More importantly, the interviewed AWWs reported that 
due to the cash transfer being active in two adjacent blocks, beneficiaries demanded cash from 
AWWs. For the beneficiaries in the T3 block, AWWs in the adjacent cash transfer blocks and their 
block must have seemed similar as they all used mobile phones and identified themselves as part 
of the BCSP. The only difference beneficiaries could point out must have been the absence of 
cash for themselves in attending the ICDS services in the T3 block. Considering corruption is a 
commonly identified phenomenon in the service delivery landscape of Bihar and social welfare 
programmes, beneficiaries suspected that they did not receive the cash because the AWWs 
embezzled it. This may explain the negative spillovers detected in Chapter 5. 
By combining the findings of the quantitative and qualitative research, this chapter also 
demonstrates a comprehensive view on the influence of the mobile phone technology and 
monetary incentives intervention at the AWW and household levels. The findings of this 
qualitative chapter help to understand the findings of the earlier quantitative chapter. The 
quantitative method could only measure the average effect of the intervention; it could not 
formally test different hypothesis why this average effect was insignificant. The qualitative 
findings clearly demonstrate how the existing programmatic and contextual barriers have 
moderated the effect of the intervention in achieving its expected impact in a way that 
quantitative findings alone could not explain.  Although these chapters can seem separated by 
methods, the integration of findings of these two chapters enhances the mixed methods 
approach used in this thesis.  
Considering the introduction of the mobile phone technology with monetary incentives bundle is 
new for the AWW context and CHW contexts in general, the reasons for its mixed influence stem 
from existing structural and contextual barriers. The findings of this chapter also suggest that 
technology-related innovations in improving CHW performance cannot solve all fundamental 
existing barriers. The technology’s availability, ease of use, utility, and relevance can improve 
specific task related performance, but its potential is limited if the existing system related 





One of the main factors that limits my research is the short intervention exposure and the on-
going feature of the programme. As revealed in the interviews, AWWs face a steep learning curve 
in using the mobile phone in early stages. Thus, understanding the influence of the intervention 
can be underestimated in my research because AWWs have not used the mobile phone long 
enough and unlocked the extended opportunities the phone has to offer. Furthermore, few 
children had been born by the time of the fieldwork limiting the potential to receive incentives.  
In the next chapter, I discuss the overall findings from my qualitative and quantitative research 






Chapter Seven: Discussion and conclusion  
7.1 Introduction  
This thesis seeks to contribute towards deepening the understanding of factors that influence 
AWW performance, especially after a technology augmented intervention has been 
implemented. In this chapter, I aim to bring together the findings from earlier chapters to 
demonstrate how the overall findings make significant contributions towards the conceptual and 
empirical knowledge base on the performance of workers like AWWs (section 7.2). I also discuss 
the implications of the findings for policy and practice at the state, national, and global contexts 
(section 7.3). I present a reflective discussion on the overall doctoral study limitations in section 
7.4. Finally, I conclude the thesis with a concluding discussion in section 7.5.  
7.2 Summary and discussions of the findings: what this thesis reveals about 
performance of workers such as AWWs  
Whilst each chapter of this thesis has a specific focus to allow in-depth analysis, a synthesis of 
findings from all chapters helps present a bigger and more complete picture of AWW 
performance in the context of Bihar. I recap the findings and contributions of each chapter 
individually, and then identify the contributions and themes that emerge across chapters.  
At the start of this thesis, there was no study available to provide a comprehensive view on the 
performance of AWWs both conceptually and empirically. Chapter 2 makes two key 
contributions. First, it analytically integrates conceptual and empirical studies that looked at 
performance of AWWs, and of facility and community-based health workers across the world, 
consulting sources across the disciplines of public health, organisational management, and 
economics. Secondly, it presents a first-ever comprehensive conceptual framework on AWW 
performance, which I then used to guide the primary qualitative research. It suggests a clear 
definition of AWW performance and establishes a rationale for defining performance at the AWW 
level rather than service utilisation which is kept as a level above AWW’s performance. I have 
revisited the conceptual framework and presented the revised version in Figure 15.  
Chapter 4 examines and finds evidence that individual factors including the initial financial motive 
and family support; programmatic factors including beneficiaries’ and AWWs’ service preference 
and work environment; community factors including caste relationships of AWWs and the 
community and seasonal migration; and organisational factors including individualised and 






First, the chapter contributes four new factors—family support, perceived service preference of 
beneficiaries and AWWs, seasonal migration, and corruption practices—towards the existing 
empirical knowledge on factors that influence performance of workers such as the AWWs. 
Although the financial motive of the AWW and community caste dynamics are factors identified 
by the existing literature, Chapter 4 demonstrates the nuanced ways in which these factors 
implicitly and explicitly influence AWW performance. I have represented the conceptual 
framework on AWW performance in Figure 15with the new factors identified in this thesis.  
Second, by highlighting the mechanisms by which factors influence AWW performance, the 
Chapter 4 findings recognise the nuanced link between the community’s expectations and AWW 
performance. The beneficiary’s preference for product-oriented services helps prioritise the 
delivery of product-oriented services over information-oriented services. The caste dynamics at 
the community level and migratory patterns of low income households coupled with resource 
targeting impede AWW performance as the AWW could never satisfy all caste groups with the 
limited resources available. These findings underscore the ways in which community expectations 
influence performance of AWWs even at her level (i.e. making services accessible with adequate 
quality) and seek to challenge the dominant view in the public health literature that worker 
performance is primarily dependent on her skills and knowledge.  
Thirdly, the chapter finds evidence that the AWW’s initial financial motive (for an income) and 
the community’s expectations (for product-oriented services) act as key drivers of performance 
(at least ensuring the bare minimum levels of service delivery) even when her motivation is low. 
This finding contributes to the knowledge of the relationship between motivation and 
performance by demonstrating a different perspective - that a demotivated community level 
worker continues in her job due to her income needs and prioritises satisfying the community’s 













Chapter 5 examines the influence of a unique technology augmented intervention combined with 
a monetary incentive component for AWWs on service uptake at the household level. In the 
emerging fields of m-Health and m-Nutrition, this analysis adds much needed empirical evidence 
for two reasons. Firstly, it examines a unique intervention which combines mobile phone 
technology and monetary incentives for an underpaid worker—one of the first experiments of its 
kind. Secondly, it estimates the impact of the intervention at the household level, unlike the 
majority of studies that evaluated the impact of worker level mobile technology interventions 
only at the worker level.  
The analysis found no significant positive impact of the intervention on the utilisation of services 
by households. I examined the weighing of children and women and attendance of children and 
women at VHSNDs. However, the same intervention coupled with cash transfer for beneficiaries 
led to improvements in the utilisation of services by the households. Therefore the technology 
augmented intervention that only focused on improving the AWW’s skills, knowledge, effort and 
motivation did not materialise improvements at the household level but achieved positive impact 
when coupled with a beneficiary level intervention which satisfied their tangible product 
expectations (also found in Chapter 4). The findings of Chapter 5 contribute to empirical 
knowledge by providing an objective assessment of the extent to which a technology augmented 
intervention can achieve improvements at the household level services uptake without a 
beneficiary level incentive.  
Chapter 6 makes an empirical contribution towards identifying the ways in which technology 
augmented interventions influence AWW performance. It also highlights how structural and 
contextual factors limit a technology augmented intervention’s full potential. The chapter found 
that the majority of the interviewed AWWs perceived the mobile phone technology easy to use 
and found it useful in reducing their workload related to reporting and attracting beneficiaries. 
However, barriers to the smooth availability of the phone and SIM card reduced its relevance in 
specific tasks, and the low magnitude of incentives limit the influence of the intervention on AWW 
motivation and performance. The findings of Chapter 6 emphasise that even when AWWs are 
supportive of the introduction of a new technology, the existing system bottlenecks adversely 
affect intervention impact.  
Some contributions and cross-cutting themes also emerge from the findings across chapters.  
First, the findings of the three chapters converge to offer a coherent narrative on AWW 
performance and the role of technology-augmented interventions. Using the conceptual 





intervention may have expected it to have an impact, even though it wasn’t the primary 
intervention, as it provided a job aid and incentives which were identified as key drivers of 
performance. Although the integrated findings of Chapters 5 and 6 suggest that the 
programmatic and fundamental contextual barriers limited the intervention, one of the new 
factors identified to add to the framework – beneficiary and worker preferences – could provide 
an enhanced explanation of why the intervention has not worked. Moreover, the other three new 
factors identified in Chapter 4 strongly mediate AWW performance as well.  
The thesis findings showed that beneficiaries prefer product oriented services over information 
oriented services, and AWWs demonstrate more of a preference to pre-school focused services. 
The intervention only sought to enhance the delivery of information oriented services related to 
nutrition (weighing and counselling). This is not a priority for either the beneficiary of the AWW, 
and helps explain why the intervention was not successful. The intervention was successful when 
a cash transfer for beneficiaries was overlayered onto it as this meant that a product was bundled 
with the information. This is perhaps the key contribution of the thesis, that one key “new” factor 
is the primary determinant of the failure of an intervention that would, under existing 
frameworks, have been expected to be successful.  
Second, among thematic findings, Chapters 2 and 4 highlight conceptual lessons to understand 
AWW performance. Although the framework envisaged the interconnectedness of individual, 
programmatic, community, and organisational factors, the findings of Chapter 4 further emphasis 
the dynamic interconnectedness of factors and sub-factors. Moreover, these findings do not fully 
support the linear relationship of outputs (especially motivation, job satisfaction, and self-
esteem) to performance outcomes (access and quality). Some factors directly affect outputs but 
not outcomes (e.g. initial financial motive, high workload, and low honorarium); others affect 
outcomes not outputs (e.g. family support, helper, and seasonal migration).  
Third, the findings from Chapter 5 and 6 also contribute to a comprehensive understanding of 
the concept of AWW performance by laying emphasis on examining performance from different 
levels of service delivery (i.e. both the AWW level and the beneficiary level). Beneficiary level 
analysis enabled understanding of the impact of the intervention; analysis at the AWW level 
enabled understanding of how and why the intervention did not translate into household level 
impacts. Both were required for a holistic understanding.  
Fourth, the combined findings of Chapters 5 and 6 also raise a crucial point towards 
understanding how existing local perceptions such as corruption influence the implementation 





without cash in fact reinforced the existing local perceptions of corruption among AWWs. This 
unintended effect is an important lesson from my research beneficial in designing and 
implementing interventions in a real-world setting.  
Fifth, Chapters 2 and 6 demonstrate how using a specialised analytical framework provides 
granular analysis of an intervention’s influence on AWW performance. To obtain a granular view 
of the influence of specific factors (in this case the combined influence of two programmatic 
factors- job aids and monetary incentives), I used an intervention specific analytic framework —
an adapted version of widely used TAM. The analytical framework supplemented the broader 
conceptual framework on AWW performance. In fact, combining the analytical guidance from 
both enabled me to understand performance comprehensively by demonstrating the dynamics 
of existing structural contextual factors and the barriers they pose to AWW performance. It 
contributes to the understanding that interventions do not impact performance in isolation, they 
are mediated by several factors, and hence, the comprehensive understanding is crucial.  
Finally, in understanding the influence of a technology augmented intervention, I found the use 
of combining quantitative and qualitative research methods necessary. Although I presented 
quantitative and qualitative findings separately, I used the qualitative research findings of Chapter 
6 to explain the quantitative research findings in Chapter 5. The integration of findings from these 
two chapters provided a comprehensive explanation of the intervention’s influence on the 
utilisation of services at the household level. The quantitative method could only measure the 
average effect of the intervention; it could not formally test why this average effect was 
insignificant. Using qualitative methods to understand the influence of the intervention at the 
AWW level provided valuable perceptions of AWWs which clearly explain the opportunities and 
challenges of a technology augmented intervention and how it could not improve service uptake 
at the household level.   
7.3 Implications for policy and practice  
As I stated at the start of this thesis, understanding how AWWs negotiate existing limitations 
within their low resource settings and emerging opportunities offered by technology remained 
as my personal and academic motivation. By pursuing this motivation, I intend to draw 
implications from the thesis findings to contribute towards intensifying supporting AWWs’ battle 
against child undernutrition especially in a context like Bihar. The overall findings of this thesis 
suggest the following implications for policy and practice at the state and national contexts:  
To enable the AWWs to fight against child undernutrition, firstly, the state and national 





resource limitation and inadequate monetary incentives seem to be a recurring theme in studies 
that examined performance of workers like the AWWs. Every single study that explored the ICDS 
identified limited resources and inadequate monetary incentives for AWWs as hindering factors 
of the implementation of the programme. This thesis also confirms that work environment factors 
such as workload, incentives, supervision, and resources limit an AWW’s motivation and 
performance. Although they continue to work due to income needs, in order to maximise their 
effort and performance, it would be crucial to address the root of their demotivation which is 
their income needs. As with the majority of studies on the ICDS, this thesis also confirms the 
severe resource gaps which exist for the AWWs and the service more generally. More 
importantly, the thesis clearly demonstrates how this gap hampers the relationship of the AWW 
and the community when the AWW does not have the resources to provide services to everyone. 
This relationship is shaped by caste dynamics, seasonal migration, and perceptions of corruption. 
In the context of Bihar, the resource gap and targeting of beneficiaries further complicates the 
AWW and community relationship leading to incidents of physical violence and closure of 
services.  Hence, addressing the financial motives of the AWWs and providing them adequate 
programmatic means to deliver their work not only remain crucial in their performance but in 
ensuring basic provision of health and nutrition services at the village level.  
Secondly, other than highlighting the income needs of an AWW, this thesis also contributes 
towards understanding the identity clash AWWs continue to feel against the programme 
expectations of them. They do not perceive themselves as honorary workers and continue to 
raise their demands for a minimum wage for their job. They also self-identify as preschool 
teachers more than as nutrition workers. Although a few studies on the ICDS mentioned the 
identity clashes AWWs feel, the majority of the studies only marked the lack of monetary 
incentives and role clarity without exploring the identity clashes behind it. Addressing the identity 
of the AWW by aligning the workers’ and programme expectation is surely needed to achieve 
programme goals.   
Thirdly, the findings of this thesis suggest that even for the AWW to make the range of health and 
nutrition service accessible with adequate quality, beneficiary preferences matter. To intensify 
the efforts to reduce child undernutrition, either the service basket needs to take the beneficiary 
preference for the product-oriented services into account or enable AWWs by providing them 
local levers to satisfy the product need of the beneficiary.  
Finally, the technology intervention studied in this thesis suggests that a technology intervention 
alone could not improve service delivery at the AWW level or at the household level because it 





services. The incentive component of the technology augmented intervention missed the 
opportunity to satisfy the income needs of the AWWs. However, technology seems to be useful 
when combined with the widely tested model of cash transfers for beneficiaries. Hence, in 
reducing child undernutrition, technology interventions coupled with interventions to engage 
beneficiaries would be more beneficial than just an intervention at the AWW level to improve her 
performance.  
Other than the above mentioned broader policy implications, the findings of this thesis suggest a 
few Bihar specific policy and practice implications.  
The ICDS services, especially food distribution, are universal across the rest of India. Bihar remains 
as the only state that practices targeting of beneficiaries (Kosec et al., 2015). The findings from 
this thesis suggests that the targeting not only hampers the AWW’s service specific performance, 
but it also hampers her community relationships. The relationships shaped by caste, seasonality 
induced migratory patterns, and the perception of beneficiary preference towards products put 
strain on the AWW.  Although the food distribution poses a multitude of challenges, the 
perception of beneficiary preference for products suggest that the AWWs will continue to need 
tangible products (food or non-food) to sustain beneficiary interest.  
The research findings suggest that the seasonal migratory patterns of low-income families to brick 
kilns and elsewhere hampers AWW performance. This happens due to the strict targeting of 
resources at the AWC level.  However, this finding also implies that the low-income families -  
especially those belonging to lower caste groups - seem to miss out the health and nutrition 
services while they migrate out. The interviews with the AWWs also suggest that these groups 
often need the services the most. Due to their migration, they stop receiving services from their 
villages and the strict catchment area demarcations prohibits them from accessing services from 
AWCs near the brick kilns. Considering these households continue to experience poor standard 
of living and limited access to health systems, the state government needs to invest in 
concentrated efforts towards improving their lives. To better link them to AWC services, these 
families can be catered to using a mobile AWC services or make provisions for them to register in 





7.4 Limitations of my thesis  
As discussed in each analytical chapter, several factors limit this thesis. Taking a reflective view 
on the research inquiry I conducted to answer my research questions, I find two types of 
limitations in this thesis—conceptual and methodological.   
This thesis is one of the first comprehensive studies of factors that influence the performance of 
AWWs from their perspective. The novelty also meant that I needed to derive a definition of 
performance and a framework to study the concept from a conceptually underdeveloped 
literature space. During my research unravelling the factors influencing AWW performance, I 
found that the concept or the word performance seems to be a judgemental concepti.e. it is a 
concept that is used to evaluate individuals, organisations, societies, or nations. The 
measurement of the concept of performance meant drawing a line within the broad spectrum of 
performance and using it to categorise ‘good’ and ‘bad’ performance. However, in the context of 
AWWs, I found there was no study exploring the concept of performance—i.e. no study even 
discussed the characteristics of the spectrum of performance. In addition, no studies 
comprehensively looked at the factors influencing performance or captured the perspectives and 
viewpoints of AWWs on factors influencing their performance. Keeping these gaps in mind, I 
chose to focus on factors influencing performance and not on the levels of performance. I needed 
to take this approach because, first, I wanted to contribute empirical evidence towards 
understanding factors influencing performance, before drawing the threshold of performance.  
It is envisaged in the conceptual framework on AWW performance that some factors such as 
incentives influence performance by changing the levels of effort. In this thesis, I do not measure 
efforts of AWWs towards achieving a level of performance. Considering AWWs deliver a multiple 
services basket, measuring the levels of effort means conducting detailed time use studies based 
on direct observations. Due to this limitation I cannot fully assess the transmission mechanisms 
between factors and performance. I consider it as the next step for future research on 
performance of workers such as the AWWs.  
In earlier chapters, I have discussed the possibility of interviewer bias in conducting the qualitative 
research. During fieldwork, I took steps to mitigate this bias by making sure I heard interviews 
conducted by the female research assistant and de-briefed as a team to discuss ways to improve 
the quality of interviews. Another limitation of the qualitative research could be the small sample 
of interviews. As discussed earlier, presenting generalizable findings was never the aim of my 
qualitative research. However, by making sure I talked to AWWs from various caste and education 





migration, and corruption reassures that even from a small sample my thesis has been able to 
capture varied views and perspectives on performance.  
The limitations of my quantitative analysis—the lack of availability of a RCT design, the live status 
of the intervention, and the lack of AWW level data to measure the impact of the intervention at 
the worker level were described in detail in Chapter 5. Here, the strategy to overcome such 
limitations incorporated several elements. First, although not an RCT, using the quasi-
experimental data I employed a valid and robust empirical strategy to improve my analysis 
although the parallel path assumption remains. Moreover, the analysis offers valuable and much 
needed empirical evidence on the impact of a unique intervention. Second, using the midline data 
meant estimating the impact even when the programme was still active in the block. Considering 
the fact that the evaluation that provided the data did not collect data from the comparison block 
(C) in the endline, my decision to go ahead with the analysis using the midline data was the best 
possible decision to seize a valuable analytical opportunity. Finally, the small size of the AWW 
data and the unavailability of detailed AWW level data on effort closed the opportunity to 
estimate the impact of the intervention at her level. I overcame this by supplementing the 
quantitative analysis with qualitative research that explored the influence of the intervention on 
AWW performance. Moreover, the qualitative research helped to explain the reasons for null 
effect of the intervention at the household level.  
7.5 Concluding discussion  
This thesis found multiple, interrelated factors that affect AWW performance at the individual, 
programmatic, community and organisational levels. These are: individual factors including initial 
financial motive and family support; programmatic factors including beneficiaries’ and AWWs’ 
service preference and work environment; community factors including caste relationship of 
AWWs and community and seasonal migration; and organisational factors including 
individualised and institutional corruption practices. The findings confirm existing conceptual and 
empirical frameworks for CHW performance that show a range of factors at individual, 
programmatic, community and organisational levels impact on AWW performance. It reinforced 
that these factors are dynamically interconnected and act in a non-linear way, with some 
impacting on outputs not outcomes, and others on outcomes but not outputs. The thesis 
identified four new factors to add to existing framework: family support, beneficiary and AWW 
service preferences, seasonal migration, and corruption.  
The technology augmented intervention examined in this thesis– a mobile phone based job aid 





existing frameworks for CHW performance. However, no positive impact on household level 
service delivery outcomes was detected (chapter 5). The qualitative findings of Chapter 6 suggest 
that at the AWW level, AWWs perceived the mobile phone technology useful for their work and 
easy to use but they faced damage to the phone and SIM card and did not fully unlock the 
potential of monetary incentives. The integrated findings of Chapters 5 and 6 confirm that the 
programmatic and fundamental contextual barriers have limited the intervention in reaching its 
impact. However, one of the new factors identified in this thesis (Chapter 4) – beneficiary and 
AWW service preferences – offers an enhanced perspective on this issue. The intervention sought 
to strengthen information-oriented nutrition services (weighing and counselling) but this was not 
a preference for either the beneficiaries (who prefer product-oriented services) or AWWs (who 
prefer education related services due to their self-identification as pre-school teachers) and as 
such did not lead to impact.  
This has implications for the understanding of the motivation and performance of AWWs and 
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Annex A: Geographical maps of Bihar and Gaya  






Annex B: Brief history of donor assistance to ICDS in Bihar78 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the ICDS programme was launched in 1975 in 33 administrative 
blocks. Out of these, only 2 blocks (i.e. 277 AWCs) belonged to Bihar (SWD, 2015a).  In 1993, the 
undivided Bihar received financial assistance from the World Bank to expand the ICDS programme 
(knows as ICDS II Project) to 589 blocks across 56 districts (SWD, 2015a). In the bifurcation of 
undivided Bihar, the state of Bihar lost a major share of its AWCs to the state of Jharkhand. In 
2000, only 35 million out of the 85 million population (approx. 42%) was served by the ICDS. Later 
in 200102, Bihar received further sanctions for AWCs and financial assistance from the World 
Bank and expanded the ICDS programme coverage. In addition to funding AWCs, the World Bank 
assisted ICDSIII project also focused on improving the quality of services by improving 
infrastructure of the training centres, capacity of trainers, and improving the overall training 
quality. After four decades of the ICDS programme, Bihar now has 91,677 sanctioned AWCs 
serving 4.5 million children, 1 million women, and 0.75 million adolescent girls in 38 districts 
(SWD, 2015a). Over the years, the government of Bihar undertook initiatives to improve the ICDS 
implementation with assistance from its development partners. In addition to the World Bank 
support, the government of Bihar also receives support from development partners and non-
governmental organisations such as CARE, BBC Media Action, the BMGF, the DFID, Save the 
Children, UNICEF and USAID (Alive and Thrive, 2014). A few initiatives the government of Bihar 
undertook with the help of these organizations to improve the ICDS implementation are: 
Table 31 Donor led initiatives in improving the ICDS implementation in Bihar (Source: (SWD, 2015a)) 




ICDS focused initiatives  Timeline Donors involved 
Ananya  Eight 
districts  
Multimedia communication for AWWs 
to improve frontline worker 
coordination and monitoring. It also 
implemented a trial to understand the 
impact of non-financial incentives for 
AWWs to improve health and 
nutrition behaviour at the household 
level  





All districts A campaign to bring long term 
changes in the ICDS by prioritising 
evidence based nutrition 
interventions. E.g. introduction of egg 
in the food menu, provision of new 
weighing scales, focus on hand 
washing, introduction of multi-media 
communication, two days of training 
for all AWWs 
2013-14 Partial support from 
DFID's Bihar state 
programme SWASTH 
and the World 
Bank's ISSNIP funds 
                                                          












A maternal and child conditional cash 
transfer programme for ICDS 
beneficiaries. AWWs received mobile 
phone technology and monetary 
incentives as well.  









A system strengthening programme 
to revamp the ICDS. E.g. 
strengthening of monitoring systems, 
supervision, and outreach activities by 
AWWs.  






A central government initiated 
conditional cash transfer for ICDS 
beneficiaries. AWWs involved in the 
implementation  







Mobile phone based technology to 
improve the top-down and bottom-up 
communication between different 
ICDS functionaries and beneficiaries  
2013-present  DFID  




One AWC in one Panchayat 
designated as the Nodal AWC with 
renewed building and other facilities. 
An additional worker Uddeepika is 
also recruited at the nodal AWC to 
provide additional supervisory 
support to AWWs 







Annex C: The BCSP evaluation sampling procedures and data quality checks79  
The evaluation strategy of the BCSP finalized a sample size of 6000 households (1500 per block) 
per survey round. The sample size was estimated to provide a Minimum Detectable Effect (MDE) 
of 5 percentage points or more for the key impact indicators. The MDE was calculated using the 
design effects reported in the NFHS-3. Table 32 shows the BCSP evaluation sample size 
considerations (OPM, 2014, 2016) 
The AWC was the PSU for the survey. A list of functional AWCs from all four blocks were compiled 
at the baseline stage. From each block, 55 AWCs were randomly sampled. Within each AWC 
catchment are, a detailed household listing was carried out to identify households with at least 
one child below two years of age. From the eligible number of households per PSU, a random 
sample of 30 households were aimed to be surveyed.  
If a household had multiple mothers with target children, then a mother was selected at random. 
All children of this selected mother who were below two years of age were included in the sample.  
Table 32 Minimum Detectable Effects for various sampling scenarios at the baseline stage (OPM, 2016) 
Sample Size with a pure control block 6400 6400 6000 
% children Height for Age <-2SD  4.8% 4% 5% 
% children Weight-for-Age <-2SD 4.6% 3.8% 4.8% 
BMI % Women 15-49 <18.5 4.6% 3.8% 4.8% 
 
During the fieldwork, the BCSP evaluation surveys ensured the highest quality data possible by 
adhering to the following procedures:  
• A survey team consisted of four female enumerators to conduct the household level 
interviews. Each enumerator completed a maximum of 3-4 interviews per day. One 
female and male health investigator per team carried out the anthropometric 
measurements of women and children. One supervisor oversaw the monitoring of the 
team and worked as the first point of quality assurance by cross checking the data 
collected by the enumerators. The supervisor also completed the AWW and PSU 
interviews.  
                                                          





• Field team supervisors were closely monitored by the Survey Manger through Field Work 
Coordinators. The two Field Work Coordinators were responsible for the daily logistics 
and support to field team supervisors.  
• Daily team meetings were held to discuss the day’s experiences and to resolve any 
problems encountered. The team supervisors sent daily reports of completion of 
interviews to the Survey Manager.  
• Daily a Data Manager compiled and transferred the data to the data processing team to 
check for inconsistent and unlikely data points.  
• 10% of interviews were spot checked by the Field Coordinators and Survey Manager. The 
enumerators and supervisors were expected to be available to answer any queries 
related to data collected.  
• OPM staff members oversaw the overall data collection process and gave regular 
feedback to ensure data quality, and support to weaker enumerators.  
• The household listing used tablets and the main survey used the Computer Assisted 
Personal Interviewing (CAPI) method using laptops.  The CAPI software was built with 
strict checks to prevent errors such as outlier values, inconsistencies between different 
questions, etc.  After several rounds of pilots, the software was finalised, and the 
enumerators were meticulously trained to use it.  The Data Manager was present at the 
survey sites to trouble shoot any issues related to the CAPI software.  
Initial data checks were carried out during the data collection phase itself. Whilst the Data 
Manager compiled and uploaded data every day to the New Delhi HQ, OPM staff members carried 
out further cleaning using statistical software such as STATA. They sent daily error reports to the 
Data Manager and supervisor highlighting the nature of the error and details of the enumerators 
responsible. This further enabled the supervisors to provide personalised support to enumerators 
to avoid such errors.  
